In his first book, The Management of Islamic Activism, Quintan Wiktorowiczexamines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis throughthe lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismissIslamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowiczcontends that social movement theory is an apt framework through whichIslamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his workleads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries toconstruct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurredbecause of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization.In addition, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “managementof collective action,” (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifledany real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given hisextensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidenceexamined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.The first chapter focuses rather heavily on the advent of Jordanian charitableNGOs and the state bureaucracy’s ability to effectively manipulate and control them. Although a key component of his argument is that the statebureaucracy has hampered and controlled the functionality of IslamicNGOs, he fails to explain what distinguishes Islamic NGOs from their counterparts.He clarifies: “The activities at most Islamic NGOs in Jordan do notdiffer substantially from those of secular and non-Islamic voluntary organizations”(p. 85). If this is correct, then what differentiates Islamic NGOsfrom non-Islamic NGOs? He explains: “What differentiates Islamic NGOsfrom their secular counterparts is … the volunteers’ beliefs that they are promotingIslam through their work. It is an insider belief in the mission, morethan the activities themselves, that distinguishes them” (p. 85) It is quiteremarkable that Wiktorowicz was privy to this “insider” belief. In a Muslimnation such as Jordan, it is hard to imagine that Islam is not a motivating factorin charitable work to some extent. The author argues that the statebureaucracy hampers Islamic NGOs, but is this indeed the case, or does thebureaucracy hamper all NGOs equally? This question remains unasked andunanswered. He would have us believe that the state bureaucracy has takenit upon itself to control Islamic NGOs, but does not thoroughly differentiatethem from the non-Islamic NGOs ...
ARUS TOP-DOWN DAN BOTTOM-UP PADA GERAKAN DIALOG ANTAR AGAMA DI INDONESIA