scholarly journals FILSAFAT ANALITIK Kritik Epistemologi Ide Analitik Logis Bertrand Russell

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Muhmidayeli Muhmidayeli

Abstract:Each logical statement reflected in the way expressed in a logical language. If a statement is expressed by a language that one would then have it wrong, therefore, necessary test of logical forms that fit with the empirical facts. In short every statement must be understood by returning to the real meaning or context. Russell offers a translation grammatically any statement that may seem misleading to the appropriate forms and logical. Bertrand Russell described his philosophy asan area of human thought that was between theology on the one hand and science on the other side. Philosophy can be said astheology, due to the nature and character of philosophy which also contains a world speculations about the definitive knowledge, but it can notbe ascertained. On the other hand, itcan be said as science, because the working procedures of philosophy that is moreleads and functioning sense like science knowledge (science). Anydogma, because it transcends knowledge certainly, including in the sphere of theology. In between there is this no man's land area that is prone to both theology and science issues. Abstrak: Setiap penyataan logis tercermin dari cara mengungkapkannya dalam bahasa logis. Jika suatu pernyataan diungkap dengan bahasa yang salah maka akan memiliki maka yang salah, oleh karena itu, diperlukan uji bentuk-bentuk logis yang cocok dengan dengan fakta empiris. Pendeknya setiap pernyataan mesti dipahami dengan mengembalikannya pada makna riil atau kontekstual. Russell menawarkan pener¬jemahan secara gramatikal setiap pernyataan yang mungkin saja tampak me¬nyesat¬¬kan ke dalam bentuk-bentuk yang tepat dan logis. Bertrand Russell menggambarkan filsafat sebagai suatu wilayah pemikiran manusia yang berada antara teologi di satu sisi dan ilmu pengetahuan di sisi lainnya. Filsafat dapat dikatakan seperti teologi, karena sifat dan watak filsafat yang juga bersikan dunia spekulasi-spekulasi tentang pengetahun yang pasti namun ia tidak dapat dipastikan. Di lain pihak, ia dapat dikatakan pula seperti ilmu pengetahuan, karena tata kerja filsafat yang memang lebih banyak mengarah dan memfungsikan akal seperti layaknya ilmu ilmu pengetahuan (sains). Segala dogma, karena ia melampaui pengetahuan pasti, termasuk dalam lingkup teologi. Di antara keduanya inilah ada daerah yang tak bertuan yang rentan terhadap kedua persoalan teologi dan sains. Keywords:filsafat analitik,analytic logic, metodologi filsafat, atomic facts, dan logical form.

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
Agustinus Wisnu Dewantara

Talking about God can not be separated from the activity of human thought. Activity is the heart of metaphysics. Searching religious authenticity tends to lead to a leap in harsh encounter with other religions. This interfaith encounter harsh posed a dilemma. Why? Because on the one hand religion is the peacemaker, but on the other hand it’s has of encouraging conflict and even violence. Understanding God is not quite done only by understanding the religion dogma, but to understand God rationally it is needed. It is true that humans understand the world according to his own ego, but it is not simultaneously affirm that God is only a projection of the human mind. Humans understand things outside of himself because no awareness of it. On this side of metaphysics finds itself. Analogical approach allows humans to approach and express God metaphysically. Human clearly can not express the reality of the divine in human language, but with the human intellect is able to reflect something about the relationship with God. Analogy allows humans to enter the metaphysical discussion about God. People who are at this point should come to the understanding that God is the Same One More From My mind, The Impossible is defined, the Supreme Mystery, and infinitely far above any human thoughts.


1985 ◽  
Vol 106 ◽  
pp. 635-639
Author(s):  
Jeremiah P. Ostriker

First let me review the historical discussions presented during our symposium: the papers by Paul, Gingerich, Hoskin and Smith. I was greatly impressed by the power of abstract human thought in its confrontation with resistant reality. On the one hand we see again and again extraordinary prescience, where abstract beliefs based on little or no empirical evidence–like the island-universe hypothesis–turn out to be, in their essentials, true. Clearly, we often know more than we know that we know. On the other hand, there are repeated instances of resistance to the most obvious truth due to ingrained beliefs. These may be termed conspiracies of silence. Van Rhijn and Shapley agreed about few things. But one of them was that there was no significant absorption of light in the Galaxy. Yet the most conspicuous feature of the night sky is the Milky Way, and the second most conspicuous feature is the dark rift through its middle. What looks to the most untutored eye like a “sandwich” was modeled as an oblate spheroid. These eminent scientists must have known about the rift, but somehow wished it away in their analyses. I find that very curious. Other examples from earlier times abound. We all know that the Crab supernova was seen from many parts of the globe but, though it was bright enough to be detected by the unaided eye in daylight, its existence was never–so far as we know–recorded in Europe. It did not fit in with the scheme of things, so it was not seen.


