Ambivalent assimilation

2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-340
Author(s):  
David A. J. Richards

Legal philosophy as a discipline, was, at best, a marginal topic of philosophical inquiry before H. L. A. Hart turned his attention to it. It may be said of Hart that no philosopher after Hart's work in the philosophy of law could ever reasonably regard legal philosophy as marginal again. Before Hart, legal positivism had, of course, its important advocates, but Hart's The Concept of Law showed that its earlier proponents had been wedded either to a command theory of law that was clearly indefensible (Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin) or a conception of norms that was inadequately defended (Kelsen, Hagerstrom, Alf Ross). In the place of the foundational concepts of command or norm, Hart rigorously defended a sociologically informed account of the operation of legal systems (marked by certain indicia of observance and acceptance) and an illuminating distinction between primary and secondary rules that explained important distinctions in law, for example, between the criminal and civil law and the constitutional law establishing the scope and limits of the competence of officials. On this basis, Hart offered an account of law as a subset of social rules, marked by its monopoly of coercive power over a well-defined territory and the finality of its authority over matters involving the scope and limits of such power. Since truth claims about law are made on the basis of ascertaining such rules, determined by observance and acceptance, such claims in law truthfully can be and are made without knowing whether such rules are substantively just according to a philosophically defensible theory of justice. For this reason, Hart argued that legal positivism is the better philosophy of law, since law can be known without knowing its justice, and positivism makes clear the responsibility of independent ethical criticism of law's sometime amorality and immorality. No one after Hart wrote about these matters, would ever think of law in the same way, and the case for legal positivism, as a philosophy of law, had been placed on an altogether sounder philosophical basis.

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (7) ◽  
pp. 124-142
Author(s):  
Sofya V. Koval

The paper discusses the Anglo-American philosophy of law of the 20th century, more specifically the philosophy of law of Ronald Myles Dworkin and his criticism of the legal positivism of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. The author presents the history of the criticism of legal positivism in Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law and distinguishes historical stages. The subject of the study is the critique of legal positivism but not the Hart-Dworkin debate itself, well known in Western philosophy of law. The reason is that the discussion was conducted between Dworkin and Hart’s supporters but not between Dworkin and Hart by himself. The latter responded to the criticism only after twenty seven years. The article explains why Dworkin chose for his criticism Herbert Hart’s version of legal positivism. This is due to the fact that Dworkin highly appreciated Hart’s positivist theory of law and characterized it as the “most clear.” The article presents the methodological foundations of criticism of Hart’s legal positivism in Dworkin’s philosophy of law. It reveals a methodological divergence between the two legal theories, which directly affects the understanding of the concept of law and its content. Therefore, we can assume that the legal theories of Hart and Dworkin are two competing models of law: Dworkin’s model considers law as a set of rules and principles and Hart’s model acknowledges only rules and court decisions as a source of law. The article also presents the key principles of positivism criticized by Dworkin. These principles, firstly, interpret law as a set of legal rules determined through a special legal criterion, secondly, provide the judge with an opportunity to make a decision “at his own discretion” in a situation not regulated by law, and, thirdly, recognize only legal rights and obligations enshrined in legal regulations. It is important to note that in this article the author describes criticism as an independent phenomenon of legal philosophy with a particular focus on the history and foundations of this phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Neil MacCormick

H.L.A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, 1952–1968, is an outstanding representative of the analytical approach in jurisprudence and philosophy of law. He restated ‘legal positivism’ in the tradition of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, differentiating between law’s existence and its moral qualities. But he rejected the Benthamite identification of law with a sovereign’s commands, advancing instead a theory of law as comprising a special, systematically organized, kind of social rules. He did this in a linguistic-analytical style, showing how attention to our way of speaking and thinking about rules can yield new insights into their nature.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-393
Author(s):  
Naomi Choi

AbstractTo answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Aditya Yuli Sulistyawan

<p class="IABSSS">The dominance of legal positivism in thought and law enforcement is a reality. Saintism of legal science presents a law that is conceptualized as something that exists in sensory terms, along with its straightforward, rational, and objective nature. Law is always requested objectively. Objectivity is done by freeing the subject's mind to the legal reality that already exists as an object. Therefore, various legal cases such as the case of Asyani, Rasminah, Minah and others, are things that are easily proven as violating the law because it is a violation of the text of the article of law. Such a way of law, is now starting to become a public concern. So, when objectivity begins to be questioned, that's when the real subjectivity of asking begins to be considered - and this will be explained [only] in the study of legal philosophy, especially paradigmatic studies. This paper will discuss the possibility of subjectivity in law, which will be presented in the paradigmatic study.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 268-275
Author(s):  
Zairusi

