Removal of the National Director of Public Prosecution: A Critique of Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mtendeweka Mhango
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Order ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
South African Constitution ◽  
National Director ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

In this article, I critically examine the constitutional provisions governing the removal of the National Director of Public Prosecutions. This examination is undertaken in the context of recent decisions by the High Court in Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] 1 All SA 471 (GP); 2018 (1) SACR 317 (GP) and the Constitutional Court in Corruption Watch NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] ZACC 23, which found certain provisions of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, which governs the removal of the National Director, unconstitutional. The article is critical of these two court decisions for their failure to properly justify the order to invalidate the provisions of the National Prosecuting Authority Act and to provide a proper account of the different separation of powers imperatives involved in the cases. The article is also critical of the Constitutional Court’s approach to the abstract review of the sections in the National Prosecuting Authority Act, and of its suspension of the order of invalidity in a manner which took no due regard to established jurisprudence. Lastly, the article is critical of the Constitutional Court’s omission to address the High Court order that the Deputy President should appoint the National Director, which runs counter to the text of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1&2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mtendeweka Mhango
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
Political Question

This article examines Justice Ngcobo’s profound contribution to the development of the foundational jurisprudence on separation of powers in South Africa. The article is premised on the fact that Ngcobo can be better understood in the context of his contribution to the foundational jurisprudence. In this way, we will better comprehend how Ngcobo’s jurisprudence fits into our contemporary understanding of the Constitution. The key question this article seeks to investigate is to what extent has Ngcobo’s jurisprudence on separation of powers has impacted or shaped South African constitutional law. The article specifically investigates whether, in his contribution to the constitutional jurisprudence on separation of powers, Ngcobo developed a political question doctrine theory for South Africa. I find that he did, and that while Justice Ngcobo’s political question jurisprudence was not clearly articulated or endorsed by the majority of the Justices while he was on the bench, the Constitutional Court has recently unanimously endorsed some of his political question doctrine theories and arguments thereby crystallising the political question theory in South Africa. The article examines Ngcobo’s contribution through the lens of the judgments that he penned as well as his academic commentaries

scholarly journals IS THERE STILL DEFAMATION BASED ON ADULTERY UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW? A CRITICAL REVIEW J v J (4918 2012) [2016] ZAKZDHC 33 (unreported)

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C Buthelezi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Personality Rights ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Made In

On 22 July 2016, the Durban High Court ruled (per Masipa J) that there is no longer an action for defamation founded on the publication of allegations of adultery against another person. The court solely based its finding on the earlier judgment of the Constitutional Court (CC) in DE v RH (2015 (5) SA 83 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1003 (CC), hereinafter “DE”). Earlier, in June 2015, in the DE judgment, the CC had unanimously struck down delictual action for contumelia and loss of consortium damages founded on adultery. In annulling this action, the CC held that the common-law action for contumelia and loss of consortium was no longer viable and that it was incompatible with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Still, a question that was never considered by the courts prior the judgment of J is whether the DE judgment has automatically abolished other delictual actions aimed at protecting personality rights, specifically an action for defamation, and in general, actions for invasion of privacy and impairment of dignity, all founded on allegations of adultery. In this judgment, the court held that in view of the decision of DE, “public opinion no longer considers adultery as tabooed... a statement to the effect that a person committed adultery can no longer convey a meaning with the propensity to define a person …”. Nevertheless, when the opportunity to definitively answer this question ultimately presented itself, albeit in relation to defamation of character (or the protection of reputation), the court in J failed to satisfactorily address this vital question. As it will be demonstrated in this contribution, the judgment of Masipa J in the J judgment does not appear to be legally sound. Primarily, no authority, other than the CC judgment of DE, is used to support the judgment of J. As a result, the judgment has not even succeeded in dealing with the question of defamation, let alone other actions (namely, privacy and dignity) – all founded on adultery. Instead, the judgment creates confusion whether the judgment of DE extends to an action for defamation, and possibly to privacy and dignity. The objective of this note is to provide a critical analysis of the high court judgment in J. The critique is undertaken in light of the reasoning in DE and other like judgments. It begins by setting out the background to the ruling of the high court, followed by a commentary on the judgment. The commentary is undertaken in the form of a comparative analysis between the approaches adopted by the court in DE and in J, highlighting the striking differences in approaches by the two courts, when they develop the common-law. In addition, the critique of the high court judgment is made in light of the interests that the judgment of DE sought to protect when it abolished an action in adultery, and those that were at issue in the judgment of J. Thereafter, a conclusion is provided. The stance that the note adopts is that the CC in DE did not repeal defamation action founded on allegations of adultery; and that even if such action were to be annulled privacy and dignity ought to remain, as of necessity.

II Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 Powers and Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Reciprocal Relations ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Lines

By presenting the Court’s principal lines of case law regarding the allocation of powers in the Italian constitutional system, this chapter explores the constitutionally regulated relationships among the President, Executive, Parliament, and Judiciary. It reveals that rather than a “separation of powers” in the conventional sense of contemporary constitutional models, the Italian system is best described as instituting a set of reciprocal “relations of powers” with the Constitutional Court as the “judge of powers” that maintains and guarantees these interrelationships of constitutional actors. The chapter explores this role of the Constitutional Court in its relations with both Parliament and the President of the Republic, as well as the Court’s regulation of the relationship between the President and the Executive.

Equality and Non-Discrimination in the South African Constitution

2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Joan Small ◽  
Evadne Grant
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The South ◽  
Legal Effect ◽  
The Law ◽  
South African Constitution

Equality occupies the first place in most written constitutions, but in South Africa, its importance is magnified both in terms of the text of the Constitution and in terms of the context in which that Constitution operates. The Bill of Rights is expected, in South Africa, to help bring about the transformation of the society. These expectations of transformation through the operation of the Bill of Rights are informing the development of the law in relation to equality and non-discrimination by the Constitutional Court. The concept of discrimination is uniquely defined in the South African Bill of Rights. The Courts are struggling to give legal effect to the terminology. The test developed by the Court to interpret the equality clause, it is submitted, is comprehensive and informed. But the application of the test is sometimes problematic. This paper addresses the evolving concepts of equality and discrimination in South Africa and discusses some of the difficulties with certain aspects of the test for discrimination, including the concepts of unfairness and human dignity, which have caused division among the judiciary.

Intermediaries for Child Witnesses: Old Problems, New Solutions and Judicial Differences in South Africa

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Noel Zaal ◽  
Carmel R. Matthias
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Child Witnesses ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The South ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
High Court ◽  
African Experience ◽  
Implementation Problems

AbstractSouth Africa has utilised intermediaries to protect child witnesses and assist their communication in criminal proceedings in the magistrates' courts since 1993. is article examines some lessons to be learned from the South African experience. It provides an overview and assessment of attempts to overcome implementation problems and develop the legislation providing for intermediaries. It reviews contradictory solutions for improvement of the law recently put forward by the high court and constitutional court. Applying both the South African history and international standards, we argue that the high court offered a better way forward. We suggest some additional reforms which may also be relevant for advocates of the intermediary system in other jurisdictions.

The Human Right to Water in South Africa and the Mazibuko Decisions

2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 521-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tracy Humby ◽  
Maryse Grandbois
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The South ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
Access To Water ◽  
South African Constitution ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

The right of access to sufficient water in the South African Constitution has for long been regarded as progressive in a global context where the human right to water is still a subject of contention. In its recent decision handed down in the Mazibuko matter, the South African Constitutional Court interpreted the right of access to sufficient water for the first time and clarified the nature of the State’s obligations which flow from this right. It also commented upon the role of the courts in adjudicating the human right to water. This article describes the passage of the Mazibuko matter and the manner in which the lower courts interpreted the right of access to “sufficient water” as well as outlining the Constitutional Court’s decision in the context of access to water services provision in South Africa.

scholarly journals Modderklip Revisited: Can Courts Compel the State to Expropriate Property where the Eviction of Unlawful Occupiers is not Just and Equitable?

