Re-Envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Yop Kang
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

Corporate Governance in China: A Survey*

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuxiu Jiang ◽  
Kenneth A Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Corporate Social

Abstract This article surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the USA to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.

scholarly journals Effects of ownership structure on the mergers and acquisitions decisions in Brazilian firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-245
Author(s):  
Nasaré Vieira Nogueira ◽  
Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Use Of Resources

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of ownership structure on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions of Brazilian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach This paper is an applied and explanatory research based on secondary data. The sample is comprises non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa between 1998 and 2007. Considering that the dependent variable is binary, the authors estimate panel data logistic regression models. Considering the existence of conflicts of interest among those who have the decision-making power and the supplier of capital for M&A transactions, they draw upon the Agency Theory to develop the theoretical hypotheses. Findings The results show that, for a sample of Brazilian non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa (B3), from 1998 to 2007, Brazilian firms present, on average, a highly concentrated ownership structure and the major controlling shareholders are families or the State. These characteristics are negatively related to the likelihood of M&A transactions, as most of these controlling shareholders are reluctant to adopt mechanisms that reduce their control. Research limitations/implications With regard to the limitations, this study considered only the M&A definitions as stated by the Bureau van Dijk database. In this sense, future studies may analyze the effects of ownership structure based on other M&A definitions and typologies. In addition, the study is limited to the period from 1998 to 2007, which is prior to the international financial crisis. Future studies may extend the analysis period to include the post-crisis period (2008) to check if there are differences in M&A strategies before and after the crisis. Practical implications From a managerial perspective, the results show that minority shareholders have little or no influence over an M&A decision, so they cannot decide on the use of resources for fast growth and access to new markets through M&A. Thus, the investment decision must take into account the nature and the quality of the controlling shareholder. Social implications This study shows a significant and negative effect of ownership concentration on the likelihood of M&A transactions. In part, this result demonstrates the importance of understanding the behavior of controlling shareholders before inferring on other key aspects that the M&A literature tends to make fundamental in explaining M&A decisions in publicly traded companies, particularly, in an environment of low minority shareholder protection. Originality/value Previous studies have partly found that the M&A decision is motivated by individual advantages obtained from increasing the size of the firm, or from managerial hubris. The results show that these hypotheses do not hold in the Brazilian context. Moreover, the results indicate that M&A decisions are associated with the characteristics of the controlling shareholder, their level of ownership concentration and their typology, contributing to the agency debate on whether the incentive or the entrenchment effect prevails in the context of the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders, particularly, in an institutional environment of low shareholder protection.

Groups of Companies

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus J. Hopt
Keyword(s):  
Creditor Protection ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Banking Competition ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
International Convergence ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Regulatory Models ◽  
Group Law

Groups of companies are common. The empirical data are heterogeneous. Agency problems arise between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders and between the shareholders and the creditors. Three regulatory models exist: regulation by general corporate and/or civil law (prototype: the UK); regulation by special group law (prototype: Germany); and regulation by areas of the law such as banking, competition, and tax. The main strategy is mandatory disclosure and group accounting. Related party transactions (including conflict of interest and tunneling) are dealt with by disclosure and consent requirements. In addition, appropriate standards for directors and controlling shareholders (corporate governance) have been developed. They become stricter, if insolvency is approaching. The concept of the shadow director extends liability to the controlling shareholder. Other mechanisms for creditor protection are indemnification, veil-piercing, subordination and substantive consolidation. A fair amount of international convergence exists as to shareholder protection, but not as to creditor protection.

scholarly journals Unfair prejudice in United Kingdom Company Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhengyang Fan
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Limited Application ◽  
Legitimate Interests ◽  
Majority Shareholder

