Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Schultz

This article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises. It combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two-party electoral choice. One state has two strategic actors—a government and an opposition party—both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo. The rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals. The parties' payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate. The model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state's preferences. This finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict, since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries, which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation.

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Janko Bekić

Revisionism is one of the main drivers of international conflict in the 21st century. Sensing the weakening of US global leadership, countries with regional or great power ambitions, especially former empires, increasingly resort to threats and the use of force to alter the status quo in their favour. In some cases, this involves military occupation, and even annexation of foreign territory. This article takes a closer look at neo‑Ottomanism, Turkey’s revisionist foreign policy, and its gradual transition from a soft‑power to a hard‑power approach, which eventually led to Ankara’s military incur‑ sion and occupation of parts of neighbouring Syria.


1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 215-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeev Maoz

The injection of a western world-view into a research field has never been more apparent than in the study—or rather9 the non-study—of crisis initiation. The status quo orientation of western strategic thought has led to a predisposition to view international crises as generically ‘bad’ and disruptive processes. The utilization of crises as a foreign policy instrument has long been perceived as taboo, despite the enormous diversity of crisis theory and research, and despite the locus of crisis at the ‘center of gravity’ between peaceful and violent interactions among states.


Author(s):  
Bernard Grofman

This article examines neo-Downsian models of party competition and voter choice, with a special emphasis on Riker’s notion of heresthetics. It argues that platform location is only one way in which parties or candidates compete to motivate voters to support them, with the neo-Downsian literature having moved well beyond the “classic comic book” version of Downs as simply predicting convergence to the views of the median voter when elections involve two-party contests held under plurality rules in single seat constituencies. The article considers a variety of models, including ones that emphasize the importance of changes in the location of the status quo, models with assimilation and contrast effects, models that look at differential issue salience and persuasion about the importance weights to be attached to different issue dimensions, and models that involve the introduction of new dimensions of political competition.


Author(s):  
Jonathan M. DiCicco ◽  
Victor M. Sanchez

International relations analysts often differentiate between status-quo and revisionist states. Revisionist states favor modifications to the prevailing order: its rules and norms, its distribution of goods or benefits, its implicit structure or hierarchy, its social rankings that afford status or recognition, its division of territory among sovereign entities, and more. Analyses of revisionist states’ foreign policies and behaviors have explored sources and types of revisionism, choices of revisionist strategies, the interplay of revisionist and status-quo states, and the prospects for peaceful or violent change in the system. Intuitive but imprecise, the concepts of revisionism and revisionist states often are used without explicit definition, reflective discussion, or rigorous operationalization. For these reasons, efforts to conceptualize and measure revisionism merit special attention. Highlighted works promise to improve understanding of revisionism as a phenomenon, as well as its use in theoretical and empirical analyses of international conflict, war, and the peaceful accommodation of rising powers. Three questions guide the survey. First, who is seeking to revise what? This question opens a foray into the realm of the status quo and its distinct components, particularly in the context of rising and resurgent powers. Second, what is revisionism, and how is it detected or recognized? This question prompts an exploration of the concept and how it is brought to life in scholarly analyses. The third guiding question invites theoretical perspective: How does revisionism help one understand international relations? Provisional answers to that question open avenues for future inquiry.


2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Chen Weiss

AbstractHow can authoritarian states credibly signal their intentions in international crises? Nationalist, antiforeign protests are one mechanism by which authoritarian leaders can visibly demonstrate their domestic vulnerability. Because protests in authoritarian states are risky and costly to repress, the decision to allow or stifle popular mobilization is informative. The threat of instability demonstrates resolve, and the cost of concession increases the credibility of a tough stance. The danger of instability and escalation increases foreign incentives to make concessions and preserve the status quo. This logic helps explain the pattern of authoritarian tolerance and repression toward nationalist protest. A case study of two U.S.-China crises shows how China's management of anti-American protests affected U.S. beliefs about Chinese resolve.


Author(s):  
Alex Dyzenhaus

The Rift Valley is Kenya’s largest and most populous province, whose diverse peoples and rich resources have led it to be central to Kenya’s politics and development. The province has also been the site of intense political competition and even electoral violence. This chapter analyses continuity and change in the Rift after the devolution of authority to county governments. First, it looks at how devolution has created the foundation for limited and ultimately unsuccessful local challenges to the broader political coalition representing the Rift Valley’s largest group, the Kalenjin. Second, it examines how devolution has led to electoral competition that has at times produced cross-ethnic cooperation, but at others has led to exclusion. Access to county funds and natural resources (like land, cattle, and oil) have also fuelled local competition. Despite the changes, the 2017 elections revealed the staying power of the status quo in Rift Valley politics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 1021-1034 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomohiro Mikanagi

AbstractIn its 2015 judgment in the Costa Rica v Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Nicaragua's establishment of a military presence in disputed territory violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica. Two judges considered that Nicaragua's actions had constituted a breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter, but the majority of the judges chose not to pronounce on the issue. Whilst it has been clarified that the prohibition of the use of force applies to a disputed territory, it seems less clear as to whether such force has to be violent in nature, causing injury to human beings or damage to property, for it to be in breach of Article 2(4). The ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case strongly indicated that the construction of the wall breached Article 2(4). If a State establishes a military presence to change the status quo in a disputed territory, it would not be regarded as a ‘peaceful’ means of settling the territorial dispute. Therefore, such behaviour would violate Article 2(3), under which States shall settle their international disputes ‘exclusively’ by peaceful means. Furthermore, to constitute an unlawful use of force under Article 2(4), the establishment of a military presence in a disputed territory does not have to be violent but should involve coercion that makes it materially impossible for other claimants to restore the status quo ante without risking human injury or damage to property.


2013 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff D. Colgan

There is a strong scholarly consensus that domestic revolutions create conditions ripe for international conflict. Traditionally scholars have treated revolutions as events, after which there is a period of time during which international conflict is more likely. Yet some states experience significant international conflict only during and in the immediate aftermath of a revolution, whereas other states continue to engage in conflict for many years and even decades afterward. This article seeks to explain the persistence of conflict for some but not all revolutionary states by differentiating the concept of revolutionary leaders from that of revolutions as events, both theoretically and empirically. The author shows that existing theories linking revolution to international conflict underemphasize an important mechanism through which revolution leads to conflict: by selecting conflict-prone leaders through the dynamics of revolutionary politics. He argues that revolutionary politics allow leaders with certain characteristics, including high risk tolerance and strong political ambition to alter the status quo, to obtain executive office because individuals without these characteristics generally do not succeed in leading revolutions. Having obtained power, revolutionary leaders have aggressive preferences that make their states more likely than nonrevolutionary states to instigate international conflict.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 467-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anahit Shirinyan

The 4-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 has shown that a shift in the political and military balance of power between the conflicting parties is not enough to reverse the status quo by military means. The use of force and the threat of war aggravate the conflict’s security dilemma, further consolidating the status quo. As the osce Minsk Group’s mediation efforts remain hostage to the geopolitics behind the conflict, it is the political will of the conflicting parties and their adherence to fair play and mutual compromise that can shift the logic of the conflict’s dynamics into a more constructive course.


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