Can continuous disclosure defaults be attributed to Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 auditor differences?

Author(s):  
Nadia Smaali

The numerous scandals attributed to lack of independence on the part of Big 4 auditors have reignited one of the most controversial issues in the accounting profession: Do Big 4 auditors provide higher audit quality? The objective of this paper is to examine whether the auditor’s reputation affects non-compliance with disclosure obligations and the type and number of defaults detected by the Ontario Securities Commission. Using an Internet-based list published by the Ontario Securities Commission in February 2020, I develop a sample of 286 firms consisting of 143 issuers in default and their 143 matching firms. Results show that the presence of a Big 4 is associated negatively with the various default types and the number of defaults.  One implication of these findings is that hiring a reputable auditor may prevent firms and shareholders from being on the “shame list.”

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aloke (Al) Ghosh ◽  
Elisabeth Peltier ◽  
Cunyu Xing

SYNOPSIS The controversy over Chinese reverse mergers has led to concerns about the audit quality of all U.S.-listed Chinese companies. Because a sizeable number of foreign firms cross-list their shares as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) issued by U.S. depositary banks (as opposed to direct listings), we study how auditors have managed their audits of Chinese ADRs. Our motivation for examining Chinese ADRs is based on the findings that cross-listing via the ADR process is beneficial for U.S. shareholders. We find that relative to ADRs from countries other than China, and relative to directly listed Chinese companies, Chinese ADRs are more likely to be associated with a Big 4 auditor and are less likely to restate prior-period financial statements. We also find that Chinese ADRs pay significantly higher fees than other emerging market ADRs and Chinese direct-listings. Collectively, these results suggest high audit quality for Chinese ADRs, which is in sharp contrast to the Chinese direct-listing results. Using Tobin's Q as a measure of market value, we find that the stock market rewards Chinese ADRs, indicating that investors incorporate the benefits of higher audit quality when evaluating Chinese ADRs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 185-208
Author(s):  
Qiao Xu ◽  
Rachana Kalelkar

SUMMARY This paper examines whether inaccurate going-concern opinions negatively affect the audit office's reputation. Assuming that clients perceive the incidence of going-concern opinion errors as a systematic audit quality concern within the entire audit office, we expect these inaccuracies to impact the audit office market share and dismissal rate. We find that going-concern opinion inaccuracy is negatively associated with the audit office market share and is positively associated with the audit office dismissal rate. Furthermore, we find that the decline in market share and the increase in dismissal rate are primarily associated with Type I errors. Additional analyses reveal that the negative consequence of going-concern opinion inaccuracy is lower for Big 4 audit offices. Finally, we find that the decrease in the audit office market share is explained by the distressed clients' reactions to Type I errors and audit offices' lack of ability to attract new clients.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott E. Seavey ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Tiffany J. Westfall

SUMMARY Prior audit research suggests that most, if not all, audit quality can be explained at the office level. However, the question remains of whether office-level audit quality is contingent on how individual offices relate to the firm as a whole. Motivated by theories of knowledge management, organizational learning, and networks, we posit that individual offices are connected to their audit network through partner knowledge sharing and oversight, which impact office-level audit quality. We interview Big 4 audit partners and learn that knowledge sharing between partners in different offices is common and intended to aid in the provision of audit services. Using network connectedness to proxy for knowledge sharing and oversight between offices of the same firm, we document that more connected offices are associated with fewer client restatements and lower discretionary accruals. We additionally find that network effects are magnified when accounting treatments are more complex and require greater auditor judgement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Baugh ◽  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

