scholarly journals Independence of Regulatory Authorities in the Energy Market. Comment to the Judgement of EU Court of Justice in C-378/19 Prezident Slovenskej republiky

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-134
Author(s):  
Adam Szafrański
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Regulatory Authorities ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
National Regulatory Authority

In its judgement C-378/19, the Court of Justice of the European Union responded to the question for a preliminary ruling referred by the Slovak Constitutional Court. The ECJ found in this judgement that Directive 2009/72/EC must be interpreted as not precluding withdrawal of the competence of the President of a Member State to appoint and dismiss the chairperson of the national regulatory authority, and conferral of the same power to the Member State’s government. Similarly, allowing the participation of the Ministers of the Environment and of the Economy in certain price-setting procedures does not violate the decision-making independence of the national regulatory authority. In his commentary, the author cites the line of argument in the judgement and presents the political context in Slovakia that led to the preliminary question. The author then comments approvingly on the judgement, noting that the Court rightly refrained from assessing the political situation in Slovakia, instead opting to focus on the law. At the end of the commentary, the author makes remarks of a general nature relating to the independence of national regulatory authorities.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The First Preliminary Reference of the French Constitutional Court to the CJEU:Révolution de Palaisor Revolution in French Constitutional Law?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1471-1490
Author(s):  
François-Xavier Millet ◽  
Nicoletta Perlo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Major Change ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
First Time

A preliminary reference on the part of the Constitutional Council was, in several respects, not to be expected. It was debatable whether it would consider itself as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and, therefore, whether it would refer a case to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) at all. The French constitutional court could also have resorted to theacte clairdoctrine so as to escape from their obligation to ask for the interpretive guidance of the CJEU. However, the main reason why a reference was not awaited by legal actors lies in the limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council. Until the introduction in 2008 of the so-called QPC, that is,question prioritaire de constitutionnalité(the Priority Preliminary Reference mechanism on issues of constitutionality), theConseil constitutionnelhad a very limited jurisdiction compared to its European counterparts. Its main mission was to assess the conformity of parliamentary bills and treaties with the Constitution and only with the Constitution. Its review could only take placeex ante, between the adoption and the promulgation of a text. By opening the way to anex postreview of statutes with regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the QPC brought about a major change in the French adjudication system: statutes are no longer immune from constitutional challenge once they are in force. However, treaties and other international or European commitments are no parameters of constitutional review. TheConseil constitutionnelmade this clear in 1975 and never seriously changed track, despite minor qualifications to the rule. In their seminalIVGruling on the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, they held that it was not up to them to review the compatibility of bills with treaties, in spite of Article 55 of the Constitution. Consequently, the task of the constitutional judges does not go beyond the assessment of laws with regard to the Constitution. This is the main reason that explains why, on the face of it, theConseil constitutionnelwas unlikely to refer a case to the CJEU. Why would it seek the interpretation or ask for the review of a European text if this text is immaterial for it and if the yardstick of its examination is the Constitution and only the Constitution? Yet, it happened. For the first time, theConseilreferred a case to the CJEU on 4 April 2013. Although this is undoubtedly a major legal breakthrough, we will see in due course that this is probably more arévolution de palaisthan a true revolution in French constitutional law.

scholarly journals The Dialectics Between Constitutional Identity and Common Constitutional Traditions: Which Language for Cooperative Constitutionalism in Europe?

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1097-1118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Fichera ◽  
Oreste Pollicino
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
And Function ◽  
Role And Function ◽  
Constitutional Identity ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis Article revisits the role and function of constitutional identity and common constitutional traditions and claims that the latter have had an increasingly stronger influence on the process of European integration—more than may appear at first sight. In addition, the relevance of common constitutional traditions has not been undermined but, on the contrary, strengthened by the emergence of fundamental rights in EU law and the subsequent conferral of binding force on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Constitutional identity and common constitutional traditions are part of two discourses—security and fundamental rights—which are an expression of the security of the European project as an overarching frame characterizing the EU as a polity and legal system. After an overview of some of the most important rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union, this Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of the recent conciliatory attitude recently adopted by the Court of Justice, although the more ambivalent attitude of the Italian Constitutional Court indicates how conflictual features are becoming increasingly important and can no longer be concealed as the EU reaches a more advanced stage of integration.

Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe's Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Past ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Bundestag

In the environment of ongoing endeavors to “rescue” the Euro, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is meanwhile dealing with several constitutional complaints challenging matters that could be described as “the future of the German Bundesbank” and “the present and the past of the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag.” Or, to be more specific, the complainants currently challenge the prospective participation of the German Bundesbank in possible future implementations of the so called “OMT Framework” of 6 September 2012. They also argue that the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag “failed to act” regarding this OMT framework.

Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aida Torres Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right

On 13 February 2014, the Spanish Constitutional Court came to a final decision regarding the fate of Mr Stefano Melloni. The story of the case is worthy of attention not only from the perspective of the interaction between the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), but also from the standpoint of the conflicting levels of rights' protection in Europe. The story of Melloni can be described in three acts: setup, confrontation, and resolution.First, the setup: in 2011, the Spanish Constitutional Court made its first and (so far) only preliminary reference to the CJEU. The Constitutional Court was faced with a collision between the constitutional right to fair trial of persons convicted in absentia and the obligation under EU law to execute a European arrest warrant (heretofore EAW). This setup generated great anticipation, both because of the protagonists and the type of conflict, since in this case what obstructed one member state from complying with EU law was its higher level of constitutional protection for the right in question.

Legal Issues of EC–Cyprus Trade Relations

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 489-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panos Koutrakos
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Association Agreement ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
The Third ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

Whilst the political aspects of Cyprus's membership to the European Union have become the main focus of academic analysis over the years, its trade relations with the Member States have raised issues just as interesting from a legal point of view. This has been illustrated quite recently by the Anastasiou II judgment delivered by the European Court of Justice in 2000. The article aims at highlighting some of these issues. It is structured in three parts: the first part outlines the provisions of the EC–Cyprus Association Agreement governing trade between the parties; the second part analyses the Court's first ruling on imports of certain produce from the northern part of Cyprus;1 the third part examines the recent judgment of the Court on imports of produce which, whilst originating in the northern part of Cyprus, are being accompanied by phytosanitary certificates issued by the Turkish authorities.

Role of the national regulatory authority for vaccines

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 128-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman W. Baylor
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Pharmaceutical Products ◽  
World Health ◽  
Expert Committee ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Mortality And Morbidity ◽  
Expert Review ◽  
Regulatory Authorities ◽  
National Regulatory Authority

Purpose Before vaccines are marketed and used, they must be evaluated and approved by a national regulatory authority (NRA). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the NRA in the USA responsible for overseeing and regulating the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of vaccines. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach Expert review. Findings Developed countries have established governmental regulatory agencies to review and determine the safety and effectiveness of vaccines to ensure that the manufacture, sale, and use of vaccines are adequately regulated. However, even today, many developing countries do not have established NRAs. Furthermore, despite similarities, there are still substantial differences in how regulatory authorities in different countries perform minimum functions required for effective regulation of pharmaceutical products, including vaccines. The World Health Organization (WHO), although not a governmental NRA, uses a consultative approach involving its Expert Committee on Biological Standardization and Biologicals Unit to develop regulatory criteria and identify and consolidate current consensus opinions on key regulatory issues. It is through this approach that WHO informs NRAs on the necessary scientific background required to assess and advise on optimal regulatory approaches and methodologies. This paper will focus on the evolution of the US FDA and its role in regulation of vaccines to illustrate the function of a vaccine NRA. Originality/value Vaccines are an important resource for protecting people and communities from the mortality and morbidity associated with many infectious diseases. The assessment, licensure, control and surveillance of vaccines are the responsibilities of government regulatory authorities.

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