The Small State Alone: Jamaican Foreign Policy, 1977-1980

1983 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaughan A. Lewis

This study is a sequel to one done by this writer on the foreign policy of Jamaica from 1972 to 1977 (Lewis, 1981) and covers the remaining period during which the People's National Party (PNP), led by Prime Minister Michael Manley, presided over the government of the country.In elections held on October 30, 1980, the PNP government was decisively defeated by the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The latter had, in the previous elections of December 15, 1976, retained only 13 seats in Jamaica's parliament. When the Jamaica Labour Party administration took office, as the party had promised in its election manifesto, it reversed the central planks of the domestic and foreign policies of the PNP administration and reestablished a close relationship with the United States as the main element of its domestic and foreign policies.

Significance The centrist, 'Blairite' section of the party has been defeated and largely excluded from leadership positions. Corbyn's past statements and policy stances are widely believed to render him implausible as a potential prime minister, and thus the Labour Party unelectable with him as leader. The likelihood of the governing Conservatives winning the 2020 general election has increased. Impacts Corbyn is likely to back continued UK EU membership in the referendum, helping to protect him from an early party coup. Because of his previous ambivalence, Corbyn's backing for continued EU membership will make it harder for the left to back 'Brexit'. Foreign policy issues will be among the most difficult under Corbyn, both within the party and with the government. Given the government's small majority, Corbyn's win will make parliamentary support for air strikes against Syrian targets harder to secure. Corbyn's win is unlikely to restore Labour's fortunes in Scotland, potentially boosting support for independence.


1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 176-191
Author(s):  
Aaron Wildavsky

I wish to consider the possibility that a good part of the opposition to the main lines of American foreign policy is based on deep-seated objections to the political and economic systems of the United States. This is not to say that existing policy is necessarily wise or that there may not be good and sufficient reasons for wishing to change it. Indeed, at any time and place, the United States might well be overestimating the threat from the Soviet Union or using too much force. What I wish to suggest is that across-the-board criticism of American policy as inherently aggressive and repressive, regardless of circumstance – a litany of criticism so constant that it does not alert us to the need for explanation – has a structural basis in the rise of a political culture that is opposed to existing authority.To the extent that this criticism is structural, that is, inherent in domestic politics, the problem of fashioning foreign policies that can obtain widespread support is much more difficult than it is commonly perceived to be. For if the objection is to American ways of life and, therefore, “to the government for which it stands,” only a transformation of power relationships at home, together with a vast redistribution of economic resources, would satisfy these critics. If the objection is not only to what we do but, more fundamentally, to who we are, looking to changes in foreign policy to shore up domestic support is radically to confuse the causal connections and, therefore, the order of priorities.


Author(s):  
Brian Lai

The effect of foreign policy on terrorism is an important area of research that bridges work on international relations and intrastate conflict by highlighting how an outside country can influence attacks from a nonstate actor in another country. Research in this area is important for understanding how countries like the United States can best deal with the threat of international terrorism. Research has generally demonstrated that states with active foreign policies are more likely to experience international terrorism, particularly democracies and the United States. This has been hypothesized to occur because active foreign policies create blowback, or negative feelings toward a state, leading to greater acts of terrorism against that state. Beyond the effects of a state’s general foreign policy, others have looked at more specific policies, such as military occupation and intervention. This body of research argues that international terrorism is often a response to perceived occupation of an area. Groups see terrorism as a method to dislodge the occupying force. This argument has been refined by other scholars, who have presented conditions or extensions of this argument. Others have focused on military intervention, arguing that the presence of troops, the negative sentiment that they evoke, and their effect on strengthening the government all create incentives for groups to attack the foreign power that has deployed troops. Foreign aid has been seen as a policy that can address the threat of terrorism. Aid has been argued to be able to improve local conditions and incentivize and reward local states for engaging in counterterrorism. Others have presented conditions under which aid is more or less likely to be effective, including the idea that military aid might actually increase the amount of terrorism, for reasons similar to military intervention, and create an incentive for states to maintain a terrorist threat. Other foreign policy approaches have focused on legal attempts to stop terrorists from financing their organizations. These policies have been driven by the United Nations, coalitions of states, and individual states. This article also focuses on the methodological issues that all these studies face, as well as future research directions.