2004 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 278-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Veldsman

AbstractThe more recently proposed epistemological models (cf Gregersen & Van Huyssteen, eds., Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue) within the context of the science and religion debate, have opened up galaxie,s of meanirzg on the interface of the debates which are inviting for exploralive, theological travelling. But how are we epistemologically to judge not only oui journets but also the rethinking of the implications of these epistemological models for our understanding of religious experience and our experience of transcendence? The interdisciplinary space that has been opened up in an exciting post-foundational manner zuithirz these very debates, leaves us as rational persons, embedded in a very specific social and historical context, with the haunting cognitive pluralist question on how to reach beyond the limits of our own epistemic traditions (Wentzel van Huyssteen). This question is pursued as an effort on the one hand to unmask epistemic arrogance and, on the other hand, not to take refuge in the insular comfort of internally closed language-systems. It is an effort to address relativism and a 'twentieth-century despair of any knozuledye of reality' (Polkinghorne). It is finally an effort to conceptually revisit the implications of tltese models for our understanding of our culturally embedded religious experience.


1950 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-505
Author(s):  
M. A. Fitzsimons

Unless you are prepared on the one hand to say, “I will fight in every case on behalf of peace, which is one and indivisible,” or on the other hand to say, “I will only fight when I am myself the victim of attack”mdash;unless you are prepared to take one of those two positions there is an inevitable no-man's land of uncertainty lying between which is quite incapable, as I think, of antecedent definition.—Viscount Halifax in the House of Lords, March 3, 1937.


1998 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Graffi

Summary This article examines the views about syntax held by Humboldt, on the one hand, and by the founders of historical-comparative grammar (Bopp, Rask, Grimm, Pott, Schleicher), on the other. In general, it is noted that the grammaire générale tradition of 17th and 18th centuries still survives in the work of such scholars, despite of all criticism they seemingly raised against it. For Humboldt, the common core of all languages has its source in the identity of human thought; also his treatment of the verb and especially his reference to a ‘natural’ word order (i.e., SVO) are clearly reminiscent of this tradition. Traces thereof are also found in Bopp’s analysis of Indo-European conjugation, and in some of Rask’s writings. For instance, Rask, just as Humboldt, assumes a ‘natural’ word order and proposes a list of possible syntactic forms which closely remind us of Girard’s membres de phrase. Grimm’s position appears as more innovative, heavily influenced by a Romantic view of language, but some older conceptions sometimes show up in his work, e.g., when he deals with the notion of ‘subject’. Pott does not completely reject general grammar and a logically-based view of language; he only stresses the need of a more empirical approach than that adopted by the 17th and 18th century linguists. This picture radically changed with Steinthai and Schleicher: the former scholar pronounced a ‘divorce’ between grammar and logic, while the latter one argued that syntax does not belong to linguistics proper and rejected any possibility of postulating syntactic distinctions which do not have any direct morphological correlate.


PARADIGMI ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 101-125
Author(s):  
Silvana Borutti

- This essay focuses on the occurrence of two words-concepts in Kant's and Wittgenstein's texts: Darstellung, which designates in both philosophies the imaginative activity of exhibition or presentation, essential in the experience of meaning, and Einstimmung, which designates the inter-subjective communicability of meaning. In Kant's philosophy, Darstellung plays a fundamental role in connecting the cognitive faculties. It refers, on the one hand, to the sublime character of imaginative power, which makes representation free from presence, and, on the other hand, to the inter-subjective and communicable character of this human capacity. By Darstellung also Wittgenstein refers to the presence of meaning in the logical form of language, and, at the same time, to the impossibility of representing language as an object. Imagination also presides over the communicability of meaning understood as an agreement, that is both a consonance of voices and a consent inscribed in the body.Key words: Agreement, Imagination, Presentation, Seeing as, Showing, Sublime.Parole chiave: Darstellung, Immaginazione, Mostrare, Sublime, Übereinstimmung,


