Third-Party Characteristics and Intergroup Conflict Resolution

1980 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 447-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Breaugh ◽  
Richard J. Klimoski ◽  
Mitchell B. Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Low Power ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
High Power ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
The Third ◽  
Main Effect ◽  
Party Characteristics

This laboratory experiment examined the differing effects of anticipating a mediator versus an arbitrator upon the negotiating behavior of group spokesmen who represented actual constituencies. In addition, the reputation (attractiveness) of the third party was also manipulated. It was hypothesized, based upon previous research, that representatives facing high-power third parties (arbitrators) would have more difficulty in negotiations. This, in fact, was found. Representatives facing a third party with arbitration power took more time to reach an agreement, used more bargaining dyads and had more deadlocks than did representatives who faced a low-power third party. Contrary to expectations, no main effect was found for third-party reputation. In concluding, the importance of replicating this study's findings was emphasized.

scholarly journals Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

2015 ◽  
Vol 112 (22) ◽  
pp. 6937-6942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Halevy ◽  
Eliran Halali
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Conflict Intervention ◽  
Intergroup Conflicts

The tremendous costs of conflict have made humans resourceful not only at warfare but also at peacemaking. Although third parties have acted as peacemakers since the dawn of history, little is known about voluntary, informal third-party intervention in conflict. Here we introduce the Peacemaker Game, a novel experimental paradigm, to model and study the interdependence between disputants and third parties in conflict. In the game, two disputants choose whether to cooperate or compete and a third party chooses whether or not to intervene in the conflict. Intervention introduces side payments that transform the game disputants are playing; it also introduces risk for the third party by making it vulnerable to disputants’ choices. Six experiments revealed three robust effects: (i) The mere possibility of third-party intervention significantly increases cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup conflicts; (ii) reducing the risk to third parties dramatically increases intervention rates, to everyone’s benefit; and (iii) disputants’ cooperation rates are consistently higher than third parties’ intervention rates. These findings explain why, how, and when self-interested third parties facilitate peaceful conflict resolution.

Formation of Contract and Third Parties in Cambodia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng
Keyword(s):  
Academic Writing ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Formal Requirements

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.

Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Under the Taiwan Civil Code

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN
Keyword(s):  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Relationship ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Privity Of Contract

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.

scholarly journals Compliance Bargaining Mechanism as The Way to Ended Iran-Iraq War 1988

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Maulana Hasymi
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Iraq War ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Loss Of Life ◽  
The Third ◽  
Border Dispute ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Way

<p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Isu-isu terkait budaya, ekonomi, dan nilai seringkali menghasilkan konflik. Tak terkecuali dengan isu perebutan wilayah. Salahsatu perang terbesar yang terkait dengan isu sengketa wilayah adalah perang Iran-Irak 1988. Perang Iran-Irak 1988 membawa sejarah besar dari kedua negara yang saling berhubungan dengan isu perebutan wilayah, perebutan pengaruh ideologi, dan isu ekonomi. Perang yang berlangsung cukup lama ini membuat Iran dan Irak menyadari akan kerugian jangka panjang yang dialami. Pada akhirnya, kedua negara sepakat untuk berdamai dalam sebuah proses yang melibatkan pihak ketiga. Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa mengambil peran sebagai pihak ketiga yang membantu penyelesaian perang antara Iran dan Irak. Resolusi no.598 yang disusun oleh Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa mengarisbawahi akan pentingnya gencatan senjata dengan banyaknya kerugian dan korban jiwa yang muncul. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa upaya Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa menyusun resolusi no.598 dalam menyelesaikan perang Iran-Irak adalah penerapan dari mekanisme compliance bargaining pada proses resolusi konflik.</p><p><strong>Kata kunci:</strong> compliance bargaining, resolusi konflik, rezim, gencatan senjata</p><p> </p><p align="center"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>Conflictual issues can be about economy, culture and values, or even a border dispute. The class cannot be avoided because of several issues triggering the conflict and also several interests. One of the bigger wars that can be was the Iran-Iraq War at 1980-1988. This war brought the long history between both of those countries, which were related with border disputes, ideological influences, and economic war. Those of both countries is thinking that if the war is still being run, it is not giving any good advantage. The damage was so big. So, it required a process to bring the two states involved war into one meeting to talk about peace or end the war. The process is called a peace process. In this case, the peace process arranged by the involvement of third party. The United Nations take a role as the third party in Iran-Iraq War by formed a Resolution no 598. In the resolution the council expressed its concern that, despite its calls for ceasefire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq continued with heavy loss of life and material destruction. The Iran-Iraq war was ended through the resolution no 598 that was produced by the United Nations. Furthermore, this paper argue that the way of the United Nations ended the Iran-Iraq war through Resolution no 598 is implementing the theory of compliance bargaining in conflict resolution.</p><p><strong>Keywords</strong>: compliance bargaining, conflict resolution, regime, ceasefire</p>

