Knowing Full Well
This chapter considers the epistemic normativity that constitutes our knowledge. It introduces two of Plato's best-known dialogues, which are both inquiries about knowledge. The Theaetetus inquires into its nature; the Meno into its value. Each dialogue, the chapter suggests, involves the same basic question: What sort of normativity is constitutive of our knowledge? A belief that falls short of knowledge is thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right just by luck. The chapter then asks what is involved in such an evaluation, and in addressing this question the chapter draws out a solution for both Platonic problems.
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1969 ◽
Vol 27
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pp. 6-7
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1982 ◽
Vol 40
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pp. 680-681
1974 ◽
Vol 32
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pp. 450-451
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1970 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 358-359
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1984 ◽
Vol 42
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pp. 376-379
1981 ◽
Vol 39
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pp. 38-39
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