Waldorf Education as a Program for Gifted Students

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 400-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Huchingson ◽  
June Huchingson

Throughout the 70 years that Waldorf schools around the world have been educating children, the teachers and parents in these schools have been excited by their observations. They observe their children becoming confident, conscious, thought-provoking individuals. Through a curriculum of “academics permeated with the arts” (J. Huchingson, 1990), the teacher stands as an evocateur and midwife assisting as the gifts within the individual human being are brought forth.

1961 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Oakley

R. G. Collingwood has suggested that the basic contrast between the Greek view of nature and what he calls the Renaissance view, springs from the difference between their respective analogical approaches to nature. Whereas, he argues, the Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based on an analogy between the world of nature and the individual human being, the Renaissance view conceived the world analogically as a machine. Instead of being regarded as capable of ordering its own movements in a rational manner, and, it might be added, according to its immanent laws, the world, to such a view, is devoid both of intelligence and life, the movements which it exhibits are imposed from without, and “their regularity due to 'laws of nature' likewise imposed from without.” Coiling- wood concludes, therefore, that this view presupposed both the human experience of designing and constructing machines, and the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God.


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-69
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

Whether or not Strauss's observation is historically accurate, it does suggest two sets of questions for philosophical examination. (1) Is Strauss correct to view natural duties and natural rights as the same type of ethical concept? Do they serve the same function? Do they work on the same level, and are they necessarily in competition with each other? (2) Does saying that the individual human being is the center of the moral world require that one reject the idea of a human end, or telos? Does accepting the ethical centrality of a human telos require that one reject ethical individualism? Are they mutually exclusive?


1987 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Leslie White

In letters to Mrs. Ernest Benzon and Mrs. Thomas FitzGerald, Browning claims affinity with the great philosopher of the Will, Schopenhauer, and asserts that elements of vitalism are the “substratum” of his life and work. These letters confirm the poet's place in the line of vitalist thought shaped by Schopenhauer, the English Romantics, and Carlyle and further developed by Nietzsche, George Bernard Shaw, Henri Bergson, and D. H. Lawrence. Vitalism resists precise definition; each theorist advances a singular terminology and application. Schopenhauer's vitalism may be understood from his concept of cosmic Will; Carlyle's from the essential presence of energy, movement, and change in the world. Bergson used the term élan vital and Lawrence such characteristically vague phrases as “sense of truth” and “supreme impulse” to express faith in forces operating beneath or hovering above the surface of life. Broadly put, when a rational orientation to the world ceased to be adequate, when rationalism devolved into a falsification of reality's authentic energy, major vitalists came into existence and posited as the true reality a primitive, universal force of which everything in that reality is an objectification. Unlike other vitalists in the English tradition, such as Blake and Lawrence, Browning was not comfortable with cosmic images. His vitalism breaks from the main line to focus on the individual human will, which he saw as an intuitive impulse and as a means to realize the self and locate its place in the world. For Browning, the comprehension of life's vital movement lay in the dynamic energy of willed action.


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicki L. Lee

This paper considers the question “What is a psychological unit?”. The ubiquity of units in daily life and in science is considered. The assumption that the individual human being or animal is the psychological unit is examined and rejected. The units represented by the data collected in operant laboratories are interpreted as a subset of the well-defined changes that individual human beings or animals can bring about. The departure of this interpretation from the traditional interpretation in terms of the behaviour of the organism is acknowledged. The paper concludes by noting the relation of the present interpretation of operant research to the problem of identifying psychological units.


