Board Risk Committees and Audit Pricing

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Hines ◽  
Adi Masli ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Oversight

SUMMARY Conditions leading up to and surrounding the global financial crisis prompted an increasing number of firms to create board-level risk oversight committees (RCs). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010) even legislates RCs for certain large banks. Distinct from audit committees, RCs present a unique setting to extend our understanding of the relation between emerging governance mechanisms and auditing. Using a sample of 3,980 U.S.-listed banks from 2003–2011, we find that on average, the presence of RCs is associated with higher audit fees. Our results are robust to multiple specifications, including self-selection and propensity score matched samples. For a reduced sample of 458 firms that employ an RC we also examine RC characteristics. We find RC independence and audit committee overlaps are associated with lower audit fees and RC size, relative to board size, is associated with higher audit fees. Supplemental analysis provides discussion of the potential audit environment implications of mandatory versus voluntary risk management controls. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2057-2085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Beck ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1641-1677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Following ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Using Data

ABSTRACT This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors' incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.

CEO Financial Background and Audit Pricing

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachana Kalelkar ◽  
Sarfraz Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Fixed Effect Model ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages

SYNOPSIS Accounting scholars theorize that audit price is a function of a client's audit and business risk. Existing research finds that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance improves financial reporting quality (Matsunaga, Wang, and Yeung 2013), increases profitability, and reduces the likelihood of firm failure (Custodio and Metzger 2014). These factors suggest that auditors' engagement risk decreases when incumbent CEOs possess financial expertise, raising the likelihood that auditors will charge these firms lower fees. In this study, we examine whether CEOs' work experience in accounting- and finance-related jobs affects audit fees. Using a panel of U.S. firms between 2004 and 2013, we find that firms that have a financial expert CEO pay lower audit fees. Our results are robust to various specifications, including firm-fixed effect model and specifications that control for other CEO- and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)-specific and audit committee characteristics. Our findings thus add to the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of a functional background of top managers and how this background can create value for a firm through savings in audit fees.

Auditors' Communications with Audit Committees: The Influence of the Audit Committee's Oversight Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Fiolleau ◽  
Kris Hoang ◽  
Bradley Pomeroy
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Level Of Detail ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Communication Style ◽  
Quality Audit ◽  
Resolution Process ◽  
Asking Questions

SUMMARY Policymakers have identified effective communications between the auditor and the audit committee (AC) as an indicator of a quality audit, but little is known about the factors auditors consider when deciding what to communicate about significant accounting issues. We propose auditors use the AC's oversight approach as a cue for the level of detail in their communications that is necessary to satisfy the AC's preferences for auditors' insights on issues that were resolved with management. In our experiment, auditors resolved an inventory obsolescence issue with a hypothetical CFO, and then wrote a communication about it for the AC. We manipulate the AC's preference for getting involved in the issue resolution process and its reputation for asking questions. Our results, supplemented by findings from audit partner interviews, suggest auditors tailor their communications to the AC's oversight approach, the AC's industry and accounting knowledge, and the AC chair's preferred communication style. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Financial distress determinants among SMEs: empirical evidence from Sweden

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darush Yazdanfar ◽  
Peter Öhman
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Binary Logistic Regression ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to empirically investigate determinants of financial distress among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) during the global financial crisis and post-crisis periods.Design/methodology/approachSeveral statistical methods, including multiple binary logistic regression, were used to analyse a longitudinal cross-sectional panel data set of 3,865 Swedish SMEs operating in five industries over the 2008–2015 period.FindingsThe results suggest that financial distress is influenced by macroeconomic conditions (i.e. the global financial crisis) and, in particular, by various firm-specific characteristics (i.e. performance, financial leverage and financial distress in previous year). However, firm size and industry affiliation have no significant relationship with financial distress.Research limitationsDue to data availability, this study is limited to a sample of Swedish SMEs in five industries covering eight years. Further research could examine the generalizability of these findings by investigating other firms operating in other industries and other countries.Originality/valueThis study is the first to examine determinants of financial distress among SMEs operating in Sweden using data from a large-scale longitudinal cross-sectional database.

