An Analysis of Managerial Use and Market Consequences of Earnings Management and Expectation Management

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 1935-1967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somnath Das ◽  
Kyonghee Kim ◽  
Sukesh Patro
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Structural Models ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Expectation Management ◽  
Earnings Targets ◽  
Market Consequences ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study examines how managers coordinate the joint use of earnings management and expectation management by estimating the relationship between these instruments and how this relationship changes as their respective constraints change. We do this by estimating structural models of the two instruments that account for the constraints on their use as well as their effects on each other. Our results suggest that managers use earnings management and expectation management complementarily when managers' ability to use earnings management is less restricted. However, as the constraints on earnings management increase, managers substitute earnings management with expectation management. Moreover, we find that the extent of expectation management influences the extent of earnings management, but not vice versa. Examining the market consequences of the use of these instruments, we find that, while there are penalties for using both earnings management and expectation management, either as complements or as substitutes, the net stock price benefit from meeting or beating earnings targets exceeds these penalties. JEL Classifications: G14; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Clawbacks and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Period Model ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.

The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Mark J. Kohlbeck ◽  
Thomas J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between aggressive income-increasing real earnings management (REM) and current and future audit fees. Managers pursue REM activities to influence reported earnings and, as a consequence, alter cash flows and sacrifice firm value. We posit that the implications of REM are considered in auditors' assessments of engagement risk related to the client's economic condition and result in higher audit fees. We find that, with the exception of abnormal reductions in SG&A, aggressive income-increasing REM is positively associated with both current and future audit fees. Additional analyses provide evidence consistent with increased effort combined with increased risk contributing to the current pricing effect, with increased business risk primarily driving the future pricing effect. We, therefore, provide evidence that aggressive income-increasing REM activities have a significant influence on auditor pricing behavior, consistent with the audit framework associating engagement risk with audit fees. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

scholarly journals Effect of Leverage on Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2232
Author(s):  
Ana Belen Tulcanaza-Prieto ◽  
Younghwan Lee ◽  
Jeong-Ho Koo
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines how leverage affects real earnings management (REM) in non-financial firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index from 2010 to 2018 by employing total, short-term, and long-term debt ratios (i.e., leverage) as independent variables and four REM metrics as dependent variables. We find a significant positive relationship between leverage and REM in suspicious firms, whereas the effect of leverage is insignificant in non-suspicious firms. We also find that the positive relationship between both variables is stronger in the second half of the fiscal year, which shows the prevalence of the seasonality of REM, as managers collect high-frequency financial information during this period. These findings are consistent with those in the literature that managers increase firm leverage and REM activities to reduce their probability of being discovered, since financial statements in the interim quarters are not often audited. Our study complements the literature by introducing quarterly data to identify clearly REM activities and detect the strongest effect on the relationship between REM and leverage. Moreover, our results from the two-stage least square (2SLS) regression analysis are consistent with our previous findings.

Characteristics of Managerial Tone Priced by Auditors: Evidence Based on Annual Letters to Shareholders of Large U.S. Firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-161
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Lorenzo Patelli ◽  
Matteo Pedrini
Keyword(s):  
Source Credibility ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Change Analysis ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Client Risk ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between audit pricing and managerial tone as a proxy of source credibility. Prior research shows that source credibility influences auditors' perceptions of client risk. Textually analyzing annual letters to shareholders, we find that characteristics of managerial tone that reflect impaired source credibility are associated with higher audit fees. Additional tests, including a change analysis and controls for other managerial characteristics, future client performance, and aggressive accounting choices, corroborate and build on our inferences that managerial tone proxies for source credibility. Our study extends literature that uses corporate disclosures to measure managerial characteristics by showing that auditors price source credibility reflected in managerial tone. These findings are important because they empirically confirm that source credibility affects auditors' assessments of engagement risk and that analysis of tone can inform researchers, auditors, and investors who seek to enhance effectiveness and objectivity in assessing source credibility based on managerial tone. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

