scholarly journals The Raid in the Editorial Of ice of the Turkish Newspaper Tan, 1945, and its Impact on the State of Soviet-Turkish and US-Turkish Relations in the Post-WWII Period

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-213
Author(s):  
Efe Sıvış
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
University Students ◽  
International Relations ◽  
State Department ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Turkish Government ◽  
National Archives ◽  
The U.S

The author examines the demonstrations carried out by university students in Istanbul on December 4, 1945 and the raid on the printing operations of the pro-Soviet Tan newspaper, known as the Tan Raid, in light of U.S. State Department documents, namely the related fi les in National Archives Records Administration. The infl uence of the Tan Raid on Turkey’s international relations is discussed in the context of Turkish-American and Turkish-Soviet relations. The Raid is regarded as a signifi cant incident since it coincides with the post WW2 period when Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union had already deteriorated due to Moscow’s demands to revise the Montreux Convention by 19th of March 1945. Furthermore, Turkish-American diplomatic contacts in the aftermath of the Raid show Washington’s perspective on policy towards Soviet Union, as U.S. offi cials advised a moderate line to their Turkish counterparts. On the other hand, preparations for the Raid seem highly controversial since Turkish government offi cials did not strongly condemn the event and the police did not intervene against the protestors despite of their violent actions towards Tan and some left leaning bookstores. The slogans during the demonstration show its anti-Soviet character, which Ankara denied in order to decrease tensions with the Soviets by arguing that it was Tan ’s owner, the Sertel couple to whom the anger was directed, not the Soviet Union. The intelligence obtained by diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, the meetings they conducted with Turkish politicians, their conclusions regarding the process leading up to the raid, and their opinions on Turkish-Soviet relations provide the background for the analysis.

Remarks by Walter Glass

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 194-198
Author(s):  
Walter Glass ◽  
Patricia O. Lawry
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The State ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Export Policy ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern European Countries ◽  
East West ◽  
The U.S

I shall discuss some of the practical legal problems we have encountered in our efforts to trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. I should like to say at the outset that ever since I began to work in this field in 1964, the U.S. Government has been very helpful. Within the framework of congressional export policy, the Department of Commerce has always endeavored to make allowance for the needs of the American businessman. The State Department has also been helpful; I recall in particular a really first-rate briefing by our embassy in Bucharest when East-West trade was a very new subject.

Civil Defense—the New Debate

Worldview ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 43-43
Author(s):  
John C. Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Civil Defense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Persian Wars ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Nuclear Arms

Before our government embarks on the proposed forms of civil defense I hope that the following reasons for not doing so will be taken very seriously.Preparations for the evacuation of cities in a society as free as ours would involve such drastic actions that they would be more of a signal than we would intend of our readiness for nuclear war. Combined with any build-up of strategic nuclear arms that suggested a first-strike capability to the other side, they would be more provocative than appears to us, to whom they would seem innocent and defensive. This reminds me of the account by Thucydides of the great pains the Athenians took to conceal from the Spartans the fact that they were rebuilding their walls after the Persian wars. What could be more innocent and defensive than a wall!Greater account must be taken of the fears of the Soviet Union. In the long run they may fear China more than the U.S. We are their powerful adversary, who for decades expressed, more unofficially than officially, hostility to the Soviet Union.

Post-Bipolar World: Peaceful Coexistence or Chaos?

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
A. Lukin
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Research University ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Modern World ◽  
The West ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
The U.S

The article explores characteristics of the international relations bipolar system, changes occurred after its collapse and the future of post-bipolar world, focusing on the role of non-Western actors in it. On one hand, the bipolar system provided stability of international relations, but on the other – lead to competition between the U.S. and the USSR for the influence on the third countries, which sometimes resulted in armed conflicts in the third states. The collapse of the Soviet Union convinced the West both in the universality of its development model and the necessity to spread it all over the world. Now it is clear that the “democratism” ideology failed politically and culturally. The Western model has neither become a panacea for eliminating disparities between countries on different stages of development, nor the only example of successful and strong governance. New power centers, such as Russia, China, India and Brazil, have been successfully developing after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their influence has been growing along with that of the West, and even though they did not necessarily directly confront it, they never shared all its values, yet never actively imposed their positions on the rest of the world. Regional powers (Nigeria, Venezuela, etc.) are also playing a more significant role in the emerging system, although sometimes they may join the alliances with more powerful countries to achieve their goals (as Vietnam does with the U.S. in its conflict with China). Russia’s reluctance to follow the West in its development created the first serious alternative to the existing unipolar world model and its values, so naturally and widely accepted by the Western actors. Whereas China with its rapid economic development is also posing a challenge to the ideology of "democratism" proving that the economic welfare is achievable outside the Western political model. As for Russia, its role in the modern world is still not defined. The Russian Federation wants to become an independent power unit and a center of the Eurasian integration. However, it is not clear whether it has resources of all kinds to implement this idea, – moreover, its economic dependence on the West is still too strong to insist on further confrontation. Instead, Russia (as well as its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union) could use Eurasian integration platforms to act as an "ambassador" of Asia in Europe and that of Europe in Asia. Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by the grant of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics in 2016.

