A Sacred Space Is Never Empty

Author(s):  
Victoria Smolkin

When the Bolsheviks set out to build a new world in the wake of the Russian Revolution, they expected religion to die off. Soviet power used a variety of tools—from education to propaganda to terror—to turn its vision of a Communist world without religion into reality. Yet even with its monopoly on ideology and power, the Soviet Communist Party never succeeded in overcoming religion and creating an atheist society. This book presents the first history of Soviet atheism from the 1917 revolution to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The book argues that to understand the Soviet experiment, we must make sense of Soviet atheism. It shows how atheism was reimagined as an alternative cosmology with its own set of positive beliefs, practices, and spiritual commitments. Through its engagements with religion, the Soviet leadership realized that removing religion from the “sacred spaces” of Soviet life was not enough. Then, in the final years of the Soviet experiment, Mikhail Gorbachev—in a stunning and unexpected reversal—abandoned atheism and reintroduced religion into Soviet public life. The book explores the meaning of atheism for religious life, for Communist ideology, and for Soviet politics.

Eugenio Corti (1921–2014), marked by a precocious vocation as a writer, focuses on communism as the major danger of the twentieth century. Aiming to see by himself the ongoing experiment of the Soviet communism, he answered the call to arms by asking to be sent to the eastern front – despite disapproving the war of the German allies against Russia. While in Ukraine, he gets aware of the communist inhumanity and, still alive after the retreat, he devotes himself to the service of truth. He denounces the connivance of the western culture with the massacres provoked by the communist ideology. The tragedy Processo e morte di Stalin (1962) originates from a long study of the theory and praxis of the communism in the Soviet Union, but also in China and Indochina. In this work, the Georgian dictator, forced by a conspiracy lead by Politburo members, analyzes the real communism; in the end, he demonstrates the practical impossibility of the ideal society of the “new mankind”, which this ideology longed for. Eugenio Corti was born on 21 January 1921, the same day when the history of Communist Party of Italy began after the split of the Italian Socialist Party: this coincidence of the dates is emblematic of the approach, both historical and transcendent, with which the Author will investigate the origin and the results of the communist experiment, denouncing the horrors perpetrated in the implementation of Marxist theories. Following this existential vocation, after a diary of his memories of the retreat from the Eastern front and after a novel about his experience in the regular army during the war of liberation of Italy from the German army, he dedicated himself to a long and consistent study of communist ideology. Alongside the works of Marx, Stalin and Lenin, he analyzed a large amount of studies on the philosophical roots of communism, including the accredited work of Isaac Deutscher on Stalin. In Corti’s view, Stalin addresses the failure of this utopian project to the unchangeability of the nature and of the human heart. By confuting the theses of marxism-leninism on the basis of reality, Corti shows that the evil is not found in unbalanced class relations, but in the human heart which, at the same time, constitutes the extreme defense of the universal human values.


Author(s):  
Albert Resis

The precise function that Marxist-Leninist ideology serves in the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy remains a highly contentious question among Western scholars. In the first postwar year, however, few senior officials or Soviet specialists in the West doubted that Communist ideology served as the constitutive element of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the militant revival of Marxism-Leninism after the Kremlin had downplayed it during 'The Great Patriotic War" proved to be an important factor in the complex of causes that led to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Moscow's revival of that ideology in 1945 prompted numerous top-level Western leaders and observers to regard it as heralding a new wave of Soviet world-revolutionary messianism and expansionism. Many American and British officials were even alarmed by the claim, renewed, for example, in Moscow's official History of Diplomacy, that Soviet diplomacy possessed a "scientific theory," a "weapon" possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. This "weapon," Marxism-Leninism, Moscow ominously boasted, enabled Soviet leaders to comprehend, foresee, and master the course of international affairs, smoothing the way for Soviet diplomacy to make exceptional gains since 1917. Now, in the postwar period, Stalinist diplomacy opened before the Soviet Union "boundlesshorizons and the most majestic prospects."


Author(s):  
Christoph Irmscher

After his return to the United States in 1927, Max Eastman finds himself isolated from his former radical friends. A controversy with Sidney Hook over his interpretation of Marxism increases his depression, as does the lackluster response to his novel, Venture. Crystal Eastman’s untimely death in 1928 nearly ends Max’s career as a professional lecturer, but Eliena’s devotion to their marriage sustains him. Max’s translation of Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution reinvigorates his friendship with the exiled leader, although during Max’s visit to Prinkipo Island the men nearly come to blows over their different interpretations of dialectic materialism. Max publishes more poetry, a book on literature and science, an edition of Marx’s writings, and Artists in Uniform, a critique of the totalitarian takeover of literature in the Soviet Union. He collaborates on the innovative documentary Tsar to Lenin, while Enjoyment of Laughter, his second book on humor, becomes a best-seller. Max’s scathing review of Hemingway’s Death in the Afternoon leads to a well-publicized fistfight between the two men. Worried about the Soviet infiltration of American life, Max is keeping lists of suspected communists in the U.S. and acts as the host of the popular radio show Word Game.