1973 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-219
Author(s):  
William Michelsen

Grundtvig for teaching purposes.N. F. S. Grundtvig: Tre Danne-Virke-artikler. Aarhus 1972. Studieserien, published by the Danish Teachers’ Association: Grundtvig og det folkelige (by Marianne Ju h l Christiansen and Lise Ettrup), Organisme tanken (by Aage Henriksen) and Tværsnit 1870 (by Peter Søby Kristensen). Copenhagen 1972 and 1973. Reviewed by W illiam Michelsen. These booklets show that it is not only Grundtvig’s best-known hymns and poems which are used for teaching purposes, but also the prose he wrote as a critic and a speaker. In the booklet about Grundtvig and the people, there is furthermore a definition of the idea of »det folkelige« (what pertains to the people), which accords with Grundtvig’s own ideas and which is supported by the texts that follow, which also include his imitators and critics.There is no doubt at all that Grundtvig regarded the people - the individual nation - as a living organism developing in a comparable manner to the individual human being. In this respect he was a romantic and can - in a way – be counted among the thinkers who suscribed to the »organism idea«, as Aage Henriksen expresses it. But when this idea is traced back to Spinoza and carried forward to Hegel, Marx and Freud, one must nevertheless protest against Grundtvig - along with Henrich Steffens and Paul Diderichsen - being the only Danish representative, from whose works a passage is quoted (from October 1810 – see Grundtvig-Studier 1956). He was in reality (from December 1810) an opponent of the whole of this school of thought, apart from in his acceptance of the idea of the people as an organism.


1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 206-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Dinstein

The individual human being is manifestly the object of every legal system on this planet, and consequently also of international law. The ordinary subject of international law is the international corporate entity: first and foremost (though not exclusively) the State. Yet, the corporate entity is not a tangible res that exists in reality, but an abstract notion, moulded through legal manipulation by and within the ambit of a superior legal system. When the veil is pierced, one can see that behind the legal personality of the State (or any other international corporate entity) there are natural persons: flesh-and-blood human beings. In the final analysis, Westlake was indubitably right when he stated: The duties and rights of States are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them.That is to say, in actuality, the international rights and duties of States devolve on human beings, albeit indirectly and collectively. In other words, the individual human being is not merely the object of international law, but indirectly also its subject, notwithstanding the fact that, ostensibly, the subject is the international corporate entity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Alexandre A. Martins ◽  

This paper argues that Simone Weil developed an anthropology of the human condition that is a radical ontology of the human spirit rooted in reality. Weil begins her account from the real, but this real is not only the historical or social reality. It is also what is true about the human person as a created being in connection with the transcendent reality. She believes that affliction reveals the human condition and provides an openness to transcendence in which the individual finds the meaning of the human operation of spirit. Therefore, Weil’s radical ontology is based on a philosophy of the human being as an agent rooted in the world. In order to be rooted, a human being needs decreation (the creation of a new human) and incarnation (cross and love in the world). In her radical ontology derived from attention to the real, Weil argues for an active incarnation in social reality that recognizes others, especially the unfortunates, for the purpose of empowering them and promoting their dignity. Her radical ontology incarnates the human in the world between necessity and good, that is, between the natural and the supernatural.


Author(s):  
Marc von Boemcken

This conceptual chapter situates the theoretical and empirical approach adopted here within the wider body of literature on security and danger in Central Asia. It is, in this sense, in parts a literature review. Moreover, it explains the concept of securityscapes in terms of combining two established analytical perspectives in (Critical) Security Studies, namely a focus on the individual human being as principal referent-object ('deepening' of security) and an understanding of security as a social practice rather than an objectively measurable condition of existence (praxeology of security). All the subsequent empirical chapters proceed from the conceptual clarifications presented here.


1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Locke

In his recent and suitably provocative book on The Object of Morality G. J. Warnock argues that the fundamental moral concern is with what he sums up as the ‘amelioration of the human predicament’, a predicament which is made even more pressing by the natural limitations of our human sympathies. The distinctively moral virtues, Warnock concludes, will be those dispositions which tend to countervail these natural limitations, especially non-maleficence, fairness, beneficence, and non-deception; and from these fundamental moral virtues we can derive, in turn, four fundamental moral standards or principles. The theory of morality—and it is thank heaven a theory of morality, not of moral language—which I have crudely summarised here seems to me correct as far as it goes, but it also seems to me that Warnock’s concentration on the predicament of the individual human being leads him to ignore what is at least as fundamental, the essentially social and interpersonal aspect of much morality.


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