It is common that the majority shareholders in a corporation take action that unfairly prejudices the minority. A majority shareholder occupies a dominant position in the decision-making process of the company's affairs and can control the company with the principle of majority rule. In the process of company development, the interests of the majority shareholders may diverge from the interests of the company. In this case, the majority of shareholders may engage in unfair prejudice conduct that harm the interests of the company and minority shareholders for their own benefit. Consequently, to some extent, the principle of majority rule provides the possibility for the controlling shareholders to abuse voting rights, which often constitutes damage to the interests of minority shareholders. In addition, due to the reliance on the controlling shareholder, the directors tend to only take into account the interests of the majority shareholders, with the result that ignore the rights and interests of non-controlling shareholders. Especially in private companies, minority shareholders not only cannot sell their shares in the stock exchanges without restrictions to exit the company, but also may be subject to more severe oppression by the actual controller of the company. When minority shareholders cannot obtain relief within the company, it is necessary for aggrieved shareholders to bring an action against the majority shareholders to protect their rights.   However, under the rule in Foss v Harbottle, shareholders only be allowed to sue if they meet the exceptions. Due to the limited application scope of these exceptions, the aggrieved shareholders are often unable to get timely and effective relief in practice. In response to this problem, statutory unfair prejudice provisions are introduced to balance the interests of majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and to prevent shareholder oppression in corporate governance. It emphasizes judicial intervention to protect the legitimate interests of shareholders. Compared with just and equitable winding up and derivative action, the unfair prejudice is regarded as a mechanism for minority protection as it covers a variety of remedies and leaves the court with greater discretion.

Controlling shareholders' stock pledges and strategic change: the moderating effects of corporate governance

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Zhong ◽  
He Wan ◽  
Qiuping Peng
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Strategic Change ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Analyst Coverage ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Change Behavior ◽  
Negative Effect

PurposeThe authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage moderates those effects.Design/methodology/approachEmploying fixed effects models, the authors test hypotheses based on Chinese listed company data from 2011 to 2017.FindingsControlling shareholders' stock pledges has a negative effect on strategic change. As the balance of power among shareholders and/or analyst coverage increases, it mitigates the effect of controlling shareholder stock pledges on strategic change. In particular, the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage weakened the relationship between controlling shareholder stock pledges and strategic change. Lastly, after distinguishing family from nonfamily firms, the authors discovered that these findings only held for family firms.Originality/valueThis study makes important contributions to strategic change, stock pledge and family firm literature, and also provides guidance on firms' strategic change practices.

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

Controlling Shareholders: Issues and Challenges for Shareholders’ Empowerment in Directors’ Remuneration in Corporate Malaysia

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanthy Rachagan ◽  
Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Current Reform

AbstractCurrent reform concerning directors’ remuneration relies on improving legal rules and self-regulation to minimise expropriation of minority shareholders. These have prominently focussed on empowering shareholders. Nonetheless, it is unclear as to the extent these reform proposals are compatible within the concentrated shareholding structure. Some of the reforms taking place in developed countries are suited for dispersed shareholding structure and thus transplanting them to emerging economies with concentrated shareholders may be ineffective. Malaysia poses an interesting case study, especially to countries with similar ownership structure as the concentrated shareholding structure raises different agency problems. The issue of protection of minority shareholder rights and the prevention of abuse of the controlling power by paying excessive remuneration to the executives is therefore a subject of due consideration in Malaysia and countries with similar shareholding structures. This article recommends that Malaysia and other emerging countries look into encouraging limited shareholder empowerment in tandem with laws.

Majority and Minority Shareholders

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-174
Author(s):  
Paul Davies
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
The Third ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
A Company

Where a company has a controlling or a small group of controlling shareholders, the non-controlling shareholders are at risk that the controllers will extract private benefits of control at the expense of the non-controllers. UK company law contains a wide range of techniques for addressing this issue, some more effective than others. This chapter begins by examining the various ways in which well-advised investors can contract for protection before they enter the company and how the law protects the agreements reached. The second part discusses rights to exit the company upon the occurrence of certain events. The third part discusses disclosure rights, designed to bring self-dealing transactions into the open. The fourth focuses on ways of structuring the board or shareholder body when the decision before it carries a high risk of self-dealing. The final part considers cases where the courts review the substantive fairness of the controllers’ conduct, notably, but not only, the provisions on ‘unfair prejudice.

5. Majority and Minority Shareholders

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-174
Author(s):  
Paul Davies
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
The Third ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
A Company

Where a company has a controlling or a small group of controlling shareholders, the non-controlling shareholders are at risk that the controllers will extract private benefits of control at the expense of the non-controllers. UK company law contains a wide range of techniques for addressing this issue, some more effective than others. This chapter begins by examining the various ways in which well-advised investors can contract for protection before they enter the company and how the law protects the agreements reached. The second part discusses rights to exit the company upon the occurrence of certain events. The third part discusses disclosure rights, designed to bring self-dealing transactions into the open. The fourth focuses on ways of structuring the board or shareholder body when the decision before it carries a high risk of self-dealing. The final part considers cases where the courts review the substantive fairness of the controllers’ conduct, notably, but not only, the provisions on ‘unfair prejudice.

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