Significance As intended, the changes will temporarily ease the Conservative Party's internal atmosphere, most importantly before the October annual party conference. However, they are unlikely to alter the fundamentals of the referendum or its outcome. The more significant internal party battle will be over the terms of Prime Minister David Cameron's EU membership renegotiation. Impacts The government could still face a September 7 House of Commons defeat over 'purdah', despite its reversal on the issue. This would boost eurosceptic elements in the Labour Party before the September 12 leadership election result. Cameron's wish to discourage migration from the Middle East could intensify his foreign policy focus on the region.


Subject Spanish foreign policy. Significance Spain does not see itself replacing the United Kingdom as one of the ‘Big 3’ in driving EU policymaking and cooperation after Brexit. Instead, the government of Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez will seek to prioritise Spanish interests in the Mediterranean and on Brexit, and will become less preoccupied with EU cooperation and integration. Spain is seeking a more balanced and broader relationship with the United States, but there is tension over the political crisis in Venezuela and trade issues. Impacts Relations with the United States will become more difficult, especially if President Donald Trump is re-elected. Although Spain would like to shift its regional emphasis towards Asia, Venezuela and the coronavirus could nullify that ambition. Immigration is now a priority, as further illegal inflows would fuel support for the far-right Vox party.


1980 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Stephen Hoadley

While debate continues on whether the foreign policies of small states are1 or are or not generically different from those of large states, little has been written explicitly about the association of size of donors with the quality of their foreign aid. This essay hypothesizes that the aid policies of small states will differ from those of large states in ways that may be measured empirically, just as Plischke, East, Sawyer, and Hermann have demonstrated with quantitative data that the general foreign policy behavior of small states varies significantly from that of large ones. More particularly, it is hypothesized that small states give higher quality aid, and give it relatively more generously, than large states. This hypothesis is grounded on general impressions—Sweden is widely acknowledged as a “good” donor and the United States an indifferent one—and on extrapolations from small state theory that will be sketched below.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


Jurnal ICMES ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-196
Author(s):  
Firmanda Taufiq

Throughout 2018, relations between Turkey and the United States seemed to deteriorate. The leaders of the two countries issued sharp diplomatic statements and the US even imposed economic sanctions on Turkey. This article aims to analyze how the future of relations between Turkey and the United States. Cooperation between the two has a long historical side after the Cold War. Relations between the two countries are based on various interests, both economic, political, military and security interests. The theory used in this study is the theory of national interest. The US has great interests in the Middle East and Turkey is the front-line ally in achieving those interests. However, there are many US foreign policies that ignore the Turkish concern and create tensions between the two countries. On the contrary, Turkey also has considerable economic interests, but the role of the government elite (in this case, President Erdogan) has a significant influence in the determination of Turkish foreign policy. The findings of this study, although it will go through complex challenges and processes, the US and Turkey will continue to maintain their relations.


1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. J. C. McKercher

One of the pervading interpretations of Anglo-American relations in the interwar period is that the advent of James Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government in June 1929 set in train the series of events that ended bitter relations between Britain and the United States, bitterness which had been caused by the naval question. There are several strands to this: first, that the American policy pursued by the Conservative second Baldwin government from November 1924 to June 1929, and especially after the failure of the Coolidge naval conference in the summer of 1927, was bankrupt; second, that MacDonald was more amenable to settling British differences with the Americans than were his Conservative predecessors and, that being so, softened the hardline towards the United States that had marked Conservative foreign and naval policy for more than two years; and, finally, that MacDonald's decision to travel to the United States on what proved to be a very successful visit in the autumn of 1929 to meet Herbert Hoover, the new president, to discuss outstanding issues personally, was a major diplomatic coup. Some of this received version is true. No one can doubt that MacDonald and his Labour ministry played a crucial role in helping to ameliorate the crisis that had been dogging good Anglo-American relations for more than two years before June 1929. The Labour Party constituted the government when the London naval conference of 1930 ended the period of Anglo-American naval rivalry. Moreover, for six months before that conference convened, Labour had conducted effective diplomacy in preparing for its deliberations.


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