Authority, Conventions, and the Normativity of Law

Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

This chapter completes the outlines of a plausible version of legal positivism. It is organized into two parts. The first section discusses some of Joseph Raz's ideas about the nature of practical authority and the implications of his views about the normativity of law. The second section returns to the rules of recognition and tries to show that, though H. L. A. Hart is basically right about the idea that social rules are at the foundations of law, we need a theory of social conventions to articulate the requisite foundations. These two ideas in hand—the authoritative nature of law and its conventional foundations—provide the main building blocks needed to reconstruct a plausible version of Hart's theory of law.

2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-340
Author(s):  
David A. J. Richards

Legal philosophy as a discipline, was, at best, a marginal topic of philosophical inquiry before H. L. A. Hart turned his attention to it. It may be said of Hart that no philosopher after Hart's work in the philosophy of law could ever reasonably regard legal philosophy as marginal again. Before Hart, legal positivism had, of course, its important advocates, but Hart's The Concept of Law showed that its earlier proponents had been wedded either to a command theory of law that was clearly indefensible (Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin) or a conception of norms that was inadequately defended (Kelsen, Hagerstrom, Alf Ross). In the place of the foundational concepts of command or norm, Hart rigorously defended a sociologically informed account of the operation of legal systems (marked by certain indicia of observance and acceptance) and an illuminating distinction between primary and secondary rules that explained important distinctions in law, for example, between the criminal and civil law and the constitutional law establishing the scope and limits of the competence of officials. On this basis, Hart offered an account of law as a subset of social rules, marked by its monopoly of coercive power over a well-defined territory and the finality of its authority over matters involving the scope and limits of such power. Since truth claims about law are made on the basis of ascertaining such rules, determined by observance and acceptance, such claims in law truthfully can be and are made without knowing whether such rules are substantively just according to a philosophically defensible theory of justice. For this reason, Hart argued that legal positivism is the better philosophy of law, since law can be known without knowing its justice, and positivism makes clear the responsibility of independent ethical criticism of law's sometime amorality and immorality. No one after Hart wrote about these matters, would ever think of law in the same way, and the case for legal positivism, as a philosophy of law, had been placed on an altogether sounder philosophical basis.


Author(s):  
Neil MacCormick

H.L.A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, 1952–1968, is an outstanding representative of the analytical approach in jurisprudence and philosophy of law. He restated ‘legal positivism’ in the tradition of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, differentiating between law’s existence and its moral qualities. But he rejected the Benthamite identification of law with a sovereign’s commands, advancing instead a theory of law as comprising a special, systematically organized, kind of social rules. He did this in a linguistic-analytical style, showing how attention to our way of speaking and thinking about rules can yield new insights into their nature.


Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-393
Author(s):  
Naomi Choi

AbstractTo answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it.


Author(s):  
Michael Giudice ◽  
Eric Scarffe

This chapter assesses the theoretical adequacy of legal positivism in explanation of several forms and features of transnational law. We suggest that while legal positivism emerged as a philosophical account of state law in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, its connection to state law is best viewed as historical and contingent rather than conceptual and necessary. Among the two core commitments of legal positivism, while the separation thesis requires no modification from its original form, the social fact thesis must be revised and developed to explain the character of transnational law. We also show how the exercise of revising a philosophical theory of law such as legal positivism provides an opportunity to illustrate the continuity between conceptual, empirical, and evaluative studies of transnational law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Morais Pereira ◽  
Sônia Aparecida Siquelli