Slavic Review ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Evans Clements

Traditionally in surveys of Soviet history, if Alexandra Kollontai is mentioned she is presented briefly as the advocate of the “glass of water theory of sex,” a woman who practiced free love as freely as she preached it. The lecturer then moves on to more serious concerns, having ignored the history of a tormented, perceptive woman intimately involved in the early Soviet experiment in female emancipation. Kollontai advocated far more than free love, and the role she played was far greater than that of mistress to Alexander Shliapnikov. From 1917 until her departure from the Soviet Union in 1923 she held positions of major importance in the young government and in the Bolshevik party. Kollontai worked first as an agitator in 1917, then took the post of commissar of state welfare from November 1917 to March 1918, when she resigned in protest against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. In 1921 she joined the Workers' Opposition, adding to Shliapnikov's proposals for trade-union reform her own call for party and government democratization and giving articulate voice to those demands in an often-cited pamphlet, The Workers' Opposition. Throughout the revolutionary years she was recognized as a major authority on the problems of women and child care. Since Kollontai did play an important role in the early period of Soviet history, her personality and ideology warrant study. That study in turn reveals a woman who perceived the problems of womanhood with clarity and who wrote about and sought a liberation beyond the comprehension of many of her contemporaries.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Zlotnik

The confrontation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps no event of comparable magnitude has been more affected by the personal interactions of two men. The history of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin relationship during the ªnal years of the USSR is largely the story of the collapse of the Soviet state. The passionate dislike and animosity that developed between the two leaders made compromise difªcult and accelerated the collapse of the union. Gorbachev's initial unwillingness to deal seriously with the new Russian leader probably did more to contribute to the disintegration of the Soviet Union than did Yeltsin's bluster and thirst for revenge. It was only when the tables were turned after the failed coup of August 1991, and when Yeltsin clearly had gained control of the situation, that he allowed his intense dislike of Gorbachev to drive his actions.


Elements ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Prescott Brown

This paper attempts to understand how the celebrated and controversial figure of Sergei Eisenstein understood and contributed to the formation of the Soviet Union through his films of the 1920s.  The lens of visual metaphors offer a specific insight into how artistic choices of the director were informed by his own pedagogy for the Russian Revolution.  The paper asks the questions: Did Eisenstein's films reflect the official party rhetoric?  How did they inform or motivate the public toward the communist ideology of the early Soviet Union?  The primary sources used in this paper are from the films Strike (1925), Battleship Potemkin (1926), October (1928), and The General Line (1929).  Eisenstein created visual metaphors through the juxtaposition of images in his films which alluded to higher concepts.  A shot of a worker followed by the shot of gears turning created the concept of industry in the minds of the audience.  Through visual metaphors, it is possible to understand the motives of Eisenstein and the Communist party.  It is also possible, with the aid of secondary sources, to see how those motives differed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-92
Author(s):  
Alexei N. Krouglov

The origins in Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the dogma about Kant as the German theorist of the French Revolution requires some analysis and I explain how a phrase of Marx later gave rise to the dogma. I first look at the sources that influenced K. Marx’s view of Kant and the French Revolution, above all С. F. Bachmann and H. Heine. I then examine the form in which Kant’s philosophy was compared with the French Revolution in the non-Bolshevik milieu before the 1917 Russian Revolution (P. Ya. Chaadayev, V. S. Mezhevich, the Dostoyevsky brothers, V. F. Ern, Archbishop Nikanor, P. A. Florensky). Then I look at how Marx’s phrase influenced Russian social democrats and specifically the Bolsheviks (G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin, V. M. Shulyatikov). I cite the example of the discussion triggered by a letter of Z. Ya. Beletsky concerning the third volume of The History of Philosophy (1943) to demonstrate the non-canonical status of Marx’s thesis on Kant and the French Revolution in the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. Finally, the first Soviet edition of Kant’s works in the 1960s canonised Marx’s phrase and gave the exact source. The reason why it took so long to give chapter and verse for the Marx quotation is that it occurs as early as 1842 in “The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law” which belongs to the idealistic period of the early Marx.