Capital Structure, Earnings Management, and Sarbanes-Oxley: Evidence from Canadian and U.S. Firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly E. Carter
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS I examine Sarbanes-Oxley's (SOX) effect on capital structure. I find that SOX is associated with higher long-term debt ratios, as firms listed in the U.S. raise their long-term debt ratios by 2 to 3 percentage points. This finding is consistent with the idea that, although the reduction in information asymmetry associated with SOX could prompt managers to increase equity financing, debt is still safer and less costly than equity in the SOX era. Further analysis shows that the increase in debt occurs in the two quarters prior to SOX, suggesting that firms anticipate a higher cost of debt after SOX and acquire debt while it is relatively cheap. Also, firms that heavily (lightly) manage earnings prior to SOX use less (more) debt after SOX. This result is consistent with the view that firms that aggressively manage earnings before SOX reveal intrinsically weaker earnings after SOX, casting doubt on those firms' ability to repay debt and relegating those firms to issue equity for financing purposes. JEL Classifications: G32; G38. Data Availability: Data available upon request.

scholarly journals Transparency Regulation and Stock Price Informativeness: Evidence from the European Union's Transparency Directive

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olena V. Watanabe ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Semih Tartaroglu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Price Informativeness ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Corporate Transparency ◽  
Financial Disclosures ◽  
Stock Price Informativeness ◽  
Transparency Directive ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine changes in stock price informativeness following the European Union's Transparency Directive (TPD). The TPD, implemented by country between 2007 and 2009, enhanced corporate transparency through mandating regular firm financial disclosures and facilitating the dissemination of financial reports. Using stock return synchronicity as a proxy for stock price informativeness, we find that price informativeness improved following implementation of the TPD. This improvement was more pronounced in countries with strong regulatory environments than those with weak regulatory environments. We additionally examine a later amendment to the TPD that eliminated the requirement of quarterly financial disclosures and document an increase in stock return synchronicity following the amendment. Our findings support prior research suggesting that transparency regulations improve financial information. JEL Classifications: F30; G15; G30; M4. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.

Auditors and Disclosure Quality: The Case of Major Customer Disclosures

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Legoria ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt ◽  
Jared S. Soileau
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
National Level ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Specialized Knowledge ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Office Size ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Little is known about the relationship between disclosure quality and auditor quality. We measure disclosure quality as the likelihood of a firm fully disclosing the identity of their major customers in the Form 10-K filing. We also measure voluntary disclosure by exempt smaller reporting companies (SRCs) disclosing, and all firms disclosing the identity in the audited notes, or affirming no major customers. We expect that firms are more likely to disclose when they engage higher-quality auditors who have specialized knowledge of 10-K regulations. We hand-collect a sample of more than 26,000 (34,000) major customer disclosures that we use for our main tests (voluntary disclosure tests). We find that firms are more likely to mandatorily disclose their major customers' identity when audited by either an office- or national-level specialist whose clientele consists largely of firms with major customers. We corroborate these results with other higher-quality auditor measures: Big N, second tier, and office size. We also show that SRCs are more likely to voluntarily disclose when they engage a higher-quality auditor. We provide further evidence of an association between voluntary disclosure and a higher-quality auditor by ranking disclosure quality on audited disclosure, nonaudited disclosure, and no disclosure. JEL Classifications: M42; M41; D23. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Irregularities in Accounting Numbers and Earnings Management—A Novel Approach Based on SEC XBRL Filings

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Henselmann ◽  
Dominik Ditter ◽  
Elisabeth Scherr
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Analysis ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Analysis Approach ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Fully Automatic ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The SEC XBRL mandate enables the gathering of accounting numbers to be fully automatic in a database-like manner that provides vast opportunities for financial analysis. Using this functionality, this study proposes a simple analytical prescreening measure that uses abnormal digit distributions at the firm-year level to identify firms suspected of having managed earnings. On average, we find that the constructed measure indicates a greater amount of irregularities in the reported accounting numbers of firms with higher incentives to engage in earnings management. The suggested XBRL-enhanced digit analysis approach may provide the SEC and investors a simple measure to flag financial reports carrying a higher probability of human interaction. JEL Classifications: C10; M41; M43. Data Availability: Data used in this paper are publicly available. The analytical prescreening VBA-Tool is available upon request. A description of the tool is available; see Appendix B.

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