scholarly journals BUILD-UP OF ANTI-MISSILE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE US DEFENSE

Author(s):  
D.B. Izyumov ◽  
E.L. Kondratyuk

The article presents the results of the analysis of the main elements and directions of development of the US missile defense system, evaluation of planned investments in its improvement and expansion. The main scientific and technological solutions for the global missile defense of the United States and NATO member states are considered.

Author(s):  
Evgeny Zvedre

The USA considers missile potentials of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as the main sources of threats to their national security. In the early 2000s following the withdrawal from the Soviet-American ABM Treaty the US began to deploy a global ballistic missile defense system to protect their “homeland, US forces abroad and its allies” from potential and real threats. The set of basic elements of a multi-layer ballistic missile defense is generally the same, its architecture is always adapted to the local conditions of the regions of deployment and specific tasks. Their common designation is the ability to work as subsystems within an integrated, global in scope antiballistic missile defense system controlled by the United States. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is actively engaging its regional allies Australia, South Korea and Japan in a joint effort to build-up ABM capabilities while simultaneously increasing its military-strategic presence in the region. Moscow strongly opposes the program considering it as potential threat to the effectiveness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and undermining strategic stability and considers emergence the ballistic missile subsystems in Europe and the Asian-Pacific Region as a direct threat to its security. US ABM policy provokes the accelerated development by China and the DPRK of ballistic missile delivery systems, encourages Russia to create new weapon systems that are guaranteed to be able to overcome any existing and future missile defense.


Author(s):  
J. Yu. Parshkova

The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

This chapter shows how Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were forced to change their strategy for nuclear arms control based on the collapse of the US congressional consensus behind nuclear superiority. Nixon entered office with strong convictions on the importance of nuclear superiority for supporting the United States’ national security commitments. Nixon also saw US technological advantages in ballistic missile defenses as one of the main bargaining chips to cap the growth of Soviet offensive forces at the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This strategy for détente was thrown into disarray, however, when Congress signaled its lack of support for a new ballistic missile defense system and the strategy of nuclear superiority. Nixon and Kissinger then changed tack, attempting to conclude a quick arms limitation agreement through backchannel negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. This initiative failed, weakening the American hand at the formal talks.


2011 ◽  
Vol 161 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-181
Author(s):  
Paweł TURCZYŃSKI

It was in the 1970s when building anti-missile systems became technically possible. In the 1980s, R. Reagan had a vision of creating such a system covering the United States. After the Cold War was over, those projects were put to a halt, but as soon as fears of terrorist attacks increased, W. Clinton started developing them again, and after 9/11, G. Bush prioritized them. The US was quick to develop proper military technologies, but the concept of the National Missile Defense was often criticized. Other countries (Russia and many EU members) criticized Americans for disturbing the international power balance and the selective choice of participating countries. In 2009 B. Obama renounced previous projects and proposed creating an international system shielding many countries. This project was accepted by NATO members and Russia, but its final creation has been put off.


Author(s):  
Ivan Bernier

SummarySince its beginning in September 2004, the negotiation of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions has raised a great deal of interest and even tension among UNESCO member states. A record number of members and non-governmental observers have been involved, and, on many occasions, the debates have taken place in overflowing rooms. During the study of the draft convention by Commission IV, on 77 October 2005, the debate even had to be temporarily suspended in order to find a larger room. Obviously, the negotiations, which addressed head on the problem of the interface between trade and culture, dealt with a very sensitive matter. On 20 October 2005, the convention was finally adopted by the UNESCO General Conference (148 votes for, two against, and four abstentions). Considered to be a historical moment by several delegations in their closing declaration, the results of this decision was vigorously denounced by the United States. It went so far as to assert, in a declaration made public by the US embassy in Paris, that the proposed convention was deeply flawed since it dealt with trade rather than culture and that it therefore fell outside UNESCO jurisdiction. How was such a result achieved? This article attempts to clarify these issues, following the negotiation step by step as well as the dynamic that led to the ultimate result.


Author(s):  
E. A. Degtereva

This article examines U.S. efforts to build a broad international coalition in the area of missile defense. The basic formats of military cooperation with foreign countries in the deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system are described, as well as the principles of cooperation on the part of the United States. A review of the regional missile defense systems created by the United States as an intermediate step on the way to a global missile defense system is provided. Particular emphasis is placed on the implementation of The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe (European Phased Adaptive Approach, EPAA) and the creation of Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). Specified milestones and activities under the program, as well as the practical difficulties faced by the U.S. and European countries to deploy missile defense in the context of the global economic crisis are analyzed.


2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (127) ◽  
pp. 205-226
Author(s):  
Jürgen Scheffran

The United States. government is moving towards missile defense and space weapons, driven by ominous threat perceptions. While missile defense is suffering from technical flaws and cost overruns, the quest for dominance in space by the US Space Command is trying to use many of the developed technologies for space warfare. lnstead of achieving a more peaceful defense-dominated world, this policy is rather creating offensive threats that may provoke an unstable and highly com plex arms spiral on earth and in space, ultimately undermining the security of all states including the US. To prevent passing the threshold to space weaponization the international community could take determined action to put diplomacy in the first place, focusing on nuclear disarmament, strengthened international missile control and a space weapons ban.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Jaganath Sankaran

Abstract The contention over the quantity and quality of regional missile defenses forward-deployed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region animates much of the US–China disagreement about strategic stability. The Chinese argue that the deployed assets exceed reasonable defensive requirements and suggest that if these missile-defense deployments continue, they will be forced to increase the size of their nuclear arsenal. In disagreement, the United States claims that regional missile defenses are defensive by design, limited in scope, and necessary to defeat a North Korean missile campaign. In this article, a series of simulation experiments were developed to empirically test these opposing arguments over missile defenses and strategic stability. The simulations indicate that current deployments are necessary for defense and proportional to the threat. The analysis also argues that current deployments do not possess the ability to alter the US–China strategic nuclear balance significantly. The article concludes with a discussion of other subjective aspects of national security that may explain Chinese concerns and explore possible ways to reassure China.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-293
Author(s):  
Iftikhar Ahmad Yousafzai ◽  
A. Z. Hilali

The United States adopted a policy of de-hyphenation in its relations with India and Pakistan in the post-09/11 period which continued to be operational in the period 2005-2015. This policy apparently meant that the United States would deal each of the two South Asian adversaries, India and Pakistan. The main reason for this phenomenon was that the policy-makers in the US saw India as a heavy-weight to counter the rising economic, political and military power of China in Asia. Pakistan could not be fitted in this strategic calculus. The United States changed its previous position on Kashmir and instead of calling for resolving this issue according to the United Nations resolutions, it stressed on bilateral negotiations. Similarly, the United States endorsed Indian stance that Pakistan was backing terrorist outfits that perpetrated acts of terrorism in India. Strategic partnership between The US and India extended cooperation in civil nuclear technology, missile defense, space technology and defense production. No such cooperation could be extended to Pakistan. Permanent membership in the UN Security Council for India was endorsed despite Pakistan’s objections.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


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