Pengaruh Religiusitas, Love of Money, dan Status Sosial Ekonomi Terhadap Kecenderungan Perilaku Tax Evasion dalam Perspektif Ekonomi Islam

Tax is a mandatory expenditure imposed on taxpayers to assist the development of the country. However, taxpayers feel that taxes are a burden for them, because the distribution of development has not been maximized, causing the people to feel reluctant to pay their obligations. So in this case the taxpayer is trying to find a way to evade taxes. The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of religiosity, love of money, and socio-economic status on the tendency of tax evasion behavior in an Islamic economic perspective. This study used a literature study which refers to journals and books. The results of this study reveal that religiosity and love of money have an effect on tax evasion behavior. However, socioeconomic status has no effect on tax evasion behavior.

Delta Variant of Covid-19 Study, and Why it is a Concern: An Overview

COVID-19 is caused by the virus SARS-CoV-2 that belongs to the Coronaviridae groups. The subgroups of the coronavirus families are α , β , γ , and δ coronavirus (the four general human coronaviruses). Representative coronaviruses consist of NL63 coronavirus (human) and porcine transmissible gastroenteritis from the Alphacoronavirus genus; mouse hepatitis coronavirus (MHV), bovine coronavirus (BCoV), severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV); avian infectious bronchitis virus (IBV); and porcine δ -coronavirus (PdCoV). This work exhibits, δ -coronavirus spikes are fundamentally and evolutionally more similar related to α -coronavirus spikes than to β -coronavirus or γ -coronavirus spikes due to the receptor recognition, membrane fusion phenomenon, and immune evasion behavior.

Pengaruh Probability To Audit Dan Machiavellianism Terhadap Tax Evasion

This study aims to analyze the effect of probability to audit and Machiavellianism on tax evasion behavior. There are two approaches to explain the factors that influence taxpayer behavior on compliance and tax evasion, named the economic approach (external factors) and non-economic approach which is the socio-psychological approach (internal factors). This study used a quasi-experimental design with 2x2 mixed factorial design to test the effect of probability to audit (external factors) and machiavellianism (internal factors) on tax evasion behavior. The hypothesis in this study tested by using repeated measures ANOVA. The results of this study indicate that subjects in a low probability to audit condition tend to commit tax evasion. Also, the results of this study found that there is no influence between a high-machiavellian subject and a low-machiavellian subject on tax evasion behavior. Furthermore, the results of this study found that there is interaction between probability to audit and machiavellianism on tax evasion behavior.

http://habibiaislamicus.com/index.php/hirj/article/view/170

Tax violation in Pakistan is very high that has led to deteriorated economic situation and lack of public service delivery. The four variables of tax morale are; feelings of guilt and shame; lack of trust on government; perception about other citizens paying taxes; and level of penalties- as determinants of tax evasion in Pakistan. The perception about utilization of money, elements of shame, perception about other citizens’ compliance behavior and level of penalties effect tax violation. However, variables of guilt and perception about corruption do not have significant impact on evasion behavior. Some policy interventions have been suggested to curb the menace of tax violation. These policies include motivating tax payers through methods like hypothecation, imposition of fines and penalties and publishing names of defaulters through media and tax department website. Tax violation is a crime in almost all developed countries, and the guilty party is liable to fines and/or imprisonment. In Pakistan, many acts that would amount to criminal tax violation in other countries are treated as civil matters. Dishonestly misreporting income in a tax return is not necessarily considered a crime. Such matters are handled in the tax courts, not the criminal courts. In Pakistan, however, some tax misconduct (such as the deliberate falsification of records) is criminal. Moreover, civil tax transgressions may give rise to penalties. It is often considered that the extent of violation depends on the severity of punishment for violation.

Pengaruh Probability Of Audit Dan Gender Terhadap Perilaku Penggelapan Pajak

Tax evasion behavior will have an impact on the poor performance of taxation which can affect the government's ability to provide public services. It is important to identify the causes of tax evasion behavior in order to adopt a policy and reduce the negative effects of this phenomenon. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to explain the factors that influence taxpayer behavior on compliance and tax evasion, namely the economic approach (external factors) and the socio-psychological approach (internal factors). This study used a quasi-experimental design with a 2x2 mixed factor design to test the effect of probability of audit (external factors) and gender (internal factors) on tax evasion behavior. The hypothesis in this study was tested using repeated measures ANOVA. The results of this study indicate that subjects in a low probability of audit condition tend to commit tax evasion. The results of this study also found that there was a gender influence on tax evasion behavior, where men were more likely to commit tax evasion than women. Furthermore, the results of this study found that there was an influence of the interaction between probability of audit and gender on tax evasion. This study contributes to the accounting and taxation literature, especially in the use of experimental methods which are still small in tax research

Antecedents And Determinants Of Taxpayer’s Perceptions Of Tax Evasion Behavior

This research was conducted to prove that behavior can occur because of the intention to do so. The population in this study are individual taxpayers who carry out business activities and independent jobs registered at KPP Pratama Samarinda. Sampling is by judgment sampling method, calculate using the Slovin measurement determined by 100 respondents. The data collection method using a survey method using questionnaires. The results of this study indicate that the intention to behave as antecedents positively affects the three determinants of taxpayer's perceptions of tax evasion, namely tax authorities services, tax justice, and tax compliance costs. The authors find that attitude toward behavior, and perceived behavioral control are predictors of intention to commit tax evasion. Factor cited as couraging tax evasion in this study is tax compliance cost. While for the tax authority's services and tax justice do not affect the taxpayer’s perceptions of tax evasion. This research find out the pattern of taxpayers when they commit tax evasion, starting from the perception of the taxpayer's intention. This study recommends that necessary measures should be taken by tax authorities to improve revenue collection and reduce tax evasion.

Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy

This work examines the issue of tax evasion through underreporting activity. The associated control problem for reducing the number of dishonest citizens and dishonest officers is explicitly analyzed. It is assumed that the social planner can choose the level of effort in order to control the dynamic system through the use of the specific countries’ characteristics [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] (the probability of punishing, respectively, a tax-evading citizen and a dishonest officer), and the level of public financial effort represented by taxation [Formula: see text] as control variables. The model implicitly considers that there is a direct correlation between these characteristics and the efficacy and the commitment of the institutional system in contrasting illegality. Hence, in the analysis, [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are considered as the effective probabilities to be charged the fine. This study supplies a novel approach concerning the dynamic model underlying the optimal control, which is based on the strategic interaction of the economic agents’ choices. These latter are described by an evolutionary dynamic process which is strongly characterized by [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. The analysis supplies a useful policy indication for the social planner in choosing the way to obtain a certain socially desirable target. Moreover, it helps the comprehension of the different corruption and evasion behavior observable in the real world, where countries with similar level of taxation may have different levels of corruption.