Africa ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. H. Ruxton

Opening ParagraphThe number of Africa published in January 1929 contains two articles which are of real help to the colonial administrator. The first article, by the Rev. Father Dubois, S.J., compares the supposedly opposite dogmas of assimilation and adaptation, or, in administrative language, of direct and indirect rule. Therein the author conclusively shows that these formulae are not dogmas, the one unorthodox and the other orthodox; that the education of a race cannot be accomplished by means of a formula, but that it is a matter of time, tact and love. In fact the methods of assimilation and adaptation are both required, as also the one in conjunction with the other.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 851-873
Author(s):  
Dieter Mersch

Abstract A critique of algorithmic rationalisation offers at best some initial reasons and preliminary ideas. Critique is understood as a reflection on validity. It is limited to an “epistemological investigation” of the limits of the calculable or of what appears “knowable” in the mode of the algorithmic. The argumentation aims at the mathematical foundations of computer science and goes back to the so-called “foundational crisis of mathematics” at the beginning of the 20th century with the attempt to formalise concepts such as calculability, decidability and provability. The Gödel theorems and Turing’s halting problem prove to be essential for any critical approach to “algorithmic rationalisation”. Both, however, do not provide unambiguous results, at best they run towards what later became known as “Gödel’s disjunction”. The chosen path here, however, suggests the opposite way, insofar as, on the one hand, the topos of creativity appear constitutive for what can be regarded as cognitive “algorithmic rationalisation” and which encounters systematic difficulties in the evaluation of non-trivial results. On the other hand, the investigations lead to a comparison between the “mediality” of formally generated structures, which have to distinguish between object-and metalanguages, and the “volatile” differentiality of human thought, which calls for syntactically non-simulatable sense structures.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agustinus Dewantara

Talking about God can not be separated from the activity of human thought. Activity is the heart of metaphysics. Searching religious authenticity tends to lead to a leap in harsh encounter with other religions. This interfaith encounter harsh posed a dilemma. Why? Because on the one hand religion is the peacemaker, but on the other hand it’s has of encouraging conflict and even violence. Understanding God is not quite done only by understanding the religious dogma, but to understand God rationally it is needed. It is true that humans understand the world according to his own ego, but it is not simultaneously affirm that God is only a projection of the human mind. Humans understand things outside of himself because no awareness of it. On this side of metaphysics finds itself. Analogical approach allows humans to approach and express God metaphysically. Humans clearly can not express the reality of the divine in human language, but with the human intellect is able to reflect something about the relationship with God. Analogy allows humans to enter the metaphysical discussion about God. People who are at this point should come to the understanding that God is the Same One More From My mind, The Impossible is defined, the Supreme Mystery, and infinitely far above any human thoughts.


Author(s):  
Howard Stein

The term ‘logicism’ refers to the doctrine that mathematics is a part of (deductive) logic. It is often said that Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell were the first proponents of such a view; this is inaccurate, in that Frege did not make such a claim for all of mathematics. On the other hand, Richard Dedekind deserves to be mentioned among those who first expressed the conviction that arithmetic is a branch of logic. The logicist claim has two parts: that our knowledge of mathematical theorems is grounded fully in logical demonstrations from basic truths of logic; and that the concepts involved in such theorems, and the objects whose existence they imply, are of a purely logical nature. Thus Frege maintained that arithmetic requires no assumptions besides those of logic; that the concept of number is a concept of pure logic; and that numbers themselves are, as he put it, logical objects. This view of mathematics would not have been possible without a profound transformation of logic that occurred in the late nineteenth century – most especially through the work of Frege. Before that time, actual mathematical reasoning could not be carried out under the recognized logical forms of argument: this circumstance lent considerable plausibility to Immanuel Kant’s teaching that mathematical reasoning is not ‘purely discursive’, but relies upon ‘constructions’ grounded in intuition. The new logic, however, made it possible to represent standard mathematical reasoning in the form of purely logical derivations – as Frege, on the one hand, and Russell, in collaboration with Whitehead, on the other, undertook to show in detail. It is now generally held that logicism has been undermined by two developments: first, the discovery that the principles assumed in Frege’s major work are inconsistent, and the more or less unsatisfying character (or so it is claimed) of the systems devised to remedy this defect; second, the epoch-making discovery by Kurt Gödel that the ‘logic’ that would be required for derivability of all mathematical truths can in principle not be ‘formalized’. Whether these considerations ‘refute’ logicism will be considered further below.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document