Composable Markov processes

1970 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 400-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Schweder

Many phenomena studied in the social sciences and elsewhere are complexes of more or less independent characteristics which develop simultaneously. Such phenomena may often be realistically described by time-continuous finite Markov processes. In order to define such a model which will take care of all the relevant a priori information, there ought to be a way of defining a Markov process as a vector of components representing the various characteristics constituting the phenomenon such that the dependences between the characteristics are represented by explicit requirements on the Markov process, preferably on its infinitesimal generator.

1970 ◽  
Vol 7 (02) ◽  
pp. 400-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Schweder

Many phenomena studied in the social sciences and elsewhere are complexes of more or less independent characteristics which develop simultaneously. Such phenomena may often be realistically described by time-continuous finite Markov processes. In order to define such a model which will take care of all the relevant a priori information, there ought to be a way of defining a Markov process as a vector of components representing the various characteristics constituting the phenomenon such that the dependences between the characteristics are represented by explicit requirements on the Markov process, preferably on its infinitesimal generator.


Author(s):  
Harold Kincaid

Positivism originated from separate movements in nineteenth-century social science and early twentieth-century philosophy. Key positivist ideas were that philosophy should be scientific, that metaphysical speculations are meaningless, that there is a universal and a priori scientific method, that a main function of philosophy is to analyse that method, that this basic scientific method is the same in both the natural and social sciences, that the various sciences should be reducible to physics, and that the theoretical parts of good science must be translatable into statements about observations. In the social sciences and the philosophy of the social sciences, positivism has supported the emphasis on quantitative data and precisely formulated theories, the doctrines of behaviourism, operationalism and methodological individualism, the doubts among philosophers that meaning and interpretation can be scientifically adequate, and an approach to the philosophy of social science that focuses on conceptual analysis rather than on the actual practice of social research. Influential criticisms have denied that scientific method is a priori or universal, that theories can or must be translatable into observational terms, and that reduction to physics is the way to unify the sciences. These criticisms have undercut the motivations for behaviourism and methodological individualism in the social sciences. They have also led many to conclude, somewhat implausibly, that any standards of good social science are merely matters of rhetorical persuasion and social convention.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 110-125
Author(s):  
Samarane Fonseca de Souza Barros

Na atual realidade urbana brasileira, muito se tem discutido sobre o papel das cidades médias nas regiões e redes urbanas as quais estão alocadas. Ao considerar as cidades médias para além de seu porte demográfico, nota-se uma multiplicidade em suas funções e temporalidades distintas que coexistem, bem como uma série de pares analíticos e dialéticos inerentes ao seu cotidiano. Para isto, propõe com o presente trabalho a análise do método regressivo-progressivo do filósofo Henri Lefebvre como possibilidade para o estudo das cidades médias. Apesar do método ter sido lançado, à priori, como investigação da sociologia rural, outras camadas das ciências sociais vêm se apropriando dele, inclusive a Geografia Urbana. Palavras-chave: Henri Lefebvre. Método regressivo-progressivo. Cidades médias.   THE REGRESSIVE-PROGRESSIVE METHOD LIKE A POSSIBILITY TO STUDIES OF SIZED-MEDIUM CITIES ABSTRACT In the current brazilian urban reality, much has been discussed about the function of medium-sized cities in the regions and urban networks that are allocated. In considering medium-sized cities beyond their demographic size, there is a multiplicity in their distinct functions and temporalities that coexist, as well as a series of analytical and dialectical pairs in their daily lives. For this, it proposes with the present work the analysis of the regressive-progressive method of the philosopher Henri Lefebvre as a possibility for the study of the medium-sized e cities. Although the method has been launched, first, as an investigation of rural sociology, other layers of the social sciences have been appropriating it, including Urban Geography.  Key Words: Henri Lefebvre. Regressive-progressive method. Medium-sized cities.   EL MÉTODO REGRESSIVO-PROGRESIVO COMO POSIBILIDAD PARA LOS ESTUDIOS DE LAS CIUDADES MEDIAS RESUMEN En la actual realidad urbana brasileña, mucho se ha discutido sobre el papel de las ciudades medias en las regiones y redes urbanas a las que están asignadas. Al considerar las ciudades medias más allá de su tamaño demográfico, se nota una multiplicidad en sus funciones y temporalidades distintas que coexisten, así como una serie de pares analíticos y dialécticos inherentes a su cotidiano. Para ello, propone con el presente trabajo el análisis del método regresivo-progresivo del filósofo Henri Lefebvre como posibilidad para el estudio de las ciudades medias. A pesar de que el método fue lanzado, a priori, como investigación de la sociología rural, otras capas de las ciencias sociales se vienen apropiando de él, incluso la Geografía Urbana. Palabras clave: Henri Lefebvre. Método regressivo-progressivo. Ciudades medias.


