Relating Derrida to the Analytic Tradition: A First Step

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharif Abouleish
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Tradition

scholarly journals Frege and Wittgenstein: The Limits of the Analytic Style

Elements ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Sheridan
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Scientific Language ◽  
German Mathematician ◽  
Broad Application ◽  
Analytic Tradition

The analytic tradition in philosophy stems from the work of German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege. Bertrand Russell brough Frege's program to render language-particularly scientific language-in formal logical terms to the forefront of philosophy in the early twentieth century. The quest to clarify language and parse out genuine philosophical problems remains a cornerstone of analytic philosophy, but investigative programs involving the broad application of formal symbolic logic to language have largely been abandoned due to the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. This article identifies the key philosophical moves that must be performed successfully in order for Frege's "conceptual notation" and other similar systems to adequately capture syntax and semantics. These moves ultimately fail as a result of the nature of linguistic meaning. The shift away from formal logical analysis of language and the emergence of the current analytic style becomes clearer when this failure is examined critically.

Drafted into a Foreign War?

Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-217
Author(s):  
Matthew Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
The Self ◽  
Spiritual Practices ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Technologies Of The Self ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
Modern Conception ◽  
The Past ◽  
Rational Inquiry

Abstract This paper examines the central criticisms that come, broadly, from the modern, ‘analytic’ tradition, of Pierre Hadot’s idea of ancient philosophy as a way of life.: Firstly, ancient philosophy just did not or could not have involved anything like the ‘spiritual practices’ or ‘technologies of the self’, aiming at curing subjects’ unnecessary desires or bettering their lives, contra Hadot and Foucault et al. Secondly, any such metaphilosophical account of putative ‘philosophy’ must unacceptably downplay the role of ‘serious philosophical reasoning’ or ‘rigorous argument’ in philosophy. Thirdly, claims that ancient philosophy aimed at securing wisdom by a variety of means including but not restricted to rational inquiry are accordingly false also as historical claims about the ancient philosophers. Fourthly, to the extent that we must (despite (3)) admit that some ancient thinkers did engage in or recommend extra-cognitive forms of transformative practice, these thinkers were not true or ‘mainline’ philosophers. I contend that the historical claims (3) and (4) are highly contestable, risking erroneously projecting a later modern conception of philosophy back onto the past. Of the theoretical or metaphilosophical claims (1) and (2), I argue that the second claim, as framed here, points to real, hard questions that surround the conception(s) of philosophy as a way of life.

scholarly journals Philosophy and Ideology

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amia Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Ideology Critique ◽  
Recent Contribution ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
Analytic Philosopher

What is it for an analytic philosopher to do ideology critique? How should analytic philosophers engage with the great critics of ideology outside the analytic tradition? Just how useful are our proprietary tools as analytic philosophers when it comes to thinking about ideology, and in what sense ‘useful’, and to whom? And to what end might we pursue ideology critique? Here I attempt to say something about these questions by commenting specifically on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works.

Creation and the Transcategorial Phenomenal

2020 ◽  
pp. 17-39
Author(s):  
David Cheetham
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Account ◽  
Phenomenological Tradition ◽  
The Real ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
The Given ◽  
Formal Category ◽  
Religious Differences

This chapter considers the concept of ineffability. Has this concept been monopolized by pluralists who use it to provide an object that is sufficiently mystical and unfathomable to accommodate religious differences? Does the ineffable do any work in their systems other than provide a formal category of ultimacy? The chapter seeks to investigate this by evaluating the use of ineffability, or the transcategorial, by advocates of the pluralist view of religions. In the second part, the chapter seeks to bring the analytic tradition into dialogue with the phenomenological tradition and particularly with the work of Jean-Luc Marion. Marion highlights the given-ness or excess of experiences that do not rely on metaphysical grounds. The chapter suggests an alternative account of ‘the Real’ as an experience of excess (the ‘transcategorial phenomenal’) that takes place in the midst of the event of interreligious encounter. ‘The Real’ from the ground-up.

Knowledge

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Stoltz
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
David Armstrong

This chapter carries out a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s definitions of the term pramāṇa. After elucidating his definitions and subsequent Indian interpretations of them, it is argued that we can characterize the standard post-Dharmakīrtian account of knowledge as a novel, truth-tracking cognition. The second half of the chapter explores how this Buddhist account of knowledge compares to analyses of knowledge in the contemporary analytic tradition of epistemology. It is argued, for example, that the Buddhist account cannot be assimilated to analyses of knowledge that appeal to justification, nor to standard versions of reliabilism. Instead, it more closely resembles the theory of knowledge defended by David Armstrong.

Heidegger and the Supposed Meaninglessness of Personal Immortality

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADAM BUBEN
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Related Literature ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
Samuel Scheffler ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACT:For several decades now, a debate about the desirability of immortality has raged on in philosophy of death circles. While these circles and their debates are found primarily within the analytic tradition, Martin Heidegger, who famously introduces the notion of human life (or something like it) as essentially ‘Being-towards-death’, has much to contribute. At first glance, this idea seems to agree with the views of ‘immortality curmudgeons’ like Samuel Scheffler, and, in fact, on the rare occasions that Heidegger is mentioned in the related literature, his name is usually placed on a list of likely pessimists about immortality. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between death and meaning allows for a rather uncurmudgeonly view of immortality. In this paper, I argue that the often-misunderstood Heidegger has important supportive insights to offer when it comes to the prospects of an unending life.

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