Agrarian Problems and the Moscow-Peking Axis

Slavic Review ◽  
1962 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-698
Author(s):  
Karl A. Wittfogel

Officially the one-centeredness of the Communist world ended in 1943. In that year the Communist International, which had recognized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the hegemon, was dissolved, because the new political situation demanded the “great flexibility and independence” of the various “sections.“ The people's democracies that a few years later came into being in Eastern Europe emphasized, as Brzezinski has noted, that they “were to be sovereign—not Soviet. Their relations with the USSR were to be, naturally, ‘friendly’ but founded on mutual recognition of the principles of independence and noninterference in internal affairs.“ Thus ideologically the transformation of international communism into a complex with many allegedly independent power-holding and power-seeking Communist parties was proclaimed long before Togliatti in 1956 asserted that the Communist world was becoming “polycentric.”

Author(s):  
Johanna Granville

About forty years ago, the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe-the 1956 Hungarian revolt-took place. Western observers have long held an image of the Soviet Union as a crafty monolith that expertly, in the realpolitik tradition, intervened while the West was distracted by the Suez crisis. People also believed that Soviet repressive organs worked together efficiently to crack down on the Hungarian "counterrevolutionaries. " Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes ofkey meetings of the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) taken by Vladimir Mal in, reveal that the Soviet Union in fact had difficulty working with its Hungarian allies.


Slavic Review ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bogdan Denitch

The Seventh World Congress of Sociologists in Varna, Bulgaria, held in September 1970, marked a major stage in the development of social science, particularly sociology, in the one-party states of Eastern Europe. Taking place in the most orthodox country of an increasingly diverse bloc, the congress was characterized by the largest and best-organized participation to date of sociologists from Eastern Europe. One country in the area—Albania—did not participate at all; and Yugoslavia, which is probably the country with the most developed social science community and institutions, had a notably small delegation. Yet the fact is that for prestige reasons, if no other, the East European countries and the Soviet Union did their best to show the state of their current development of sociology. This was shown in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Most delegates presented papers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-144
Author(s):  
Tomasz Gajownik

The non-aggression pact concluded in November 1932 between France and the Soviet Union was on the one hand the peak achievement of French diplomacy in implementing the plan of strengthening influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and on the other the growing position of Moscow in the international arena. The signed document was the first inter-state agreement concluded by France and the USSR. From the perspective of the Second Polish Republic, the Franco-Soviet rapprochement could have had certain unfavorable consequences. That is why both civilian and military factors closely watched the negotiation process between both parties and tried to determine the actual state of bilateral relations.


1951 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam B. Ulam

The creation of the Cominform in the summer of 1947 marked an important stage in the development of communism in Europe. The precise reasons that led the leaders of Soviet Communism to revive a public form of co-operation between several Communist parties remain to this day uncertain. What is obvious is the use to which the Cominform has been put during its brief existence up to now. It has acted as an added catalyst of social and political change in the satellite countries. Its resolutions, like the one on the occasion of the expulsion of Yugoslavia from that body, have laid down the broad lines of policy to be pursued by the People's Democracies on such vital issues as the question of collectivization of agriculture, the “nationalist deviation,” etc. The original concept of the Com-inform included, undoubtedly, creation of the appearance of complete autonomy of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. The language of the speeches at the founding meeting and the choice of the seat for the new organization, outside of the Soviet Union, testify as to the serious attempt to present the collaboration between the Soviet Union and her Communist allies under a veneer of equality. If the picture thus presented seemed to lack realism to the Communist leaders from Poland or Yugoslavia, it is unreasonable to assume that the propaganda effect of the establishment of the Cominform was entirely lost upon the masses who had, since the end of the war, joined the ranks of the ruling parties in the satellite states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 100-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Zaytsev

The journal Slavyane was created by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as an organ of internal and external political propaganda aimed at Russian-speaking Slavs. It reflected the pullback of Soviet foreign policy from proletarian internationalism. The policy of its editorial board towards Yugoslavia repeated the one of the Party, but sensitive subjects were avoided or covered with a delay on the pages of the journal. Josip Broz Tito as spokesman for the aspirations of Yugoslav peoples was extolle since 1943 while D. Mihajlović’s activities had not been covered until his condemnation in October 1943. The journal supported the government of the People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until early 1948, condemned it since late 1949 to early 1953, kept silence on Yugoslavia for several months in 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. Each time such deliberate silence had been caused by the aggravation or, on the contrary, by attempts to break ice in relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) / the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia / the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. The only exception from the rule seems to be Issue 5/1953 of the journal which contains anti-Tito insults but they may be due to struggle on top of the Soviet government. Overall, the policy of the editorial board was marked by more caution and desire to cover up problems than the policy of Party newspapers.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth P. Coughlan

On December 13, 1981, the Polish military under the leadership of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law, effectively ending sixteen months of popular protest and bargaining between the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) and the independent trade union Solidarity. In the West, and particularly in the United States, martial law was interpreted as the Polish military declaring war on its own people on the orders of the Soviet Union. It was assumed and repeatedly asserted that the military was loyal to the Communist Party and to the Soviet high command, that they were little more than communists in uniform.  Such an assertion, however, leaves one hard pressed to explain the acquiescence of the militaries across Eastern Europe to the changes of 1989 and the ability of those militaries to adapt to noncommunist regimes to the point of being willing and even eager to join NATO.


Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer

Brezhnev’s Bureaucratic Leninism was broadly emulated (or imposed) in East European communist regimes. But it was controversial and led to many rejections. The Prague Spring of 1968 was an effort to democratize the communist party from within. It was crushed by Warsaw Pact troops. Poland experienced a repeated wave of worker rebellions, as well as a cross-class alliance that resulted in Solidarity almost coming to power, until it was crushed in 1981 by Polish special-service troops. Hungary experimented with narrow-scope marketization of its economy, insufficient to create prosperity, but enough to avoid the extent of economic stagnation plaguing the Soviet Union. All these set the stage for Gorbachev’s reforms.


Slavic Review ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Korbonski

Writing some ten years ago about the changing political situation in the Soviet Union, Allen Kassof made the astute observation, “Although liberalization tells something about where the Soviet system has come from, it does not say very much about where it is going. To say that the system is being liberalized is like walking away backward from a receding reference point, a procedure that gives too little information about what lies on the road ahead.” It is clear that this statement applies with even greater force to Eastern Europe—even if we were to substitute “change” for “liberalization.” Anyone reckless enough to write about the prospects for change in Eastern Europe is faced with an almost impossible task, certainly a more difficult one than for the Soviet Union, or for that matter China, where at least there is, or was, a single reference point—be it Stalinism or Maoism, totalitarianism or the “administered society.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-475
Author(s):  
Witold Małecki

In 1956, the Soviet legal science resumed discussion on the structure of the legal system, in particular — its division into branches. In the years 1938–1956, as a result of rejecting the concept of unified economic law, Soviet science did not use the category of “economic law” at all. The first scholar who in 1956 re-proposed the separation of economic law in the Soviet legal system was Vramshap Samsonovich Tadevosyan. His arguments for the separation of economic law referred to both practical (pragmatic) and theoretical reasons. On the one hand, Tadevosyan pointed out that the separation of economic law would contribute to improving the legal system of national economy management, which would be conducive to the implementation of the sixth five-year plan, adopted at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. On the other hand, he emphasized that regulating the functioning of the national economy by the provisions of civil law — as has been the case so far — was unacceptable due to the incompatibility of relations within the national economy with the civil law paradigm. Tadevosyan saw economic law as one from among the three branches of the Soviet legal system — the other branches being state law and civil law.


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