Management's Responsibility Acceptance, Locus of Breach, and Investors' Reactions to Internal Control Reports

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (6) ◽  
pp. 331-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hun-Tong Tan ◽  
Yao Yu
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Event ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Relative Strength ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Effective Strategy ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The triangle model of responsibility (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, and Doherty 1994) predicts that the extent that investors hold management responsible for an adverse event is jointly determined by the links among three elements—management, the adverse event, and the relevant accounting regulations/standards or public norms. Applying this theory, we conduct experiments to examine how the locus of breach (external versus internal) moderates the efficacy of management's responsibility acceptance (higher versus lower). Our results show that management's higher (versus lower) responsibility acceptance is a more effective strategy in the presence of an external breach, but not in the presence of an internal breach (Experiment 1). Follow-up experiments suggest that this result is driven by the relative strength of the triangle links underlying the external versus internal breaches, rather than the locus per se. JEL Classifications: G40; M41. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

SOX 404, Auditor Effort, and the Prevention of Financial Report Misstatements

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuping Zhao ◽  
Jean C. Bedard ◽  
Rani Hoitash
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Lower Incidence ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Financial Report ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Prior research shows that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Section 404(b) integrated audit is associated with a lower incidence of misstatements. We predict that under 404(b), the auditor's ability to detect misstatements increases relative to other internal control regimes when greater resources are exerted during the engagement. Supporting this prediction, we find that the benefits of 404(b) versus other regimes (including SOX 404(a)) in reducing misstatements increase with incremental audit effort (proxied by abnormal audit fees). We find no benefit of 404(b) in misstatement reduction when abnormal audit effort is low. This implies that the value of 404(b) testing is not uniform, but rather is greater when sufficient resources are available to thoroughly understand client controls. In contrast, we find no benefit of abnormal audit effort under other regulatory regimes. We further examine the conditions under which knowledge gained from auditor internal control testing is more valuable. We find that the benefits of increased audit effort under 404(b) do not vary across internal control regimes under AS2 versus AS5, and are more pronounced for engagements with shorter auditor tenure, non-Big 4 auditors, and industry-specialist auditors. JEL Classifications: M49. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.

Empirical Evidence on Repeat Restatements

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Files ◽  
Nathan Y. Sharp ◽  
Anne M. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Market Consequences ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS This study examines the characteristics and market consequences of repeat restatements. We find that 38 percent of the restating companies in our sample restate at least twice between 2002 and 2008, and 31 percent of repeat restatement firms restate three or more times during the same period. Our tests identify several auditor and restatement characteristics that distinguish single from repeat restatements at the time of the first restatement. Repeat restatements are more likely among clients of non-Big N auditors and those with lower ex ante accounting quality. However, firms that switch auditors between the end of their misstatement period and the restatement announcement are less likely to experience repeat restatements. Although subsequent restatements tend to be less severe than the first in a series of restatements, firms suffer similar declines in stock prices with up to three restatement announcements. In addition, firms often restate the same fiscal periods multiple times, and these “overlapping” restatements are more frequent when managers are distracted by other difficulties, such as discontinued operations or internal control weaknesses. Our findings should be valuable to investors, regulators, and other parties interested in repeat restatements. We provide research design recommendations for researchers to incorporate in future research. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G34. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated.

Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (5) ◽  
pp. 1703-1728 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Erkens ◽  
K. R. Subramanyam ◽  
Jieying Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Relationship Lending ◽  
Conservative Accounting ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Board Representation ◽  
Covenant Violations ◽  
Unobservable Factors ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the effect of lender monitoring through board representation, which we label “affiliated banker on board” (AFB) on conservative accounting. We hypothesize that monitoring reduces lenders' demand for conservatism-facilitated control transfers through debt covenants by reducing the information asymmetry that underlies the agency problem of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that AFB firms have markedly lower conservative accounting than non-AFB firms. This result is robust to a battery of tests that account for bias from both observable and unobservable factors. We also find additional evidence to support key elements of our hypothesis. First, an examination of the relation between borrower-unfavorable renegotiations and covenant violations suggests that board representation allows lenders to renegotiate in a timelier manner based on private information. Second, an examination of the relation between covenant intensity and conservative accounting suggests that board representation decreases lenders' reliance on conservatism-facilitated control transfers. Finally, an analysis that uses relationship lending as an alternative proxy of lender monitoring suggests that it is lender monitoring, and not AFB per se, that reduces demand for conservative accounting. JEL Classifications: G3; G21; M41 Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Business Strategy, Internal Control over Financial Reporting, and Audit Reporting Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen A. Bentley-Goode ◽  
Nathan J. Newton ◽  
Anne M. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Business Strategy ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This study examines whether a company's business strategy is an underlying determinant of the strength of its internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) and auditors' internal control reporting quality. Organizational theory suggests that companies following an innovative “prospector” strategy are likely to have weaker internal controls than companies following an efficient “defender” strategy. Consistent with theory, we find that firms with greater prospector-like characteristics are more likely to report and less likely to remediate material weaknesses, incremental to known determinants of material weaknesses. We also find that auditors' internal control reporting quality is lower among clients with greater prospector-like characteristics when measured using the timeliness of reported material weaknesses. Our findings indicate that business strategy is a useful summary indicator for evaluating companies' internal control strength and suggest that internal control reporting is an important area for audit quality improvement among prospector-like clients. JEL Classifications: D21; 21; M41. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources as indicated in the text.

An Analysis of Multiple Consecutive Years of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2027-2060 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence A. Gordon ◽  
Amanda L. Wilford
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Significant Negative Impact ◽  
Second Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT The primary objective of the current study is to empirically reexamine the relation between material weaknesses in internal control (MW) and cost of equity (CE). We direct particular emphasis to the way non-remediation, as well as remediation, of MW affects a firm's CE. This study utilizes a dataset that contains a large sample of second-year MW non-remediation cases, as well as third-, fourth-, and fifth-year non-remediation cases. The findings provide evidence that reporting MW, absent any remediation, in multiple consecutive years has a significant negative impact on CE. However, the current study also shows that the market views favorably a reduction in the number of MW (i.e., partial remediation). Our study helps to reconcile conflicting results in the literature devoted to the relation between MW and CE. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: Available from sources identified within the article.

The Search for Order in Municipal Administration: Herman A. Metz and the New York City Experience, 1898–1909

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-74
Author(s):  
Ryan P. McDonough ◽  
Paul J. Miranti ◽  
Michael P. Schoderbek
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
York City ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Public ◽  
Operational Activities ◽  
The City

ABSTRACT This paper examines the administrative and accounting reforms coordinated by Herman A. Metz around the turn of the 20th century in New York City. Reform efforts were motivated by deficiencies in administering New York City's finances, including a lack of internal control over monetary resources and operational activities, and opaque financial reports. The activities of Comptroller Metz, who collaborated with institutions such as the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, were paramount in initiating and implementing the administrative and accounting reforms in the city, which contributed to reform efforts across the country. Metz promoted the adoption of functional cost classifications for city departments, developed flowcharts for improved transaction processing, strengthened internal controls, and published the 1909 Manual of Accounting and Business Procedure of the City of New York, which laid the groundwork for transparent financial reports capable of providing vital information about the city's activities and subsidiary units. JEL Classifications: H72, M41, N91. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Accelerated Filing Deadlines, Internal Controls, and Financial Statement Quality: The Case of Originating Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colleen M. Boland ◽  
Scott N. Bronson ◽  
Chris E. Hogan
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Similar Increase ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Initial Decrease

SYNOPSIS We examine whether regulations requiring accelerated filing deadlines and internal control reporting and testing affect financial statement reliability. Unlike prior research, we examine whether these regulatory changes are associated with an increase in the likelihood that misstatements originate in the period following the respective change. If the implementation of these rules causes a misstatement, then the misstatement would most likely occur in the period immediately following the rule change. We provide evidence that accelerated filers (AFs) experience an increase in the likelihood of an originating misstatement following the acceleration of filing deadlines from 90 to 75 days. Large accelerated filers (LAFs), however, do not experience a similar increase following this acceleration or the subsequent acceleration from 75 to 60 days. After the implementation of the SOX Section 404 internal control requirements, we find that the likelihood of an originating misstatement declined for AFs but not for LAFs. Taken together, the findings suggest that, although AFs experienced an initial decrease in financial statement reliability, this decrease was temporary. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

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