The United States and the Cold War: from Truman to Eisenhower (1948–53)

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Korean War ◽  
Jewish People ◽  
State Department ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
The West ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter shows the change in America’s attitude towards Israel, from opposition to de jure recognition of Israel’s military capabilities for the west during ther Korean war. While in 1948 secretary of state General Marshall warned against an enduring conflict with the Arabs, Truman recognized it de facto. However, the state department continued to treart Israel as a liability. Henry Byroade claimed that Israel should not be the homeland of the Jewish people. Israel was left outside of strategic western alliances because it was assumed that its membership might push the Arabs towards the Soviet Union. The notion that Truman’s administration was pro-Israel is a myth. Although Truman himself was sympathetic, the State Department and the Pentagon did not consider Israel an asset.

The Battle for Minds in Cold War Afghanistan: Outlining the United States Information Management Regime

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-207
Author(s):  
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Information Management ◽  
Information Dissemination ◽  
The United States ◽  
Management Regime ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
National Archives ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The U.S

The essay examines four files from the U.S. National Archives dealing with information management in Afghanistan at the onset of the Cold War. The files describe the structure of information dissemination by the U.S. in Kabul, providing considerable detail about the materials distributed, their varying appeal to local communities and constituencies, and their function in the larger ideological competition with the Soviet Union.

Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America's Cold War Statecraft, 1948–1960

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Marquardt
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Open World ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Primary Documents ◽  
Aerial Observation ◽  
The U.S

In recent years, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the role of transparency in international relations. U.S. efforts during the early Cold War to press for greater openness as a way of reducing tensions with the Soviet Union are often cited by specialists on military transparency. Yet the ill-fated Open Skies proposal has not been thoroughly investigated. This article draws on primary documents from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to show that proponents of transparency have generally drawn the wrong conclusions about Open Skies. The U.S. proposal for a system of aerial observation was part and parcel of a strategy to contain and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union. Consequently, Open Skies does not conform to the logic of transparency as a confidence-building measure; it instead affirms basic realist thinking about the competition for security between rivals. Future scholarship that appreciates how the quest for a more open world is affected by the competition for security would improve our understanding of the causes, consequences, and limitations of transparency.

Sweden, the United States, and Raoul Wallenberg's Mission to Hungary in 1944

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Matz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
World War ◽  
Soviet Occupation ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Face ◽  
The U.S

This article provides an in-depth examination of the U.S. government's role in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the courageous Swedish envoy who died mysteriously in the Soviet Union after being arrested by Soviet occupation forces at the end of World War II for unknown reasons. The article recounts how U.S. officials, particularly the diplomat Herschel V. Johnson, tried to alleviate the plight of Hungarian Jews after German forces occupied Hungary in 1944. A key part of this policy was their effort to work with Sweden in enlisting Wallenberg's help. The U.S.-Swedish relationship was never particularly close, and the mistrust that officials in each country felt toward the other side impeded any coordinated action. The article discusses the bureaucratic impediments on the U.S. side and highlights some of the obstacles that Johnson strove to overcome. The article builds on the report produced by the Eliasson Commission documenting the Swedish government's handling of the Wallenberg case. Although the Swedish authorities bore by far the greatest amount of blame for doing nothing in the face of Soviet stonewalling, Matz argues that U.S. officials also made significant misjudgments that may have exacerbated the situation.

West Germany and the U.S.: What's Wrong With the Alliance?

Worldview ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-22
Author(s):  
Harvey Waterman
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Birth Defects ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
West Germany ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Internal Strains ◽  
Human Institution ◽  
The U.S

Some of NATO's faults are birth defects and others are accidents of history or the usual sort of problems that beset any human institution during a third of a century. Yet despite internal strains and external challenges, NATO watched over the political and economic reconstruction of Europe and has kept the peace. Today, new and multiple tensions strain the Alliance still further. Will the NATO that survives—and few actually contemplate its demise— be as successful?The original deal was this: We would protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union and in return the nations of Western Europe would remain friendly to us and to Western ideas of government and international relations. West Germany also would be protected and, eventually, allowed to contribute to its own defense. We would not even ask the Germans to abandon hope for reunification or concern for their brethren to the east.

When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.-Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Blight ◽  
janet Lang
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Oral History ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
The Other ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

Drawing on “critical oral history” conferences held after the demise of the Soviet Union, this article seeks to explain why the détente in U.S.-Soviet relations collapsed at the end of the 1970s. Both the U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, and the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, had sought to improve bilateral ties, but instead they found that the relationship deteriorated and then broke down altogether after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The article suggests that neither side had a sufficient appreciation of how the other side perceived the relationship. The authors argue that the critical oral history helped officials on both sides to develop a sense of empathy for how the other side viewed its own interests and objectives. Empathy does not imply any sympathy; instead, it merely entails an effort to understand the other side's perceptions and goals. Presenting excerpts from an oral history conference, the authors argue that greater empathy in the policymaking process might have helped to avoid an outcome that neither side desired.

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