Introduction

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Preferential Trading Arrangements ◽  
Theoretical Issues

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of what preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) are and why they are important. It covers the economic effects of PTAs, political and security effects of PTAs, PTAs in historical perspective, and the effects of domestic politics on PTAs. It then sets out the book's central argument, that trade agreements are often motivated by domestic political conditions. The book seeks to explain why leaders choose to enter these agreements. The next section discusses how the present analysis of the domestic sources of PTA formation bears on a host of important theoretical issues in the fields of international relations and political economy. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.

A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Preferential Trading Arrangements ◽  
Over Time

This chapter presents a theory of the domestic political conditions that lead countries to enter into formal trade agreements. More specifically, it attempts to explain the establishment of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), institutions in which member-states reciprocally lower their trade barriers on each other's products and thereby grant each member preferential market access. The focus is on why and when countries have chosen to enter such agreements, understanding that there is substantial variability in the spread of PTAs over time and the countries that join them. Why have some countries joined many PTAs, while others have joined very few, and what explains the timing of PTA formation? The chapter first presents a rationalist theory of domestic politics to explain the pattern of PTAs. It then develops seven auxiliary hypotheses that follow from the logic of the present model to further explore the model's implications.

Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
The Government ◽  
Preferential Trading Arrangements ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

This chapter examines three auxiliary hypotheses that flow from the main argument. First, in countries with more veto players it is less likely that political leaders will be able to form deeper integration agreements. As trade agreements become more constraining, they will prompt greater resistance from more groups. Hence, countries marked by a large number of veto players are unlikely to accede to agreements that aim to achieve more extensive integration. Second, in the same vein, political leaders are also unlikely to enter preferential trading arrangements that include more constraints, such as a dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, in countries with more veto players, we expect greater delays between signing and ratifying agreements. As the number of veto players rises, so does the time needed for the government to convince these groups of the agreement's value and to design ways of compensating those that will be harmed by it.

Book Reviews

2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 552-553
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreement ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Princeton University

Pravin Krishna of Johns Hopkins University reviews, “Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements” by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the role of domestic politics in governments' decisions to enter trade pacts. Discusses a political economy theory of international trade agreements; systemic influences on preferential trade agreement formation; regime type, veto players, and preferential trade agreement formation; and auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.”

scholarly journals Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner ◽  
B. Peter Rosendorff
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Interstate Cooperation ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Regime Types ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Preferential Trading Arrangements

Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.

Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
World Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The North

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. This book argues that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, the book explains why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players—interest groups with the power to block policy change—increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.

FISCAL PESSIMISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: TOCQUEVILLE'S CROSS REVISITED

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Isabel Cepeda ◽  
Pedro Fraile Balbín
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Economic Decision ◽  
Modern School ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
The Future

ABSTRACT This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.

The Political Economy of Urban Homicide: Assessing the Relative Impact of Gender Inequality on Sex-Specific Victimization

2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mari A. DeWees ◽  
Karen F. Parker
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Gender Inequality ◽  
Urban Areas ◽  
Gender Disparities ◽  
Homicide Victimization ◽  
Mixed Support ◽  
Unique Effect ◽  
Market Opportunities ◽  
Us Cities ◽  
Theoretical Issues

This research examines the ways in which the changing political economy of urban areas has contributed differently to the homicide victimization rates of females and males across US cities. Recent research, while relatively limited, has presented disparate results regarding the effect of gender inequality on urban sex-specific victimization. Our work further explores this relationship by taking into account relative gender disparities in income, education, labor market opportunities, and politics in an examination of sex-specific homicide victimization in 1990. Key to this current investigation is the evaluation of feminist and lifestyle arguments that suggest that structural gender inequality has a unique effect on female victimization. Overall, our findings reveal gender inequality to be a significant predictor of both male and female urban homicide. While these findings suggest mixed support for theoretical arguments regarding gender inequality, further analyses reveal significant differences in specific types of gender inequality on victimization patterns across genders. These additional results highlight the need for greater attention toward both methodological and theoretical issues when examining the interconnections between gender, political economy, and violence in research.

scholarly journals The political consequences of the product cycle: industrial history and political outcomes

1979 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Kurth
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Product Cycle ◽  
The West ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Industrial History ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
The Impact

What explains the continuing stagnation in the industrial economies of the West? What will be the impact of such stagnation upon domestic politics and upon international relations? Are there domestic and foreign policies which the state can undertake to bring about a return to sustained economic prosperity and a recapitulation of that lost golden age of 1948–1973? These are now the central questions for scholars in the emerging field of international political economy. A recent special issue of International Organization, edited by Peter Katzenstein, has presented some of the most useful and sophisticated approaches to these questions and analyses of the international political economy of the West during the period of the last thirty years.

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