The Indirect Influence of Congressional Investigations on Policy Outcomes

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas L. Kriner ◽  
Eric Schickler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Future Policy ◽  
Congressional Investigations

This chapter explores a third pathway of investigative influence: investigations in one policy area may affect presidential actions in unrelated policy areas by raising the threat of new investigative actions should the president stray too far from congressional preferences. It focuses on several important characteristics of military policy making—particularly the plausible assumption that most international crises arise independently of the domestic political environment in the United States—to assess the concrete impact of even unrelated investigations in the recent past on future policy outcomes. The analysis suggests that the scope of investigative influence may be even greater than it superficially appears. Even when Congress does not investigate, the threat of an investigation and the political costs it generates may well affect the administration’s political calculus and its implementation of policy accordingly.

Notes and Comments

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES C. GARAND ◽  
MARCI GLASCOCK LICHTL
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
The United States ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
The Political ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Growth Industry ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Political Media

In recent years the study of divided government has been a growth industry. Numerous scholars have sought to explain patterns of divided government in the United States, while others have attempted to explore the consequences of the phenomenon. No doubt this scholarly interest in the subject is due in large part to the attention paid by the political media to divided control of the presidency and Congress during the 1980s, as well as the resulting ’gridlock‘ that dominated policy making in Washington during that time period.

The Violence of Inequality: Race and Lobbying in the Politics of Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States

2021 ◽  
pp. 68-93
Author(s):  
Sappho Xenakis ◽  
Leonidas K. Cheliotis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Political Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Criminal Justice Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Us

There is no shortage of scholarly and other research on the reciprocal relationship that inequality bears to crime, victimisation and contact with the criminal justice system, both in the specific United States context and beyond. Often, however, inequality has been studied in conjunction with only one of the three phenomena at issue, despite the intersections that arguably obtain between them–and, indeed, between their respective connections with inequality itself. There are, moreover, forms of inequality that have received far less attention in pertinent research than their prevalence and broader significance would appear to merit. The purpose of this chapter is dual: first, to identify ways in which inequality’s linkages to crime, victimisation and criminal justice may relate to one another; and second, to highlight the need for a greater focus than has been placed heretofore on the role of institutionalised inequality of access to the political process, particularly as this works to bias criminal justice policy-making towards the preferences of financially motivated state lobbying groups at the expense of disadvantaged racial minorities. In so doing, the chapter singles out for analysis the US case and, more specifically, engages with key extant explanations of the staggering rise in the use of imprisonment in the country since the 1970s.

Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions

2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 766-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON A. MACDONALD
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Regulatory Actions

Limitation riders, which allow the U.S. Congress to forbid agencies from spending money for specific uses, enable congressional majorities to exert greater influence over bureaucratic policy decisions than is appreciated by research on policy making in the United States. I develop a theory of limitation riders, explaining why they lead to policy outcomes that are preferable to a majority of legislators compared to outcomes that would occur if this tool did not exist. I assess this perspective empirically by analyzing the volume of limitation riders reported in bills from 1993 to 2002 and all limitation riders forbidding regulatory actions from 1989 to 2009. In addition to supporting the conclusion that Congress possesses more leverage over agencies’ decisions than is currently appreciated, the findings have implications for advancing theories of delegation.

Is Germany Different? A Comment on Hexham and Poewe's Interpretation of German Anticult Policy

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-128
Author(s):  
Hubert Seiwert
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Movements ◽  
New Religious Movements ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Minority Religions ◽  
Government Involvement ◽  
Actual Policy

The article comments on Irving Hexham and Karla Poewe's analysis of German anticult policy. It argues that the concept of verfassungsfeindlich (hostile to the constitution), which according to Hexham and Poewe is central in German anticult rhetoric, is used only against Scientology, and it does not play any significant role in other cases. The anticult climate in German public and government reactions to minority religions does not appear to be more intense than in many other European countries. It is not convincing, therefore, to explain them with specific German historical experiences. However, religion does hold a lower position on the scale of constitutional rights than in the United States. Freedom of religion may not impinge upon other constitutional rights. Government involvement in anticult activities does not seem to be due to shortcomings of the political or legal system. Rather it reflects deficiencies in actual policy-making and in particular lack of reliable information about new religious movements.