1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert F. Hoselitz

When John Stuart Mill composed his System of Logic, he maintained that valid application of the comparative method to problems in the moral or social sciences is impossible, or, at best, inadmissible, since it must be based on a priori judgments. Mill founded his objection to the use of this method in social science on two essentially interrelated propositions: the uniqueness of each social event, and the multiplicity and variety of causal factors which may be considered as having a determining influence on these events. Although this conception of the special nature of social events has, on the whole, remained unchanged, social scientists have freely applied the comparative method to the analysis of social problems. History has been outstanding among the social sciences in rejecting longest the application of this method. The main argument against its use was derived from the description of history formulated by Ranke and his school, a description which was endowed with a philosophical underpinning by Windelband and Rickert, who classified sciences according to method into a nomothetic and an ideographic group. History was the ideographic science par excellence, and with the strong historical emphasis that was placed in Germany upon other social sciences as well, there was a tendency to return to the viewpoint of Mill and to regard as scientifically suspect generalizations in social science based on the application of the comparative method.


2003 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Albert

AbstractBayesianism is the predominant philosophy of science in North-America, the most important school of statistics world-wide, and the general version of the rational-choice approach in the social sciences. Although often rejected as a theory of actual behavior, it is still the benchmark case of perfect rationality. The paper reviews the development of Bayesianism in philosophy, statistics and decision making and questions its status as an account of perfect rationality. Bayesians, who otherwise are squarely in the empiricist camp, invoke a priori reasoning when they recommend Bayesian methods - a recommendation that is not justified by their own standards.


2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.L. Noll

AbstractOver the centuries, rabbis, priests and laity have wrestled with the Bible's various and often conflicting portraits of the God Yahweh. The social sciences suggest that each Yahweh text reflects the needs of the communities that formulated the text. Also, academic research has explored the reception of the complete Bible by religious communities. With the exception of so-called canonical criticism, very little work has been done on the transition between these two stages of the Bible's (and Yahweh's) evolution, from initial composition of texts to complete biblical canon. But canonical criticism usually presumes, a priori , that any text later deemed biblical was in some sense religiously useful from the day of initial composition, became (or continued to be) religiously authoritative as it evolved toward final edited form, and only increased in sacredness as it moved toward canonization. This study disputes that presumption, suggesting that the anthology was produced by a group of literati whose motivation was both socio-ideological and aesthetic, but not religious. This motivation best explains the extreme diversity of Yahweh personalities in the Hebrew canon.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 747-748
Author(s):  
Lloyd I. Rudolph ◽  
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph

Not long ago, many political scientists suffered from economics envy. Some still do. They view economics as the queen of the social sciences, claiming that it is “scientific,” like physics. Physicists and other natural scientists spend most of their time trying to explain phenomena, but non-behavioral micro-economists spend most of their time on mathematical proofs and econometric tests ofa prioritheories based on intuitive plausibility or principles of “rational action.” Being “scientific” it was alleged, meant that economics could access objective knowledge, knowledge that was said to be true independent of time, place, and circumstance. Robert Bates called on political scientists to do the same by arguing that they should be in search of “lawful regularities which … must not be context bound” (Bates 1997b).


