Paris from EDC to WEU

1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Leites ◽  
Christian de la Malène

On July 28, 1949, the French parliament ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a week before, it had given its assent to the treaty establishing the Council of Europe. On May 9, 1950, M. Robert Schuman proposed the creation of a European coal and steel community.None of these arrangements for the defense of the free world and the unification of Europe altered France's status as one of the “big three” of the West: her sovereignty was not going to be substantially reduced by the institutions then created or planned.

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 538-549
Author(s):  
Max Beloff

In a year which sees the tenth anniversary of both the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) there are a number of good reasons for looking again at some aspects of the problems of these organizations of limited membership. The most important reason is that there is a general feeling in the western world that neither the “European” organizations nor NATO are working as well as might have been hoped, and that there is probably a good deal of room for improvement even within the limits set by the present public attitudes toward the counter-claims of “integration” and “national sovereignty” in the countries concerned.


1968 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 821-840 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Holmes

In confronting any question about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the late sixties one is uncomfortably aware of insistent questioning as to how much it all matters. Is NATO a device to meet horizontal challenges when the new challenges are vertical? Is “the West,” whatever that is, defending the Elbe when the struggle is going on in its own streets? These challenges from within are not the subversion directed from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which NATO subcommittees had always taken into their calculations. Insofar as they are Communist in inspiration at all, they are the consequences of the disruption of the Muscovite International. What makes them serious is that they have their roots in Western society itself. Perhaps the West has been too much preoccupied with interstate relations and the creation of superstates when the essential problems are internal—not isolated national phenomena certainly, but eruptions which ignore boundaries, in some cases intensely nationalistic and at the same time dedicated to removing the barriers between peoples. The new rebels are deeply skeptical of that “way of life” the West has insisted it was defending through NATO and believe nothing could be more irrelevant than a military alliance to defend it.


1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 253-254 ◽  

According to the press, the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its twelfth annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 13 to 15, 1961. It was reported that diplomatic soundings of the Soviet Union's intentions on Berlin would be undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom, Berwith the approval of thirteen other NATO partners and the acquiescence of France, The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, was reported to have expressed the view that the Soviet offensive on Berlin was aimed ultimately at the neutralization of Germany and the detachment of Germany and the Scandinavian counganization tries from the NATO alliance, and to have urged that the West strengthen its military forces.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-632 ◽  

On May 5, 1951, the Deputies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced the adoption by their governments of new terms of reference for the North Atlantic Council, a reorganization of the various committees of the Council, and the creation of a financial and economic board.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200942199391
Author(s):  
Simone Turchetti

This essay explores the reception of ‘nuclear winter’ at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This response is paradigmatic of how scientific predictions can work as stimuli for science diplomacy activities, and either inflate or deflate these forecasts’ public resonance. Those who elaborated the theory in the early 1980s predicted that the environmental consequences of a future nuclear conflict would have been catastrophic; possibly rendering the earth uninhabitable and leading to the extinction of humankind. This prospect was particularly problematic for the Western defence alliance, since it was difficult to reconcile with the tenets of its nuclear posture, especially after the 1979 Dual Track decision, engendering concerns about the environmental catastrophe that the scientists predicted. Thus, NATO officials refrained from commenting on nuclear winter and its implications for the alliance’s deterrence doctrine for some time in an effort to minimize public criticism. Meanwhile, they progressively removed research on nuclear winter from the set of studies and scientific debates sponsored by NATO in the context of its science initiatives. In essence, NATO officials ‘traded’ the promotion of these problematic studies with that of others more amenable to the alliance’s diplomacy ambitions.


Atmosphere ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 329
Author(s):  
Albenis Pérez-Alarcón ◽  
José C. Fernández-Alvarez ◽  
Rogert Sorí ◽  
Raquel Nieto ◽  
Luis Gimeno

The combined effect of the sea surface temperature (SST) and the North Atlantic subtropical high-pressure system (NASH) in the interannual variability of the genesis of tropical cyclones (TCs) and landfalling in the period 1980–2019 is explored in this study. The SST was extracted from the Centennial Time Scale dataset from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and TC records were obtained from the Atlantic Hurricane Database of the NOAA/National Hurricane Center. The genesis and landfalling regions were objectively clustered for this analysis. Seven regions of TC genesis and five for landfalling were identified. Intercluster differences were observed in the monthly frequency distribution and annual variability, both for genesis and landfalling. From the generalized least square multiple regression model, SST and NASH (intensity and position) covariates can explain 22.7% of the variance of the frequency of TC genesis, but it is only statistically significant (p < 0.1) for the NASH center latitude. The SST mostly modulates the frequency of TCs formed near the West African coast, and the NASH latitudinal variation affects those originated in the Lesser Antilles arc. For landfalling, both covariates explain 38.7% of the variance; however, significant differences are observed in the comparison between each region. With a statistical significance higher than 90%, SST and NASH explain 33.4% of the landfalling variability in the archipelago of the Bahamas and central–eastern region of Cuba. Besides, landfalls in the Gulf of Mexico and Central America seem to be modulated by SST. It was also found there was no statistically significant relationship between the frequency of genesis and landfalling with the NASH intensity. However, the NASH structure modulates the probability density of the TCs trajectory that make landfall once or several times in their lifetime. Thus, the NASH variability throughout a hurricane season affects the TCs trajectory in the North Atlantic basin. Moreover, we found that the landfalling frequency of TCs formed near the West Africa coast and the central North Atlantic is relatively low. Furthermore, the SST and NASH longitude center explains 31.6% (p < 0.05) of the variance of the landfalling intensity in the archipelago of the Bahamas, while the SST explains 26.4% (p < 0.05) in Central America. Furthermore, the 5-year moving average filter revealed decadal and multidecadal variability in both genesis and landfalling by region. Our findings confirm the complexity of the atmospheric processes involved in the TC genesis and landfalling.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


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