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

SUMMARY We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources

The aestheticization of restraint: The popular appeal of de-cluttering after the global financial crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susie Khamis
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Discussion Groups ◽  
Occupy Wall Street ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
Occupy Movement ◽  
Video Tutorials ◽  
Popular Appeal ◽  
Liberal Economy ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The concept of consumer restraint has had a popular makeover. This is seen in the worldwide popularity of books, video tutorials and online discussion groups devoted to de-cluttering, and specifically the stunning success of professional organizer Marie Kondo and her best-selling book, The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying. De-cluttering sits on a broad continuum of alternative consumption that champions the benefits of consumer restraint, on multiple fronts: economic, environmental, psychological, and so on. Through Kondo, this is framed in positive, uplifting ways. This is distinct from the more critical, nuanced, or anti-consumerist rhetoric associated with more subversive advocates of alternative consumption, such as voluntary simplifiers or Occupy Wall Street. That said, just as the Occupy movement channeled growing frustration with how the reigning tenets of capitalist culture had shackled and misled the “99%,” de-cluttering finds cultural traction in the midst and wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Unlike Occupy though, Kondo’s appeal rests less on the logic and language of political economy than the more emotive vernacular of pop psychology. In this way, de-cluttering positions restraint as reflective of a highly developed and sophisticated sensibility, whereby individuals “own” their consumption choices and in turn craft carefully curated spaces. Therein lies the aestheticization of restraint: freed of any negative connotations (dour, miserly or miserable), the de-cluttered subject is autonomous, self-aware, and chic. Crucially, it also pivots on the slippery assumptions of the (new) neo liberal economy, which requires individuals to be agile, creative, and empowered.

An investigation of the credibility of and confidence in audit value: evidence from a developing country

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Taslima Akther ◽  
Fengju Xu
Keyword(s):  
Structural Equation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Order Type ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This study aims to investigate the factors that enhance the credibility of and confidence in audit value. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected from 254 institutional investors through a questionnaire survey and were analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM). Findings The findings reveal that the two influential predictors of enhanced credibility and confidence are perceived auditor independence and improved auditor communication. Factors related to auditor–client affiliation, such as restrictions on providing non-audit services, mandatory auditor rotation and the presence of effective audit committees, are identified as creating the perceived independence. Improved auditor communication is linked with improving the audit report and ensuring audit education, thus creating more sophisticated users who better understand the scope and purpose of an audit. Furthermore, independent audit oversight acts as a moderator in the relationship between perceived auditor independence, improved auditor communication and enhanced credibility. Enhanced credibility can lead to greater confidence in audit value. Originality/value In the wake of the global financial crisis and loss of confidence in the role of auditors, this study investigates the factors that can enhance the credibility of and confidence in audit value, especially in a non-Anglo-American setting. This study is unique in terms of methodological development, as it uses a higher-order Type II reflective–formative model using PLS-SEM.

Transparency Regulation in Financial Markets – Moving into the Surveillance Age?

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Regulatory Control ◽  
Legal Reforms ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Oversight

In the wake of the global financial crisis, the trajectory of legal reforms is likely to turn towards more transparency regulation. This article argues that transparency regulation will take on a new role of surveillance as intelligence and data mining expand in the wholesale financial sector, supporting the creation of designated systemic risk oversight regulators.The role of market discipline, which has been acknowledged to be weak leading up to the financial crisis, is likely to be eclipsed by a more technocratic governance in the financial sector. In this article, however, concerns are raised about the expansion of technocratic surveillance and whether financial sector participants would internalise the discipline of regulatory control. Certain endemic features of the financial sector will pose challenges for financial regulation even in the surveillance age.

scholarly journals Gender Diversity of Audit Committees and Audit Fees: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Xiang ◽  
Meng Qin ◽  
Craig A Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
State Enterprises ◽  
The Relationship

<p>This paper investigates whether women, who serve on the audit committee of the board, can have a significant impact in reducing audit fees paid by China's A-share listed companies during the period 2004 to 2007. We show that audit committees composed of both men and women pay significantly smaller audit fees. The relationship is significantly greater in non-state enterprises than that exhibited by state-owned enterprises and significantly greater in companies deemed to have weak management vis-à-vis strong management. Further analysis shows that the composition of the committee is irrelevant when management is strong, regardless of whether it provides guidance for a state-owned enterprise or a strictly public company. When management is deemed weak, however, gender diversity is associated with smaller fees.</p>

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