scholarly journals EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE AS A NEW FORM OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF USA ON MISSILE DEFENSE

Author(s):  
E. A. Degtereva

This article examines U.S. efforts to build a broad international coalition in the area of missile defense. The basic formats of military cooperation with foreign countries in the deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system are described, as well as the principles of cooperation on the part of the United States. A review of the regional missile defense systems created by the United States as an intermediate step on the way to a global missile defense system is provided. Particular emphasis is placed on the implementation of The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe (European Phased Adaptive Approach, EPAA) and the creation of Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). Specified milestones and activities under the program, as well as the practical difficulties faced by the U.S. and European countries to deploy missile defense in the context of the global economic crisis are analyzed.

Author(s):  
Evgeny Zvedre

The USA considers missile potentials of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as the main sources of threats to their national security. In the early 2000s following the withdrawal from the Soviet-American ABM Treaty the US began to deploy a global ballistic missile defense system to protect their “homeland, US forces abroad and its allies” from potential and real threats. The set of basic elements of a multi-layer ballistic missile defense is generally the same, its architecture is always adapted to the local conditions of the regions of deployment and specific tasks. Their common designation is the ability to work as subsystems within an integrated, global in scope antiballistic missile defense system controlled by the United States. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is actively engaging its regional allies Australia, South Korea and Japan in a joint effort to build-up ABM capabilities while simultaneously increasing its military-strategic presence in the region. Moscow strongly opposes the program considering it as potential threat to the effectiveness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and undermining strategic stability and considers emergence the ballistic missile subsystems in Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region as a direct threat to its security. US ABM policy provokes the accelerated development by China and the DPRK of ballistic missile delivery systems, encourages Russia to create new weapon systems that are guaranteed to be able to overcome any existing and future missile defense.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-41
Author(s):  
Justyna Lipińska

The ongoing cooperation between the United States and Poland on ballistic missile defense has been centered for a long time solely around the construction of the U.S. missile defense complex in Redzikowo, Poland. Although the complex is going to operate as an element of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, its origins were tied to bilateral security and defense cooperation between the U.S. and Poland. As the presence of the U.S. military forces in Poland will remain crucial for Polish security and defense, and the societal support will be vital for its sustainment, it is worth exploring how Polish society reacted to concepts and plans for fielding the U.S. missile defense complex several years ago. The aim of this article was to explore the evolution of societal support and public opinion in Poland related to the construction of the U.S. missile defense complex in Redzikowo, Poland. The following research problem was posed: how has Polish public opinion about the missile defense complex construction changed over time? The research relied on methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis, and the primary research technique was the analysis of public opinion polls in Poland between 2004 and 2019. Public opinion has remained interested in the developments related to hosting the U.S. missile defense complex in Poland since early negotiations to the project implementation phase. The project was seen in a broader context of security and defense cooperation with the U.S. and within the NATO.


Author(s):  
A. I. Podberezkin ◽  
J. Y. Parshkova

The article analyses the political and military aspects of progress in the dialogue between Russia and the U.S./NATO on cooperation in missile defense; investigates the past experiences and current state of cooperation between Russia and the Alliance on missile defense issues; examines the technical features of American missile defence systems today; finds a solution to question whether or not the European Missile Defence Program actually threatens Russia's nuclear deterrent and strategic stability in general; identifies both potential benefits and possible losses for Russia stemming from the development of cooperation with the United States and NATO in countering ballistic missile threats, or from refusal to have such cooperation. Evidently, the initiative of creation of a missile defense in Europe surely belongs to the USA. Washington has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities in the field of a missile defense, exceeding by far other NATO member-states. In February 2010, the President of the United States B. Obama adopted a project "European Phased Adaptive Approach" (EPAA) as an alternative to G. Bush's global strategic missile defense plan. The first two stages of the Phased Adaptive Approach are focused on creating a system capable of intercepting small, medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The possibility of intercepting long-range missiles is postponed to the third (2018) and forth phases (2020). Moscow finds especially troublesome the third and the fourth phases of Washington's project of creating a European segment of the global antiballistic missile system, considering prospective capabilities of the U.S. interceptor missiles 61 and the envisioned areas of their deployment. The U.S. counter-evidence is that phase four interceptors do not exist yet. Russia insists on getting the political and legal guarantees from the U.S. and NATO that their missile defense systems will not slash the efficiency of Russian nuclear deterrence forces.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (056) ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Judit Temesvary ◽  
◽  
Andrew Wei ◽  

We study how U.S. banks' exposure to the economic fallout due to governments' response to Covid-19 in foreign countries has affected their credit provision to borrowers in the United States. We combine a rarely accessed dataset on U.S. banks' cross-border exposure to borrowers in foreign countries with the most detailed regulatory ("credit registry") data that is available on their U.S.-based lending. We compare the change in the U.S. lending of banks that are more vs. less exposed to the pandemic abroad, during and after the onset of Covid-19 in 2020. We document strong spillover effects: U.S. banks with higher foreign exposures in badly "Covid-19-hit" regions cut their lending in the United States substantially more. This effect is particularly strong for longer-maturity loans and term loans and is robust to controlling for firms’ pandemic exposure.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

This chapter shows how Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were forced to change their strategy for nuclear arms control based on the collapse of the US congressional consensus behind nuclear superiority. Nixon entered office with strong convictions on the importance of nuclear superiority for supporting the United States’ national security commitments. Nixon also saw US technological advantages in ballistic missile defenses as one of the main bargaining chips to cap the growth of Soviet offensive forces at the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This strategy for détente was thrown into disarray, however, when Congress signaled its lack of support for a new ballistic missile defense system and the strategy of nuclear superiority. Nixon and Kissinger then changed tack, attempting to conclude a quick arms limitation agreement through backchannel negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. This initiative failed, weakening the American hand at the formal talks.


Worldview ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Jack Walker

The currently emerging debate on the desirability of the U.S. undertaking to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system (A.B.M.) threatens to become the next national defense issue to have an impact on national elections. In the past we have all become familiar with real or alleged “bomber gaps,” “missile gaps,” and “conventional gaps.” The basis for all these “gaps” was a deep fear that potential enemies would subject ns to nuclear blackmail, or that our own failure to develop other kinds of military forces would require us to respond to any emergency with an all-out nuclear attack.In an earlier essay, I pointed out how our obsession with nuclear war had encouraged us to discount the significance of conventional war. I want now to turn to an examination of how specific groups in the U.S. have changed their positions in recent years on the subject of defensive weapons. In doing so I have borrowed the term used in 1960 by Henry Kissinger to describe the shifting arguments of the Air Force and Navy.


Author(s):  
D.B. Izyumov ◽  
E.L. Kondratyuk

The article presents the results of the analysis of the main elements and directions of development of the US missile defense system, evaluation of planned investments in its improvement and expansion. The main scientific and technological solutions for the global missile defense of the United States and NATO member states are considered.


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