Can Gandhi’s ethics remedy the self-interest maximisation of existing theories of justice?

2021 ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Neha Tayshete
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila L. Nemesi

AbstractOn the basis of examples drawn from seven classic Hungarian film comedies, I argue in this article that the place of humor within the Gricean–Leechian model needs to be revisited and extended towards social psychological pragmatics to account for a wider range of humorous material. Scrutinizing the relevant controversial details of Grice’s conceptual framework, my concern is to find a practical way of fitting the various forms of humor into an adequate (and not an idealistic) pragmatic theory. I propose to differentiate between two levels and five types of breaking the maxims, introducing the Self-interest Principle (SiP) supposed to be in constant tension with, and as rational as, Grice’s Cooperative Principle. Politeness and self-presentational phenomena are subsumed under the operation of the SiP which embraces and coordinates the speaker’s own personal and interpersonal purposes.


1988 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 981-982
Author(s):  
Kerry C. Martin ◽  
Jay Hewitt

Men and women were presented descriptions of two dyadic work groups. In both groups, one member of the dyad did approximately two-thirds of the work. For one of the groups, subjects were asked to imagine that they were the worker of high productivity while for the other group subjects were asked to imagine that they were impartial observers. Subjects were asked to divide the rewards among the two workers for both groups. Men and women did not differ in allocation of reward when acting as impartial observers. When subjects imagined themselves as the worker of high productivity, men gave themselves a greater share of the reward than did women. It was concluded that the results were consistent with the self-interest explanation of sex differences in allocation of reward.


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-85
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill

Philosophers have debated for millennia about whether moral requirements are always rational to follow. The background for these debates is often what I shall call “the self-interest model.” The guiding assumption here is that the basic demand of reason, to each person, is that one must, above all, advance one's self-interest. Alternatively, debate may be framed by a related, but significantly different, assumption: the idea that the basic rational requirement is to develop and pursue a set of personal ends in an informed, efficient, and coherent way, whether one's choice of ends is based on self-interested desires or not. For brevity I refer to this as “the coherence-and-efficiency model.” Advocates of both models tend to think that, while it is sufficiently clear in principle what the rational thing to do is, what remains in doubt is whether it is always rational to be moral. They typically assume that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise with the pursuit of self-interest.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan W. Carlson ◽  
jamil zaki

Are humans ever truly altruistic? Or are all actions, however noble, ultimately motivated by self-interest? Scientists and philosophers have long grappled with this question, but few have considered laypeople’s beliefs about the nature of prosocial motives. Here we examine these beliefs and their social correlates. In line with prior work, we find that people tend to believe humans can be, and frequently are, altruistically motivated. Moreover, people who more strongly believe in altruistic motivation act more prosocially themselves—for instance, sacrificing relatively high levels of money and time to help others—a relationship that holds even when controlling for trait empathy. People who believe in altruism also judge other prosocial agents to be more genuinely kind, especially when agents’ motives are ambiguous. Together, this work suggests that believing in altruism predicts the extent to which people both see altruism and act altruistically, possibly reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of such lay theories.


2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (106) ◽  
pp. 70-95
Author(s):  
Maria Jørgsen

Disquieting Ethics in »Michael Kohlhaas« by Heinrich von Kleist:This article argues that the concept of evil takes a central place in the exploration of the Kantian ethics in Heinrich von Kleist’s novella »Michael Kohlhaas«.Maria Jørgensen argues that not only is the famous duty to which Kohlhaas finds himself obliged conceived in accordance with Kant’s ethics of duty, but also the description of Kohlhaas’ subjectivity in general is constructed by means of Kantian terms. Kleist’s text makes use of concepts such as duty, freedom, pathology, universality and the sublime in order to construct Kohlhaas as an inherently decentered subject. Furthermore Jørgensen argues that the emptying of the concept of the Good in Kantian ethics surfaces in Kleist’s novella as a hitherto unnoticed tendency to a certain tautologisation in Kohlhaas’ qualitative judgments.In the final section of the article the evil act in »Michael Kohlhaas« as an act of freedom, »Aktus der Freiheit«, is investigated with a departure in the Kantian concept of diabolical evil in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. If Kohlhaas’ first attempt to act ethically is contaminated by the self-interest which sticks to his initial duty to secure redress for the wrongs done to him and his fellow citizens by the Junker von Tronka, his last act of refusing to negotiate with the Elector of Saxony functions as a purely ethical act in Kantian terms. Kohlhaas’ act can be seen as an ethical act as it neglects the subject’s pathology, which according to Kant can only be done by an act of reason. Furthermore the act is in keeping with the criteria which Kant, according to Alenka Zupančič, delivers in the famous footnote on the execution of Louis XVI in Metaphysik der Sitten: The act is characterized by being purely formal, it arises from a maxim, and it is first of all an act of freedom. This article thus argues that »Michael Kohlhaas« evidently contains a fulfilled ethical act in Kantian terms, but that this act must be found in quite another place than previously assumed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-184
Author(s):  
Togardo Siburian

This article seeks to connect the ethics of civil disobedience with the practices of golput (abstaining from voting), that is, purposeful abstention from voting in Indonesia's general elections. By describing golput as a form of civil disobedience—for its ability to mobilize on principle; for its aims to achieve certain moral ideals—I argue that golput comprises the conscientious and soft-resistance of many citizens, in their struggle for civil rights. Evangelicals and their churches ought to perceive this issue of social ethics primarily within the framework of theology, not politics. Indeed during Indonesia's Reformasi era many of democracy's ideals—including justice and prosperity—have been misused for the fulfillment of the self-interest of the few people in power. Indonesian Christians, therefore, have a responsibility to act against such abuses of power, necessitating a theological framing for understanding the praxis of golput as a form of civil disobedience.


Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.


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