DERECHO NATURAL E INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL PERDDN DE LOS DELITOS DE LESA HUMANIDAD: BASES PARA UNA APROXIMACIIN AL DEBER DE OBEDIENCIA AL DERECHO EN EL CASO SIMMNN (Natural Law and Unconstitutionality of Forgiveness of Crimes Against Humanity: Grounds for an Approach to the Duty of Obedience to the Law in the 'Simon' Case

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano D. Laise
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2020 ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Michael Pakaluk

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Henrique Garbellini Carnio

<p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O presente artigo tem como base a conferência dada por Rudolf von Jhering em 12 de março de 1884 para a Sociedade Jurídica de Viena, intitulada "Sobre o nascimento do sentimento jurídico". O objetivo é demonstrar algumas reflexões surpreendentes e pouco conhecidas deste importante jurista, enfatizando, em especial, a importância que ele atribui ao devir histórico na formação do sentimento jurídico, apostando que o sentido do direito é modelado pela história e não proveniente das leis naturais eternas. Jhering, propondo uma tarefa genealógica, defende de forma contundente um historicismo ético e jurídico que o distancia de um relativismo absoluto como o das clássicas posições jusnaturalistas, completamente ahistóricas, que se revela extremamente interessante para as reflexões atuais sobre a filosofia do direito.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chave:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; sentimento jurídico; historicismo ético-político.</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> This article is based on a lecture given by Rudolf von Jhering on March 12, 1884 for the Law Society of Vienna, entitled "About the birth of the legal feeling." The objective is to demonstrate some surprising and little-known reflections of this important jurist, emphasizing, in particular, the importance he attaches to the historical development in the formation of the legal feeling, betting that the sense of law is shaped by history and not from the eternal natural laws. Jhering proposing a genealogical task, forcefully defends an ethical and legal historicism that distances him of the absolute relativism as the way of classic natural law positions, completely ahistorical, that reveals itself highly interesting for the current reflections on the philosophy of law.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; legal feeling; ethical and political historicism.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 64-85
Author(s):  
Artur Ghambaryan

The aim of the article is to reveal the collisional relationship between justice and the law in the philosophical dimension. The main objectives of the article are to analyze the contradictions between law from the point of view of broad legal understanding, as well as the answer to the question of how law enforcement agent should act if, in solving a specific case, an outrageous contradiction between law and justice is encountered. The author used a number of scientific methods, in particular, historical-legal-comparative methods. The author concludes that supporters of a broad legal understanding consider the issue of contradiction between law mainly from the point of view of legislative policy, however, they do not discuss the issue of how the law enforcement agent should act when an obvious contradiction between law is encountered in a particular case. In the article the sayings «dura lex sed lex» (The law [is] harsh, but [it is] the law) and «lex iniusta non est lex» (An unjust law is no law at all) are considered in the dimensions of the legalism and natural law. The author concludes that the Radbruch formula is an exception to the saying «dura lex sed lex» (The law [is] harsh, but [it is] the law), which has undergone practical approbation. On the one hand, this resolution values the certainty and stability of the law, and on the other hand, it protects the person (society) from the unjustly shouting unjust laws.


Author(s):  
Annabel S. Brett

This chapter looks at Francisco de Vitoria and his Dominican colleagues at the Spanish School of Salamanca in the middle of the sixteenth century. They are famous for their reconstitution and redeployment of Thomas Aquinas's theory of natural law to address the new problems of the sixteenth century, problems that beset Spain along with the rest of Europe: the power of the crown both within its own commonwealth and in relation to other commonwealths, and these powers both within Europe and overseas. For the School's most celebrated member, Francisco de Vitoria, natural law is the law of reason by which all human beings are naturally governed—the law of humanity as such—and, for him as for Aquinas, it ultimately determines the legitimacy of any subsequent human institutions and laws. The chapter also considers Domingo de Soto's The deliberation in the cause of the poor, which was published in 1545.


Author(s):  
Tina Beattie

Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s idea of homo sacer and on the Catholic natural law tradition, Beattie explores the paradoxes and tensions inherent in the Christian understanding of divine justice and human laws. While natural law resists the pessimism of some Protestant theologies and their secularized postmodern derivatives, the doctrine of original sin means that all human laws are flawed in their quest to maintain justice through the imposition of order. Beattie argues that Christ is homo sacer in whom God is profaned, the human is made sacred, and the crucified body of the dehumanized other on the cross becomes the bearer of an absolute dignity outside the law.


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