Author(s):  
Mikhail V. Novikov ◽  

The subject of the study is some modern conservative versions of the history of the Soviet Union’s military assistance to the Spanish Republic in 1936–1939. The aim of the article is to attempt a critical analysis of the new and revived versions of the motives of Soviet intervention in the Spanish conflict, of the involvement of the Soviet leadership in large-scale terror against civilians in the republican zone, of the degree of influence of the Soviet leadership and Soviet representatives in Spain on the governmental structure of the Spanish Republic, of the anti-fascist character of the war. The study has established the inconsistency of the versions about Soviet aid as a means of promoting the world revolution in Spain and as an attempt to draw the democratic and fascist states into a major war between themselves through the Spanish conflict, about the possibilities of Stalin in 1936 to manipulate the great powers. It has been proved that conservative historians exaggerate the degree of influence of Stalin and Soviet political representatives in Spain on the military-political leadership of the republic. The impact of the so-called “instruments” of Soviet influence in the Spanish Republic is also exaggerated. The first of the instruments is considered to be the relocation of part of the gold reserve to Moscow, which, allegedly, allowed the Soviet control over the finances of the republic to be established. The second is the activities of Soviet military advisers; the third is the Communist Party of Spain, which was part of the Comintern, and was considered as an obedient tool in the hands of Moscow. It was and still is traditional to attribute responsibility for unleashing large-scale terror against civilians in the republican zone to Stalin, which does not correspond to reality as convincingly proved by the British historian P. Preston in his famous work The Spanish Holocaust. The scale of terror was exaggerated in the republican zone and, accordingly, understated in the Francoist zone. The study shows the failure of attempts to distort the anti-fascist nature of the war waged by the Spanish Republic relying on the support of the Soviet Union, Mexico, the progressive public of most civilized countries of that time, as well as attempts to present the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco in 1936–1939 as quite respectable. The new and updated critical versions of the Soviet aid to the Spanish Republic considered in the article are the result of the neoconservative wave in western historiography, which influenced representatives of both the classical historical school and the adherents of postmodernism.


Author(s):  
Victoria Smolkin

This book discusses the history of Soviet atheism from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 until the return of religion to public life in the final years of the Soviet Union. When the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917, they were armed with a vision: to make Communism a world without religion. More specifically, they sought to remove religion from the “sacred spaces” of Soviet life. They rejected all previous sources of authority, replacing the autocratic state with Soviet power, religious morality with class morality, and backward superstition with an enlightened, rational, and modern way of life. Despite all these earnest efforts, however, Soviet Communism never managed to overcome religion or produce an atheist society. This book examines why Soviet Communism abandoned its commitment to atheism, and whether there was a relationship between the divorce of Communism and atheism, and the divorce of the state from the Soviet Communist Party.


2018 ◽  
pp. 793-808
Author(s):  
Alexander S. Masyutin ◽  

The article analyses various aspects of the life in prison of political prisoners of the Vyatka gubernia. Unpublished documents from the archives of Kirov and Moscow, on which this study is based, designate the subject of the study; that is, they allow to establish forms of resistance of political prisoners to prison regime, to identify patterns of their escapes, to trace dynamics in occupancy of political prisons in the Vyatka gubernia, to establish instances of interaction between representatives of different left parties while in penal institutions. The timeframe of the study is the period of the first Russian revolution of 1905-1908, when prisons ceased to be the tenement of few and far between ardent revolutionaries from the privileged strata of society, and swarmed with much less versed ideologically masses of the discontented. Thus, in view of a participant of the revolutionary events of 1905-1908, Socialists-Revolutionary Maximalist G. A. Nestroev, the ideological grounding of the political prisoners deteriorated significantly. The author, however, believes that this ‘diversity’ of prisoners allows to conduct a more thorough analysis of their public activity in prison and to better link the activities of prisoners with the people on whose behalf the revolutionary forces acted. The author focuses on the Socialists-Revolutionaries, as their percentage among prisoners was much higher than that of the Socialists-Democrats. Known for several high-profile assassinations, the former were considered more dangerous state criminals than the Socialists-Democrat ‘propagandists,’ and thus were subject to more severe punishments. After the October revolution 1917, the Bolsheviks created an extensive mythologized literature on fellow party members who served time in tsarist prisons but mentioned only several Socialists-Revolutionaries, and these were politically harmless, or deceased (like E. S. Sazonov), or attached to the Bolshevik party (like V. N. Rukhlyadev). Findings and conclusions of the article can be used in research of the later periods in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union, particularly, for comparison of the prisoners’ struggle with the prison administration and of the forms of assistance to prisoners from the outside in tzarist Russia and later.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document