scholarly journals Offences against Internationally Protected Persons: Problems of International Legal Qualification

Author(s):  
V. E. Tarabrin ◽  
R. A. Kantur

INTRODUCTION. The article examines various aspects of the international legal qualification of offences committed against internationally protected persons. The analysis of different elements of corpus delicti was laid at the heart of the study: namely, those of actus reus (whether the offence was perpetrate in the situation of an armed conflict), mens rea (whether the perpetrator was moved by a special intent, particularly the terrorist dolus specialis), and the legal status of a perpetrator (whether he or she was a state agent).MATERIALS AND METHODS. The materials of the study encompass international conventions, rules and principles of customary international law, case law of international courts and tribunals and international legal doctrine. The paper uses the comparative method and those of analysis and synthesis.  RESEARCH RESULTS. The key result of the study consists in the assumption that offences against internationally protected persons can be considered as either a conventional crime within the meaning of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (including, if a terrorist dolus specialis is established, as a crime of terrorism), or (in case of armed conflict) a violation of laws and customs of war, for this category of persons falls within the definition of protected persons by implication of Article 4 of the 1949 IV Geneva Convention, which gives grounds for the application of Article 146 of the 1949 IV Geneva Convention for purposes of the their criminal prosecution.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Given the result of the study, it is states that the following test can be applied for purposes of international legal qualification of offences against internationally protected persons: first, it is necessary to establish whether the offence of committed in a situation of armed conflict; second, it is highly important to enquire about the intent of the delinquent. If there is a terrorist dolus specialis, the offence can be qualified as terrorism-related. Moreover, it is necessary to establish the status of the delinquent and whether the one is a state agent or a private person, or, even if the person is a state agent, whether the one is a person acting sua sponte; additionally, the status of a delinquent and its relation with the belligerent state in regard to the situation of armed conflict is also significant for the qualification of respective offences in light of international law

Author(s):  
Mutaz M. QAFISHEH ◽  
Ihssan Adel MADBOUH

Abstract Upon the 2014 State of Palestine's accession to Geneva Convention III, captured Palestinians who took part in belligerent acts against the occupier should be treated as prisoners of war due to the fact that they belong to a party to an armed conflict. These individuals fall under three categories: members of security forces, affiliates of armed resistance groups, and uprisers who fight the occupant spontaneously on an individual basis. Contrary to established rules of IHL, Israel does not make any distinction regarding the status of these three types. Unilateral Israeli treatment of its captives does not hold water under international law. Such actions may trigger liability based on international criminal law, particularly as the ICC decided in 2021 that it possesses jurisdiction to investigate crimes occurring in the territory of Palestine. The mere fact of confining prisoners of war after the cessation of hostilities may constitute a ground for criminal prosecution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-131
Author(s):  
Anthony Carty

Abstract Customary international law as a source of general law is given a primary place in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. However, it is historically a concept created by legal doctrine. The very idea of custom supposes legal persons are natural persons living in a dynamic, evolving community. This was the assumption of the historical school of law in the 19th century when the concept of custom was developed. Now the dominant notion of legal personality is the State as an impersonal corporation and international legal theory (Brierly and D’Amato) can see well that the death of the historical school of law has to mean the death of the concept of custom. What should replace it? Two steps need to be taken in sequence. Firstly, following the Swedish realist philosopher Haegerstrom, we have to ascertain the precise constellations of the conflictual attitudes the populations of States have to the patterns of normativity which they project onto international society. Secondly, we should follow the virtue ethics jurisprudence of Paul Ricoeur and others, who develop a theory of critical legal doctrinal judgement, along the classical lines of Aristotle and Confucius, to challenge and sort out the prejudices of peoples into some reasonable shape, whereby these can be encouraged to understand and respect one another. Then one will not have to endure so many silly interpretations of international law such as the one declaring that there are only rocks in the South China Sea and not islands. Such interpretations have nothing to do with the supposedly ordinary legal language analysis of a convention and the State practice surrounding it. They have to do entirely with a continued lack of respect by Western jurists for non-Western societies and nations.