This article analyzes the pedagogical ideas of legal education in Brazil, in a historical and political perspective, seeking to question how positivist thought has exerted and still exerts influence in the formation of Law professionals, since, at present, the egress profile has was shown with the characteristics of a technical professional, who was often incapable of exercising a reflection of his own practice. Conceived in the nineteenth century, the positivist school, whose precursor was the philosopher Augusto Comte, maintained that only the laws established by science should be accepted. In the juridical field, positivism was elaborated in detail by the Austrian jurist and philosopher Hans Kelsen in his work "Pure Theory of Law", which corroborated the influence of philosophical positivism in the legal field, by maintaining that only the law is able to fully realize the Right. For the rigid thought, the norm is sufficient, being the main source of the Law, prevailing over all the others. The methodology used in the research was of a qualitative nature, developed from a bibliographic analysis of the philosophical legal concepts that compose the formation of this professional. A documentary investigation was also made in the curricular guidelines pointed out by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The final results of this research identified that legal positivism continues to influence the formation of the bachelor of Law. However, it is not the only factor that forges the current legal professional.ResumoO presente artigo analisa as ideias pedagógicas do ensino jurídico no Brasil, numa perspectiva histórica e política, buscando questionar como o pensamento positivista exerceu e ainda exerce influência na formação dos profissionais do Direito, uma vez que, atualmente, o perfil do egresso tem se mostrado com características de um profissional técnico, entretanto incapaz muitas vezes de exercer uma reflexão de sua própria prática. Concebida no século XIX, a escola positivista, que teve como precursor o filósofo Augusto Comte, sustentava que apenas as leis estabelecidas pela ciência deveriam ser aceitas. No campo jurídico, o positivismo foi detalhadamente trabalhado pelo jurista e filósofo austríaco Hans Kelsen em sua obra “A Teoria Pura do Direito”, que corroborou a influência do positivismo filosófico no campo jurídico, ao sustentar que apenas a lei é capaz de realizar plenamente o Direito. Para o rígido pensamento, a norma se basta, sendo a principal fonte do Direito, prevalecendo sobre todas as demais. A metodologia empregada na pesquisa foi de natureza qualitativa, desenvolvida a partir de uma análise bibliográfica dos conceitos filosóficos jurídicos que compõem a formação deste profissional. Também foi feita uma investigação documental nas diretrizes curriculares apontadas pelo Ministério da Educação e Cultura (MEC). Os resultados finais desta pesquisa identificaram que o positivismo jurídico continua influenciando a formação do bacharel do Direito. No entanto, não é o único fator que forja o atual profissional da área jurídica.Keywords: Positivism, Legal positivism, Curricular guidelines, Bachelor's degree in law.Palavras-chave: Positivismo, Positivismo jurídico, Diretrizes curriculares, Bacharelado em direito.ReferencesBITTAR, E. C. B. Curso de filosofia do direito. 4 ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2005.BRASIL. Constituição (1988). Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil. Brasília, DF: Senado Federal: Centro Gráfico, 1988. 292 p.BRASIL. Resolução CNE/CES n. 9/2004. Brasília: CNE, 2004.COMPARATO, F. K.  Ética: direito, moral e religião no mundo moderno. 3 ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2016.COMTE, A. Comte (Os pensadores) Curso de filosofia positiva; Discurso sobre o espírito positivo; Discurso preliminar sobre o conjunto do positivismo; Catecismo positivista. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.DELBONO, B. F. Os Direitos difusos e coletivos como componentes obrigatórios na organização curricular das faculdades de direito do Brasil. 2007. Tese (Doutorado em Direito das Relações Sociais), Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2007.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria geral das normas. Tradução de Jose? Florentino Duarte. Porto Alegre: Fabris, 1986.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria Geral do Direito e do Estado. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998a.KELSEN, Hans. Teoria pura do direito. Tradução: João Baptista Machado. 6 ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1998b. MENDONÇA, J. S. Curso de Filosofia do Direito: o homem e o Direito. 2 ed. São Paulo: Rideel, 2011.MOSSINI, D. E. S. Ensino jurídico: história, currículo e interdisciplinaridade. 2010. Tese (Doutorado em Educação). Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo – PUC-SP, São Paulo, 2010.MOTTA, C. D. B; BROLEZZI, A. C. A influência do positivismo na história da educação matemática no Brasil. Universidade de São Paulo, 2008. OLIVEIRA, A. G. de. Filosofia do Direito. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, 2012.REALE, M. Lições preliminares de Direito. 27 ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2002.ROCHA, J. L. A educação matemática na visão de Augusto Comte. 2006. Tese de Doutorado em Educação. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, 2006.ROCHA. L. S. Epistemologia e democracia. 2 ed. São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2003.SAVIANI, D. A educação na Constituição Federal de 1988: avanços no texto e sua neutralização no contexto dos 25 anos de vigência. Revista Brasileira de Política e Administração da Educação, v. 29, n. 2, p. 207-221, maio/ago. 2013.SAVIANI, D. História das ideias pedagógicas no Brasil. Campinas: Autores Associados, 2007. SIMIONI, R. L. Curso de hermenêutica jurídica contemporânea: do positivismo clássico ao pós-positivismo jurídico. Curitiba: Juruá, 2014.SANCHES, R. C. F.; PEREIRA, N. C. F. O ensino dogmático do direito como elemento limitador à universalização do acesso à justiça. XVIII CONGRESSO NACIONAL DO CONPEDI. Anais...  São Paulo, 2009.WARAT, L. A. A pureza do poder: uma análise crítica de teoria jurídica. Florianópolis: Ed. da UFSC, 1983.WARAT, L. A. Introdução geral ao direito: a epistemologia jurídica da modernidade. Porto Alegre:  Safe, 2002.WARAT, L. A. Introdução geral ao direito: O direito não estudado pela teoria jurídica moderna. Porto Alegre: Safe, 1997.WARAT, L. A. Saber crítico e senso comum teórico dos juristas. In: Seqüência. UFSC, Florianópolis, SC, Brasil, ISSNe 2177-7055, 1982.WOLKMER, A. C. História do Direito no Brasil. 2 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense, 2000. 


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-261
Author(s):  
Damir Banović

Summary This article deals with analytical jurisprudence topics presented in John Austin’s work, his predecessors, and its influence on the contemporary theory of law. The article analyses his analytical method, understanding of what the method implies, and its application in understanding law as a social phenomenon. Not only does the article analyse the law phenomenon, but it also presents his views on similar phenomena in law, such as international and constitutional law, the phenomenon of sovereignty and a sovereign, and the principle of general utility as one of the moral principles. His theory of law was one of the most significant theoretical approaches in England of the 19th century, and also constituted the baseline for new conceptions and the basis of critical analyses of later positive law theories. Moreover, his work provides a solid ground for explanations of individual branches of law, especially criminal law. Finally, the article also presents a critical analysis of his approach, useful and important findings, and the perspectives for further development of the theory of law, especially in the domain of his analytical, empirically oriented and descriptive method.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Jay Stone

Scott Shapiro offers an elaboration and defense of “legal positivism,” in whichthe official acceptance of a planfigures as the central explanatory notion. Rich in both ambition and insight,Legalitycasts an edifying new light on the structure of positive law and its officialdom. As a defense of positivism, however, it exhibits the odd feature that its main claims will prove quite acceptable to the natural lawyer. Perhaps this betokens – what many have begun to suspect anyway – that our usual tests for classifying legal theories (as positivist or not) are, in the present state of discussion, no longer credible. In any case, my hope in the following remarks is to suggest how certain ambiguities inLegalitymight easily be resolved in favor of PlanningNatural Law. The Planning Theory of Law, in other words, is not proprietary to positivism.


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