Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature

1961 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Oakley

R. G. Collingwood has suggested that the basic contrast between the Greek view of nature and what he calls the Renaissance view, springs from the difference between their respective analogical approaches to nature. Whereas, he argues, the Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based on an analogy between the world of nature and the individual human being, the Renaissance view conceived the world analogically as a machine. Instead of being regarded as capable of ordering its own movements in a rational manner, and, it might be added, according to its immanent laws, the world, to such a view, is devoid both of intelligence and life, the movements which it exhibits are imposed from without, and “their regularity due to 'laws of nature' likewise imposed from without.” Coiling- wood concludes, therefore, that this view presupposed both the human experience of designing and constructing machines, and the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God.

2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (115) ◽  
pp. 345
Author(s):  
Maria Clara Lucchetti Bingemer

Diante do panorama extremamente complexo do campo religioso hoje o documento de Aparecida declara estar o ser humano do século XXI em meio a uma “mudança de época”. Ao lado do processo de secularização, que leva o ser humano a não temer declarar sua ausência de crença em Deus e sua não pertença a qualquer sistema religioso, está igualmente o revival” religioso anárquico e selvagem que fez eclodir seitas e novas propostas “espirituais” dos mais variados perfis, questionando em profundidade a decantada supremacia do monoteísmo cristão no Ocidente. A proposta neste artigo é, depois de uma breve análise da situação da religião no mundo e especialmente no Brasil hoje, refletir sobre a diferença entre fé e religião e como esta reflexão, tomada em sua radicalidade, leva a uma compreensão renovada do que seja a fé cristã e sua identidade no mundo atual. Para chegar a isto, são analisados três elementos constitutivos da fé cristã: a historicidade, a experiência e o testemunho, no desejo de traçar um perfil aproximado de uma tendência importante na teologia cristã hoje, que prefere definir o Cristianismo mais como uma revelação do que como uma religião.ABSTRACT: Before the extremely complex panorama of the religious field today the document of Aparecida declares the human being of the XXI century to be in the mist of an “epoch change”. On the side of the secularização process, that leads the human being not to fear in declaring his lack of belief in God and his not belonging to any religious system, there is also the religious anarchical and wild “revival” that brought out sects and new “spiritual” proposals of the most varied profiles, questioning in depth the decanted supremacy of Christian monotheism in the Occident. The proposal of this article is, after a brief analysis of the situation of religion in the world and especially in Brazil today, to reflect on the difference between faith and religion and how this reflection, taken in its radicality, leads to a renewed understanding of what Christian faith is and its identity in the current world. To arrive at this, three constituent elements of the Christian faith are analyzed: the historicity, the experience and the witness, in the desire to trace a profile that approaches an important trend in the Christian theology, which prefers to define Christianity more as a revelation than as a religion.


1972 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-57
Author(s):  
William Michelsen

Hil dig, Frelser og Forsoner. An essay in close readingBy William MichelsenThis article should be read as a reply to Niels Egebaks interpretation of the same hymn in Grundtvig-Studier 1971. Jørgen Elbek3s characterisation of Grundtvig’s Sang-Værk - the point that it “demands to be regarded as the unanimous hymn of praise of the Danish church of today” (ibid. 1959) - and Magnus Stevns’s analysis of the difference between Grundtvig’s and Kingo’s Easter hymns are adduced in support of the claim that from beginning to end this hymn aims at the paradoxical goal of loving life while bearing in mind the reality of death. It is only in the beginning of the poem, however, that this aim is enigmatic, where the image of winding a rose garland round the Cross is employed. - Egebak seems to regard the religious feelings expressed in Grundtvig’s hymns as an ideology created by the human mind, that is, something that man can trace back to himself. Instead, the claim is made that faith is confidence in something beyond man. Man cannot live without a greater or lesser amount of confidence in his environment. Confidence in an extra-human outside world is a condition for existence, which manifests itself in religion or religious feelings. The Gospel of Christ presupposes this situation. So does the hymn we are concerned with.The writer of a poem is speaking for himself, but the hymn writer is speaking on behalf of any Christian. In this point lies the difference in kind between the poem “De Levendes Land” and the hymn “O Christelighed!” - A hymn presupposes faith. A poem may lead towards faith or away from faith or be indifferent towards faith. A poem may express nihilism, a hymn may not. – An ideology or theology may be a conceptual superstructure on the fundamental faith. But neither ideology nor theology is faith. It is inconceivable that the word “ troer” in st. 2 should express a mere assumption, let alone st. 8 and st. 11.The reason that the Danish Hymn Book leaves out st.2-4 may be certain offending expressions, or that they express a belief that is not common to all worshippers (“Thi jeg troer, Du er tilstæde” ). Here, then, we have an aspect of faith that is disputed, but not an assumption. Egebak identifies the “ I” of the hymn with “the writer” rather than with the individual Christian singing the hymn, and he confronts the two persons with each other. This confrontation is at odds with the concept of “hymn” as a literary genre. But it is particularly unreasonable when, as here, we are dealing with a new version of an old hymn.Egebak’s opposition between “ the world” and “ I” (of st. 1) as if it covertly pervaded the whole hymn presupposes a pietistic line of thought that is alien to the hymn. I cannot change “Hjertets Haardhed, Hjertets Kulde” – only God can. Egebak is right that death is the personal cause of the despair and doubts of human being - and this is true not only in the case of the hymn writer. Faith is an answer to this, but to man it remains an insoluble mystery. The poet cannot redeem himself; but a hymn is the literary expression of faith, frequently wavering, in a superhuman power.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Khusnul Mualim