Author(s):  
Boris Krivokapić

The paper deals with international legal status of multinational (transnational) companies. The first part gives an overview of this entities and the specifics of their role in the modern world.In the second part, the author deals with the elements of international legal personality of multinational (transnational) companies. Such as international legal regulation of the position of these entities, their specific rights and obligations under international law, international responsibility, process subjectivity before certain international judicial bodies and the special relationship (partnership) with international organizations. It should be added that not only that international law acknowledges their existence, but also multinational companies themselves at least in part influence the development of that law.In the concluding remarks the author notes that multinational (transnational) companies do not have all the elements of a full international personality, the one that is inherent to states. However, even if not complete their personality is beyond doubt. Although between them, depending on the case, there are major differences, there is no dispute that, from the perspective of international law, at least some multinational companies have the legal capacity (the ability to be the holder of a larger or smaller circle of rights and obligations established by international law), legal capacity (the ability to conclude international agreements, create international custom, etc.), tort capacity (the ability to provide for the legal bears responsibility for violating the norms of international law), process capability (active and passive legitimacy before some international courts), etc. In all likelihood, along with the expected further strengthening of the economic, but also political and every other power and role of the companies themselves, their international personality will also become more and more developed, At one point this will require global (universal) agreement which would precisely define rights, but, in particular, the duties and responsibilities of these entities.


Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

Abstract International humanitarian law provides for fundamental guarantees, the content of which is similar irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict and which apply to individuals even if they do not fall into the categories of specifically protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. Those guarantees, all of which derive from the general requirement of human treatment, include prohibitions of specific conduct against persons, such as murder, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, or against property, such as pillaging. However, it is traditionally held that the entitlement to those guarantees depends upon two requirements: the ‘status requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons must not or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, and the ‘control requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons or properties must be under the control of a party to the armed conflict. This study argues in favour of breaking with these two requirements in light of the existing icc case law. That study is divided into two parts, with each part devoted to one requirement and made the object of a specific paper. The two papers follow the same structure. They start with general observations on the requirement concerned, examine the relevant icc case law and put forward several arguments in favour of an extensive approach to the personal scope of the fundamental guarantees. The first paper, which was published in the previous issue of this journal, dealt with the status requirement. It especially delved into the icc decisions in the Ntaganda case with respect to the issue of protection against intra-party violence. It advocated the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in such a context by rejecting the requirement of a legal status, on the basis of several arguments. Those arguments relied on ihl provisions protecting specific persons as well as on the potential for humanizing ihl on the matter and also on the approach making the status requirement relevant only when the fundamental guarantees apply in the conduct of hostilities. The second paper, which is published here, deals with the control requirement. It examines several icc cases in detail, including the Katanga and Ntaganda cases, in relation to the issue of the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in the conduct of hostilities. It is argued that the entitlement to those guarantees is not dependent upon any general control requirement, and that, as a result, some of these guarantees may apply in the conduct of hostilities. This concerns mainly those guarantees whose application or constitutive elements do not imply any physical control over the concerned persons or properties.


Author(s):  
Henckaerts Jean-Marie

This introductory chapter provides an overview of international humanitarian law (IHL), which is also known as the international law of armed conflict, or simply law of armed conflict (LOAC) or law of war. The rules and principles of IHL seek to limit the effects of armed conflict and at its core, IHL aims to preserve a sense of humanity in time of war. At the same time, IHL has been developed to regulate the social reality that is armed conflict. As such, in order to provide a realistic, and hence useful, legal framework, IHL must also take into account the military needs of parties to an armed conflict in their pursuit of defeating the adversary. The development of particular treaties and specific rules of IHL over time reflects the exercise of finding the correct balance between these humanitarian and military considerations. As a branch of international law, IHL is subject to the general rules of international law, such as those related to sources, treaty interpretation, and state responsibility. The sources of international law are set out in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This provision lists international conventions, international custom, and general principles of law as the main sources of international law in accordance with which the Court is to decide disputes submitted to it.