The study of Philosophy of Law is developing rapidly from time to time as we know that there are many schools of Philosophy of Law that are believed and used in a particular place, time, and adherents. Philosophy of Law, nowadays a school growing very fast is Postmodern Philosophy of Law. The postmodern flow of legal philosophy as a reaction to the flow of Positivism Legal Philosophy. Postmodernism's thinking about law is that legal truth is not particular, absolute, and objective, but relative, plural, consensual. This thinking often raises the pros and cons among experts. Therefore, this study tries to increase the flow of postmodern philosophy as a form of human reaction to legal positivism concerning the criminal justice system in Indonesia. This study uses a qualitative approach with a literature review method. The results of the study indicate that the criminal law system in Indonesia is unable to accommodate the purpose of the law, namely justice, because the criminal law system in Indonesia always considers justice based on the fulfilment of written law in which everyone applies a rule of law that is ultimately the same. Therefore, the author expresses Postmodern Philosophy as a creative legal justice breakthrough that is heterogeneous or combines various elements in everyday human life such as social, legal, cultural, psychological, political, educational, etc.


Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Raz

In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. But in some ways the more radical and surprising claim he makes is that not only were previous legal philosophers mistaken about the nature of law, they were also mistaken about the nature of the philosophy of law or jurisprudence. Perhaps it is possible to summarize his main contentions on the nature of jurisprudence in three theses: First, jurisprudence is interpretive: “General theories of law… aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice” (LE, 90). Second, legal philosophy cannot be a semantic account of the word “law.” Legal philosophers “cannot produce useful semantic theories of law” (id.). Third, legal philosophy or jurisprudence “is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law” (id.).


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
Dejan Stankovic

The contemporary natural law theory was grounded in the philosophical and the jurisprudential work of Australian legal and moral philosopher John Mitchell Finnis. He reaffirmed the natural law and also corrected some of false notions about it which were dominant through the history of legal philosophy. Finnis moral and legal philosophy could be understood by the specific theoretical figure - moral argument for law. This theoretical concept implies unity of two mutually connected moments which are necessary for a philosophical treatment of any socially relevant phenomena: methodological and epistemological as well as practical. The meeting point of these two philosophically relevant dimensions is theory of practical rationality exposed in the philosophy of John Mitchell Finnis. By grounding his concept of natural law on the theory of practical rationality, John Finnis historically contextualize it. He made some sort of specific anti metaphysical concept of natural law theory that is alternative to the classical natural law as well as to the legal positivism, which mainly exposed in the legal theories of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A Hart.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
James Allan

‘Legal Positivism’ is a much abused term. It is often pejoratively invoked by those occupying both the natural law and critical legal studies ramparts. The former see it as a school of thought which ignores the role in law of those standards and values which have not been deliberately laid down or unintentionally evolved. Positivism, for them, fails because it is prepared to describe a legal world where moral values play no necessary part and where transcendent values may not exist at all. The latter group of critics, not too dissimilarly, see legal positivism’s doctrines as over-reliant on rules and too inclined to accept that a legal system somehow can generate a logically mandated code of answers.In order to defend positivism it is advisable to start with an enunciation of its core precepts. With all that has been written attacking and supporting positivism though, this can be a contentious matter. So instead I shall defend one particular version of positivism, that of H.L.A. Hart. As Hart’s The Concept of Law, first published in 1961, is at worst one of the handful of great legal philosophy texts written in English this century and at best “the classic work of philosophical jurisprudence”, this preference for concentrating on the tangible and identifiable precepts of Hart over the woolly, elusive and frequently caricatured precepts of something disparagingly termed positivism has much to recommend it.


Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

This chapter presents some of H. L. A. Hart's main contributions to legal philosophy. Hart's The Concept of Law is widely regarded as the single most important contribution to legal philosophy in the twentieth century. It shows that Hart's theory is the most consistent and sustained attempt to develop a detachment view of law and legal philosophy, and one that is thoroughly reductive. The chapter introduces another separation, or detachment, that Hart's theory attempted, and one that is less successful: the detachment of law from state sovereignty. The legal positivist tradition, from Hobbes to the main positivists of the nineteenth century, conceived of law as the instrument of political sovereignty, largely influenced by the emergence of the modern state. Hart tried to show that this identification of law with state sovereignty is profoundly misguided; law is independently grounded on social rules, not on political sovereignty. It is argued that Hart's attempt to separate our understanding of law from the concept of sovereignty is only partly successful.


Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

This chapter completes the outlines of a plausible version of legal positivism. It is organized into two parts. The first section discusses some of Joseph Raz's ideas about the nature of practical authority and the implications of his views about the normativity of law. The second section returns to the rules of recognition and tries to show that, though H. L. A. Hart is basically right about the idea that social rules are at the foundations of law, we need a theory of social conventions to articulate the requisite foundations. These two ideas in hand—the authoritative nature of law and its conventional foundations—provide the main building blocks needed to reconstruct a plausible version of Hart's theory of law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document