The Political Economy of Religion and Social Insurance in the United States, 1910–1939

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Scheve ◽  
David Stasavage
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Individual Preferences

There are few scholars who would disagree with the proposition that individual economic position and economic risk play a critical role in shaping preferences for income redistribution and social insurance. There is less consensus, however, about the extent to which non-economic factors also influence individual preferences regarding social insurance provision. A number of scholars have examined how issues of race and identity have influenced the development of social insurance programs in the United States, as well as individual attitudes with respect to these programs. In a theoretical context, other authors have considered how attitudes toward income redistribution might also depend upon psychological dispositions such as the “belief in a just world.” In this article, we focus on religiosity as an important factor that can shape both individual preferences and policy outcomes regarding social insurance in the United States. To do so, we develop an argument about religion and social insurance as substitutes that draws both on existing work on the political economy of social insurance and on findings in social psychology regarding what we call the “coping effect” of religion. We test our hypothesis using historical evidence from two early social insurance policies: workers’ compensation legislation enacted by state governments between 1910 and 1930 and New Deal unemployment relief.

The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States, 1933–1972

1989 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary D. Libecap
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Crude Oil ◽  
Oil Prices ◽  
The United States ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Crude Oil Prices

This article examines a government-sponsored cartel that fixed domestic crude oil prices in interstate markets from 1933 through 1972. Although the cartel raised and stabilized nominal oil prices beyond earlier private efforts, it also resulted in politically driven constraints on price, output levels, and cartel rent distribution. Political factors molded quota assignments, diverted production from low- to high-cost producers, and raised production costs. Political pressures prevented Texas from acting as a residual or swing producer. Instead, the interstate oil cartel members maintained nominal prices and spread the political costs of output adjustments.

Following Suit or Falling Behind? A Comparative Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Abelson ◽  
Christine M. Carberry
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
The United States ◽  
Think Tanks ◽  
The Political ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Political Landscape ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Economic Barriers

AbstractPolicy institutes, or think tanks, have become increasingly visible on the political landscape. However, their policy role has varied in different countries. This article seeks to explain why, compared to think tanks in the United States, Canadian institutes have maintained a relatively modest presence in the policy-making community. Although many Canadian think tanks have made concerted efforts to replicate the strategies of their American counterparts, they have had far less success employing them in an effective and meaningful manner. While many American think tanks have both the resources and the opportunities to convey ideas to policy makers, Canadian organizations must overcome institutional, cultural and economic barriers before they can play a decisive role in policy-making circles. This article also makes reference to the experiences of think tanks in some parliamentary systems, notably Great Britain, to demonstrate that although these barriers are formidable and need to be addressed in some detail, they are not insurmountable.

The political effects of referendums: An analysis of institutional innovations in Eastern and Central Europe

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hug
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Central Europe ◽  
National Level ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Direct Involvement ◽  
Political Effects

Theory suggests that the political effects of referendums should vary according to the institutional provisions that allow for direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. Relying on extant theoretical models the paper proposes initial tests of some implications for the newly democratized countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The constitutions of these countries distinguish themselves by a wide variety of institutional provisions for referendums. Taking advantage of this increased variance, the paper demonstrates effects of different institutional provisions on policy outcomes, which, so far, have only been demonstrated at the sub-national level, for example, in the United States and Switzerland.

Telecommunications Reform in Mexico from a Comparative Perspective

2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 83-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Mariscal
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
Telecommunications Reform ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Policy Context

Abstract This paper examines the process of reform in the Mexican telecommunications sector and makes comparisons with similar processes in the United States, New Zealand, and Brazil. Differences in policy responses are explained by the structure of the political institutions and the policy context in any given country. The policy lessons to be drawn from the regulatory experiences examined are that the sequence and the pace of reform influence policy outcomes. The speed with which the Mexican reform was carried out led to a lack of the institutional and legal support necessary to create a level competitive playing field. The permanence of a vertically integrated firm in the Mexican market, moreover, introduced consequential costs to the regulation of the industry. The results of this paper support the theoretical argument that privatization, in itself, does not guarantee the development of the sector and point to the need to attain a more effective regulation of competition in telecommunications.

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