scholarly journals The Unificatory Power of Scientific Realism

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (44) ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park

Abstract The no-miracles argument (Putnam 1975) holds that science is successful because successful theories are (approximately) true. Frost-Arnold (2010) objects that this argument is unacceptable because it generates neither new predictions nor unifications. It is similar to the unacceptable explanation that opium puts people to sleep because it has a dormative virtue. I reply that on close examination, realism explains not only why some theories are successful but also why successful theories exist in current science. Therefore, it unifies the disparate phenomena.

Author(s):  
Samir Okasha

‘Realism and anti-realism’ is concerned with the debate between scientific realism and its converse, anti-realism or instrumentalism. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that it is to provide a true description of the ‘observable’ part of the world. The ‘no miracles’ argument, one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, is shown to be a plausibility argument — an inference to the best explanation. Central to the debate between realism and anti-realism is the observable/unobservable distinction and the views of realist Grover Maxwell and anti-realist Bas van Fraassen are described. The underdetermination argument is also explained.


Author(s):  
Timothy D. Lyons

This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically valid modus tollens arguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With the content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan McArthur

In the lengthy debate over the question of scientific realism one of the least discussed positions is structural realism. However, this position ought to attract critical attention because it purports to preserve the central insights of the best arguments for both realism and anti-realism. John Worrall has in fact described it as being ‘the best of both worlds’ that recognizes the discontinuous nature of scientific change as well as the ‘no-miracles’ argument for scientific realism. However, the validity of this claim has been called into question by Stathis Psillos. He questions its ability to correctly account for the examples of scientific change that its supporters, like Worrall (following Poincaré), claim ought to be understood in a structural realist light.In this paper I examine these arguments for and against structural realism and demonstrate that neither Worrall nor Psillos is fully correct. I agree with Psillos’ claim that realism with regards to a theory ought not to be ‘all or nothing,’ that one should not always take the whole of a theory to be true or else commit only to the belief in its directly empirical content.


2018 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park

In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.


Author(s):  
Doreen Fraser

The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific (anti-)realism debate. Chapter 13 argues that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions of the ‘No Miracles’ Argument (NMA) for scientific realism: Stathis Psillos’ Refined Explanationist Defense of Realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism. The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. The chapter also suggests some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form.


Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger ◽  
Stephan Hartmann

The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is perhaps the most prominent argument in the debate about scientific realism. It contends that the truth of our best scientific theories is the only hypothesis that does not make the astonishing predictive and explanatory success of science a mystery. However, the argument has been criticized from a Bayesian point of view as committing the base rate fallacy. We provide two Bayesian models (one related to the individual-theory-based NMA and one related to the frequency-based NMA) that respond to that objection. The first model takes into account the observed stability of mature scientific theories, the second the success frequency of theories within a scientific discipline. We conclude that the NMA can be used to defend the realist thesis and that its validity is a highly context-sensitive matter.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian J. Boge

AbstractTwo powerful arguments have famously dominated the realism debate in philosophy of science: The No Miracles Argument (NMA) and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). A standard response to the PMI is selective scientific realism (SSR), wherein only the working posits of a theory are considered worthy of doxastic commitment. Building on the recent debate over the NMA and the connections between the NMA and the PMI, I here consider a stronger inductive argument that poses a direct challenge for SSR: Because it is sometimes exactly the working posits which contradict each other, i.e., that which is directly responsible for empirical success, SSR cannot deliver a general explanation of scientific success.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Lorne Direnfeld ◽  
David B. Torrey ◽  
Jim Black ◽  
LuAnn Haley ◽  
Christopher R. Brigham

Abstract When an individual falls due to a nonwork-related episode of dizziness, hits their head and sustains injury, do workers’ compensation laws consider such injuries to be compensable? Bearing in mind that each state makes its own laws, the answer depends on what caused the loss of consciousness, and the second asks specifically what happened in the fall that caused the injury? The first question speaks to medical causation, which applies scientific analysis to determine the cause of the problem. The second question addresses legal causation: Under what factual circumstances are injuries of this type potentially covered under the law? Much nuance attends this analysis. The authors discuss idiopathic falls, which in this context means “unique to the individual” as opposed to “of unknown cause,” which is the familiar medical terminology. The article presents three detailed case studies that describe falls that had their genesis in episodes of loss of consciousness, followed by analyses by lawyer or judge authors who address the issue of compensability, including three scenarios from Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania. A medical (scientific) analysis must be thorough and must determine the facts regarding the fall and what occurred: Was the fall due to a fit (eg, a seizure with loss of consciousness attributable to anormal brain electrical activity) or a faint (eg, loss of consciousness attributable to a decrease in blood flow to the brain? The evaluator should be able to fully explain the basis for the conclusions, including references to current science.


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