Author(s):  
Peter R. Monge ◽  
Noshir Contractor

Computer simulations have long been used as an effective tool in engineering, economics, psychology, and a number of other social sciences. Engineers typically use simulations to predict performance of a system that has known dynamic characteristics. These characteristics are typically obtained from theory and are then articulated in the simulation as difference or differential equations. The goal of engineering simulation is then to assess the dynamic performance of a system based on a priori knowledge of the dynamic relationships among the various elements of the system. Forrester (1961, 1973) was one of the earliest and most influential advocates of simulation modeling of dynamic social systems. Forrester advocated this approach as a way to model and assess the dynamics of industrial and world phenomena. Sterman (2000) provides a recent review of research on dynamics simulation from this tradition. While this approach has produced a considerable number of studies, it too is based on the assumption that the researcher has a priori knowledge of the dynamic relationships among elements of the system. Indeed, many of the results of these models have been criticized for specifying relationships that were at best untested and at worst flawed. In response to these criticisms, more recent interest has focused on redefining the utility of simulations in the social sciences. Rather than using simulations to test the long-term dynamics of systems with known interrelationships, theorists (Carley & Prietula, 1994; Contractor, 1994; Hanneman, 1988) have suggested that social scientists should use simulations to help construct theory, to identify the heretofore-unknown interrelationships. This section describes the traditional use of computer simulations as well as the adaptation of this approach toward theory construction and testing in the social sciences. Later sections will apply these general approaches to the computational modeling of networks in particular. Carley and Prietula (1994) suggest that the emergence of the new field of computational organizational theory (COT) signals the growing interest in the construction of computational models to augment and assist theory building. Most social science theories are richly evocative but highly abbreviated (Poole, 1997), that is, they offer explanations that suggest complex interrelationships but do not provide precise, falsifiable mathematical formalizations of the theory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ståle Gundersen

Mechanism-based explanations are widely discussed in contemporary social science. A virtue of mechanism-based explanations is that they can tell us how social and psychological factors are related to each other and in addition provide explanatory depth. I will argue against an argument which contends that to describe underlying mechanisms at the individual level do not contribute to improve macro-explanations at the social level. However, the critics of the mechanism approach are right that under certain conditions there can be successful explanations without mentioning underlying mechanisms. Although the mechanism approach is a reductive strategy, it does not entail that the social sciences will lose their descriptively and explanatory autonomy. The debate about reductionism and explanation often take place at an abstract philosophical level, but it is argued that to what extent the mechanism approach will influence the autonomy of the social sciences is an empirical problem and cannot be decided a priori.


2003 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Michell

Five episodes in the history of quantitative science provided the occasions for changes in the understanding of measurement important for attempts at quantification in the social sciences. First, Euclid's generalization of the ancient concept of measure to the concept of ratio provided a clear rationale for the use of numbers in quantitative science, a rationale that has been important through the history of science and one that contradicts the definition of measurement currently fashionable within the social sciences. Second, Duns Scotus's modelling of qualitative change upon quantitative change provided the opportunity to extend measurement from extensive to intensive attributes, a shift that makes it clear that the possibility of measuring qualitative attributes in the social sciences is not one that can be ruled out a priori. Third, Hölder's specification of the character of quantitative attributes showed that quantitative structure is a specific kind of empirical structure, one that is not logically necessary and, therefore, it shows that it is not necessary that any psychological attributes must be quantitative either. Taking the points emanating from Duns Scotus and Hölder together, the issue of whether psychological attributes are quantitative is shown to be an empirical issue. Fourth, Campbell's delineation of the categories of fundamental and derived measurement, and his subsequent critique of psychophysical measurement, showed that attempts at psychological measurement raised new challenges for measurement theory. Fifth, the articulation of the theory of conjoint measurement by Luce and Tukey reveals one way in which those challenges might be met. Taken as a whole, these episodes show that attempts at measurement in the social sciences are continuous with the rest of science in the sense that the issue of whether social science attributes can be measured raises empirical questions that can be answered only in the light of scientific evidence.


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