scholarly journals TANGGUNGJAWAB BLU TRANSJAKARTA TERHADAP PIHAK KETIGA DALAM HAL TERJADI KECELAKAAN MENURUT UU NO. 22 TAHUN 2009 TENTANG LALU LINTAS DAN ANGKUTAN JALAN

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elfrida R Gultom
Keyword(s):  
Public Service ◽  
Public Transport ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Transportation Services ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Ticket Prices

The objective of Busway development is to provide transportation services faster, safer, comfortable, and affordable for people in Jakarta. Ticket prices are subsidized by the local government busway. Busway given special line, however could not be separated from the accident. In a carriage, in the event of an accident then apply provisions of Law No. 22 of 2009 on Traffic and Transportation. If there is a loss that hit the third party then setting responsibilities Public Service Agency TransJakarta Busway to third parties refer to the provisions of Article 194 paragraph (1) which determines that the public transport companies are not responsible for any losses suffered by third parties, unless the third party may prove that the loss is caused by the fault of public transport company. Under these provisions, if the third party wants to sue for damages, ketigalah party must prove the fault of the carrier, the claim is based on the basis of tort or on the basis of error set forth in Article 1365 of the Civil Code which stipulates that any action unlawfully harming others, require the person who carries the loss offset. Keywords: transport, the responsibility of the carrier, a third party, transport law

7. Privity of contract and third party rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Privity Of Contract

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.

31. Remedies against strangers to the trust

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Pearce ◽  
Warren Barr
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Trust Property ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Stranger

This chapter considers remedies involving a breach of trust which involves a third party who was not a trustee either as a participant in the breach or as the recipient of trust property transferred to them in breach of trust. In the event of such a breach, the beneficiaries of the trust may be entitled to pursue remedies against the stranger. The third party is termed a ‘stranger to the trust’ because he or she was not a trustee and, therefore, was not subject to any obligations prior to his or her involvement in the breach. Remedies against third parties may prove more attractive to the beneficiaries than their remedies against the trustee in breach. The availability of remedies against a stranger to the trust will be especially important if the trustee is insolvent, thus rendering direct remedies against the trustee ineffective.

3. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

2019 ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Common ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.

Taking Sides in Wars of Attrition

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT POWELL
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
War Of Attrition ◽  
The Third ◽  
Boomerang Effect ◽  
Formal Framework

Third parties often have a stake in the outcome of a conflict and can affect that outcome by taking sides. This article studies the factors that affect a third party's decision to take sides in a civil or interstate war by adding a third actor to a standard continuous-time war of attrition with two-sided asymmetric information. The third actor has preferences over which of the other two actors wins and for being on the winning side conditional on having taken sides. The third party also gets a flow payoff during the fighting which can be positive when fighting is profitable or negative when fighting is costly. The article makes four main contributions: First, it provides a formal framework for analyzing the effects of endogenous intervention on the duration and outcome of the conflict. Second, it identifies a “boomerang” effect that tends to make alignment decisions unpredictable and coalitions dynamically unstable. Third, it yields several clear comparative-static results. Finally, the formal analysis has implications for empirical efforts to estimate the effects of intervention, showing that there may be significant selection and identification issues.

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