Humanistic thought in education has always been interesting to be discussed. As between two figures who discuss humanistic education is Naquib al-Attas and Paulo Freire. The purpose of doing research is the study of humanistic thought from the second related about: (1) the meaning of humanistic psychology in education; (2) the thought of humanistic Naquib al-Attas and Paulo Freire; (3) the Humanistic Education in Islam; and (4) Seeking similarities and differences of humanistic thought both figures in the context of Islamic education. A research method in this research is qualitative research. The collection of data in this study using the method of documentation. Data analysis was done by providing a hidden meaning to the data that was successfully collected based on primary data. The technique of the validity of the data by triangulation. Based on the results of research conducted, the following conclusions were obtained: (1) the Humanistic in Islamic education is a process of education that paying more attention to aspects of human potential as being given a chance by the Almighty God to develop the potential in themselves;  (2) the MenurutNaquib al-Attas, humanistic religious concept puts human being having regard to responsibility. Meanwhile, according to Paulo Freire, humanistic is the concept of giving freedom to the individual human being; (3) the Humanistic Education in Islam is an effort of the embodiment or manifestation of the self in the world of Islamic education; (4) the equation of the theory of both figures are located on its object, the man. While the difference is based on human concepts, goals, and values.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 187-200
Author(s):  
Govinda K. Shah

The article explores the various meanings and concepts of secularism presented by famous ideologues and sociologists of their time. Two contrary concepts of the secularism - one that defines secularism as denial of existence of religions or supernatural forces and another that defines secularism as concept of peaceful co-existence and mutual harmony has been discussed here. The difference of application of secularism on the individual human being and a state is also explained here. The article concludes that no state of human being can remain isolated or indifferent from the influence of religion even if they want. None of the concepts of secularism apply in real life performances; neither on individual nor state.


1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 400-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Huchingson ◽  
June Huchingson

Throughout the 70 years that Waldorf schools around the world have been educating children, the teachers and parents in these schools have been excited by their observations. They observe their children becoming confident, conscious, thought-provoking individuals. Through a curriculum of “academics permeated with the arts” (J. Huchingson, 1990), the teacher stands as an evocateur and midwife assisting as the gifts within the individual human being are brought forth.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 573-599
Author(s):  
Alex Batesmith ◽  
Jake Stevens

This article explores how ‘everyday’ lawyers undertaking routine criminal defence cases navigate an authoritarian legal system. Based on original fieldwork in the ‘disciplined democracy’ of Myanmar, the article examines how hegemonic state power and a functional absence of the rule of law have created a culture of passivity among ordinary practitioners. ‘Everyday’ lawyers are nevertheless able to uphold their clients’ dignity by practical and material support for the individual human experience – and in so doing, subtly resist, evade or disrupt state power. The article draws upon the literature on the sociology of lawyering and resistance, arguing for a multilayered understanding of dignity going beyond lawyers’ contributions to their clients’ legal autonomy. Focusing on dignity provides an alternative perspective to the otherwise often all-consuming rule of law discourse. In authoritarian legal systems, enhancing their clients’ dignity beyond legal autonomy may be the only meaningful contribution that ‘everyday’ lawyers can make.


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.


Author(s):  
Eugene S. Poliakov

The Parable of the Unjust Steward should be interpreted allegorically, its literal interpretation shown to be impossible. Certain facts make this parable unique: a lord as the Lord; divine possessions; the symbolism of the house interpreted as a human being; the material principles of the world understood as the governor of a human being; the Lord’s debtors as spiritual teachers of various kinds; theological doctrines with their own theogonic and cosmogonic views, all claiming to know the truth in its wholeness. Their debts consist of their misunderstandings and errors which have caused the difference between them and truth. Examples of the part of the material principles of the world in correcting theological doctrines are adduced. Two different kinds of debt are considered. I conclude that ‘make to yourselves friends of the riches of unrighteousness’ means that the material reasons of the world, the wisdom of this age, must be used for the good of spiritual teachings.


PMLA ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl R. Wasserman

The current insistence upon a new poetic mythology to serve as a unifying reference frame for human experience and thought has recently provoked from Bertrand H. Bronson a brilliant defense of the eighteenth-century use of personified abstractions.1 Bronson properly recognizes in the eighteenth-century affection for personification a reflection of the emotional power lent to universals by the mathematicism that had created a sense of an ordered universe operating by simple and general laws. To the unity of this “view of the world so comprehensive and assured as to enable us to state common experience in general terms” he has opposed the fragmentary world of modern naturalism which requires expression by fragmentary concrete symbols. The neoclassicist conceived the norm to be the universal, which particulars struggle to fashion, and therefore he sought, in the highest forms of his art, to express himself in terms equally eternal and comprehensive as the laws of nature. Personification satisfied the desire for the grandeur of generality; “labored particularities” in themselves distract from the largeness of thought, for “great thoughts are always general.” Bronson's paper is salutary, for we have too long and too uncritically scorned what one modern critic has called “those allegorical capitals which the age affected.” We are indeed misguided in judging on the basis of our own responses, conditioned by our own civilization alone, that the personified abstraction was but a literary convention sterile of emotional force in the eighteenth century. And in relating personification to the emotional excitation the age received from the contemplation of a harmonious universe, Bronson has supplied us with the proper framework for a more nearly accurate reading of much eighteenth-century poetry.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-69
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

Whether or not Strauss's observation is historically accurate, it does suggest two sets of questions for philosophical examination. (1) Is Strauss correct to view natural duties and natural rights as the same type of ethical concept? Do they serve the same function? Do they work on the same level, and are they necessarily in competition with each other? (2) Does saying that the individual human being is the center of the moral world require that one reject the idea of a human end, or telos? Does accepting the ethical centrality of a human telos require that one reject ethical individualism? Are they mutually exclusive?


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