SUMMARY We examine the consequences of misconduct in a Big 4 firm's nonaudit practice for its audit practice. Specifically, we examine whether KPMG's audit practice suffered a loss of audit fees and clients and/or a decline in factual audit quality following the 2005 deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Department of Justice for marketing questionable tax shelters. We find little evidence that the DPA adversely impacted KPMG's audit practice by way of either audit fees or the likelihood of client gains/losses, suggesting little or no harm to KPMG's audit reputation. We also find that the DPA had no effect on the firm's factual audit quality, even for those audit clients that dropped KPMG as their tax service provider. Collectively, our findings suggest that there was no spillover effect from the DPA to KPMG's audit practice. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1901395
Author(s):  
Dwi Martani ◽  
Nur Aulia Rahmah ◽  
Fitriany Fitriany ◽  
Viska Anggraita
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Arifur Khan ◽  
Dessalegn Getie Mihret ◽  
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin

Purpose The effect of political connections of agency costs has attracted considerable research attention due to the increasing recognition of the fact that political connection influences corporate decisions and outcomes. This paper aims to explore the association between corporate political connections and agency cost and examine whether audit quality moderates this association. Design/methodology/approach A data set of Bangladeshi listed non-financial companies is used. A usable sample of 968 firm-year observations was drawn for the period from 2005 to 2013. Asset utilisation ratio, the interaction of Tobin’s Q and free cash flow and expense ratio are used as alternative proxies for agency costs; membership to Big 4 audit firms or local associates of Big 4 firms is used as a proxy for audit quality. Findings Results show that politically connected firms exhibit higher agency costs than their unconnected counterparts, and audit quality moderates the relationship between political connection and agency costs. The results of this paper suggest the importance of audit quality to mitigate agency problem in an emerging economic setting. Research limitations/implications The findings of this paper could be of interest to regulators wishing to focus regulatory effort on significant issues influencing stock market efficiency. The findings could also inform auditors in directing audit effort through a more complete assessment of risk and determining reasonable levels of audit fees. Finally, results could inform financial statement users to direct investments to firms with lower agency costs. Originality/value To the knowledge of the authors, this study is one of the first to explore the relationship between political connection and agency costs, and the moderating effect of audit quality of this relationship.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this paper is to analyze the PCAOB's inspection reports of large, annually inspected accounting firms. The inspection reports identify audit deficiencies that have implications for audit quality. By examining the inspection reports in detail, we can identify the nature and severity of audit deficiencies; we can track the total number of deficiencies over time; and we can pinpoint common, recurring audit deficiencies. We focus on large accounting firms because they play a dominant role in the marketplace (i.e., they audit public companies that comprise approximately 99 percent of U.S.-based issuer market capitalization). We document a significant, downward linear trend in the number of deficiencies from 2004 to 2009. We also identify common, recurring audit deficiencies, determine the financial statement accounts most often impacted by audit deficiencies, and isolate the primary emphasis of the financial statement impacted. Our findings generally are consistent comparing Big 4 and second-tier accounting firms, though a few differences emerge. In addition, we make comparisons with findings that have been documented for small, triennially inspected firms. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (8) ◽  
pp. 1068-1091
Author(s):  
Yun Cheng ◽  
Christine M. Haynes ◽  
Michael D. Yu

Purpose Auditing studies have shifted the research focus from the audit firm level to the individual audit partner level in recent years. Motivated by the call from Lennox and Wu (2018) to explore the effect of audit partners’ characteristics on audit quality in the US, this study aims to develop a new measure of engagement partner workload (EPW), which includes both the size and number of clients audited to test the effect of EPW on audit quality. This study also examines the moderating effect of the partner firm size on audit quality. Design/methodology/approach To test the effect of the EPW on audit quality, this study runs multivariate regressions of EPW on each specific client’s discretionary accruals and audit report delays. This study also runs a logistic regression of EPW on clients’ probability of having small profit increases to meet performance benchmarks. Findings Results of the hypotheses show that partner workload is positively related to audit quality. The results indicate that partners with larger, but fewer, clients conduct higher quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the relationship between partner workload and audit quality only holds for partners from the non-Big 4 firms. Originality/value This study contributes to the literatures of both audit quality and audit partner characteristics, and the results complement initial research aimed at identifying US partner-related characteristics that influence audit quality.


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