Author(s):  
Ward Thomas

International law and armed conflict have a rather contentious history together. One the one hand, armed conflict implies and absence of law, and yet, on the other, international law plays an important role in codifying the use of force. The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, drafted in the waning days of a second cataclysmic world war, were intended to radically transform the centuries-old ideology of raison d’état, which viewed war as a sovereign prerogative. More precisely, Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids not just war but force of any kind, or even the threat of it. On its face, the Charter system is a model of simplicity, consisting of a clear prohibition and two exceptions to that prohibition. The apparent simplicity is misleading, however. Article 2(4) is violated so often that experts disagree about whether it should even be considered good law. The Chapter VII enforcement exception is rarely used, and the meaning of self-defense under Article 51 is the subject of contentious disagreement. Moreover, even some UN bodies have supported creating another exception (humanitarian intervention) that coexists uneasily with the organization’s foundational principles. In addition, there is yet another exception (the use of force by national liberation movements) that may be as significant as the others, yet is little discussed by contemporary commentators.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

Public international law and comparative law have so far been regarded as largely distinct fields, with little to no overlap between them. The degree of separation between the two disciplines is rendered in particularly stark relief by the absence in practice or scholarship of any real inquiry into the relationship between comparative law on the one hand and customary international law and general principles of international law on the other. Some eminent international lawyers go so far as to claim that it would be both unnecessary and unrealistic to have recourse to comparative law in the context of the identification of customary international law and general principles of law, pointing to the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, which, according to them, “show[s] a clear disinclination towards the use of the comparative method.”


Author(s):  
RODEL A. TATON

This comes at a time when the stand-off over the Scarborough Shoal has matured to the status of an international dispute. It involves rivaling claims on points of law or fact between the People’s Republic China (PRC) and the Republic of the Philippines (RP). PRC calls the shoal as Huangyan island while RP refers to it as Bajo de Masinloc or Panatag Shoal as advanced and published in their respective governmental positions, albeit their claims for de facto sovereignty and territory. Employing mainly descriptive, historical, documentary and content analyses techniques, this dwells on (a) the character of Scarborough Shoal in the perspective of international law, (b) the conflicting claims of the PRC and RP with their respective governmental positions, (c) the mechanisms for settlement of an international dispute as provided for by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and (d) whether or not the Philippines can avail of the said remedies and how can the Scarborough Shoal be settled employing international law, rules and principles. The UNCLOS provides for a mechanism in Part XV, for settlement of disputes, ranging from the pacific modes of dispute settlement to resort to compulsory mechanisms entailing binding decisions. It is also provided that sans a choice of procedure, only Arbitration under Annex VII, the Hamburg Tribunal, is available, and this, the Philippines followed when it submitted its notification and statement of claims. Based on the international jurisprudence on related issues, there are rarely a winner and a loser. However, having studied the current situation principally in the light of the UNCLOS III, which favors the position of the Philippines, one is forced to recognize that oceans and their basic rules - droit de la mer- existed before UNCLOS. Certainly, the final settlement of the issues hereinbefore presented will go beyond the confines of UNCLOS.Keywords: Social Sciences, International disputes, Law of the Sea, descriptive design,Philippine-China Relations, UNCLOS, Philippines, Southeast Asia


2005 ◽  
Vol 87 (858) ◽  
pp. 269-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheikh Wahbeh al-Zuhili

AbstractThis article by an Islamic scholar describes the principles governing international law and international relations from an Islamic viewpoint. After presenting the rules and principles governing international relations in the Islamic system, the author emphasizes the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the aspiration of Islam to peace and harmony. He goes on to explain the relationship between Muslims and others in peacetime or in the event of war and the classical jurisprudential division of the world into the abode of Islam (dar al-islam) and that of war (dar al-harb). Lastly he outlines the restrictions imposed upon warfare by Islamic Shari'a law which have attained the status of legal rules.


2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (902) ◽  
pp. 567-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt ◽  
David S. Goddard

AbstractUnmanned maritime systems (UMSs) comprise an important subcategory of unmanned military devices. While much of the normative debate concerning the use of unmanned aerial and land-based devices applies equally to those employed on or under water, UMS present unique challenges in understanding the application of existing law. This article summarizes the technological state of the art before considering, in turn, the legal status of UMSs, particularly under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the regulation of their use under the law of naval warfare. It is not yet clear if UMSs enjoy status as ships under UNCLOS; even if they do, it is unlikely that they can be classified as warships. Nevertheless, their lawful use is not necessarily precluded in either peacetime or armed conflict.


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