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Jackie Dugard
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The State ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Western Cape ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Republic

This article examines whether, to give effect to the section 26 constitutional right to adequate housing, courts can (or should) compel the state to expropriate property in instances when it is not just and equitable to evict unlawful occupiers from privately-owned land (unfeasible eviction). This question was first raised in the Modderklip case, where both the Supreme Court of Appeal (Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA)) and Constitutional Court (President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC)). dodged the question, opting instead to award constitutional damages to the property owner for the long-term occupation of its property by unlawful occupiers. It is clear from cases such as Ekurhuleni Municipality v Dada 2009 4 SA 463 (SCA), that, mindful of separation of powers concerns, courts have until very recently been unwilling to order the state to expropriate property in such circumstances. At the same time, it is increasingly evident that the state has failed to fulfil its constitutional obligations to provide alternative accommodation for poor communities. In this context, this article argues that there is a growing need for the judiciary to consider, as part of its role to craft effective remedies for constitutional rights violations, the issue of judicial expropriation. It does so, first, through an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence on evictions sought by private landowners and, second, through an in-depth engagement of the recent Western Cape High Court case, Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and those Persons whose Identity are Unknown to the Applicant and who are Unlawfully Occupying or Attempting to Occupy Erf 150 (Remaining Extent) Phillipi, Cape Division, Province of the Western Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 418, 3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v Persons whose Identities are to the Applicant Unknown and who are Unlawfully Occupying Remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 228 (WCC).    

scholarly journals THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE HYUNDAI-INSPIRED INTERPRETATION Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly (CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Themba Maseko
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So

The Hyundai-inspired interpretation obliges the courts to interpret, where possible, legislation in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. This process involves taking into account the objects and purports of an Act and interpreting its provisions in the manner that complies with the constitutional values. Essentially, it ensures that courts give preference to an interpretation of legislation that is within the parameters of the provisions of the Constitution over the one that is not. However, courts do not apply the Hyundai-inspired interpretation if it cannot be ascribed to the provision of the legislation in question or if it is not reasonably possible for them to do so. Such situations include the Hyundai-inspired interpretation that unduly strains the text, or that obliges the court to read-in too many qualifications. In these situations, the courts have to declare the legislative provision in question unconstitutional and resort to the remedy of reading- in or notional severance. The Hyundai-inspired interpretation is evidenced in quite a number of cases. However, this case note critically dissects the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly ((CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8).It concludes that the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it, in this case, is inconsistent with the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo six years earlier. When interpreting the word “disturbance” which section 1 of the Powers Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (4 of 2004) defined as “any act which interferes with or disrupts or which is likely to interfere with or disrupt the proceedings of Parliament or a House or Committee” and which the High Court had found to be too broad that it had the effect of finding a robust and controversial debate unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court unexpectedly read in too many qualifications to the word “disturbance” in conformity with the Constitution. The reason being, the Constitutional Court, six years earlier, found the approach of reading- in too many qualifications in conformity with the Constitution to be straining the text and to be contrary to the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo.

scholarly journals CASE NOTE: Illegal sales of alcohol and asset forfeiture

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karabo Ngidi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Legal Limit ◽  
Asset Forfeiture ◽  
National Director ◽  
Business As Usual ◽  
The Impact

The Constitutional Court recently confirmed an order for the forfeiture of a house from which an unlawful shebeen had been run for years (Van der Burg and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions).In deciding whether to confirm the order of the full bench of  the High Court, Justice van der Westhuizen, writing for a unanimous court, addressed the following questions: whether the house was an instrumentality of an offence; whether the illegal sale of alcohol is an organised crime; the proportionality of the crime to the forfeiture under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (the POCA); as well as the impact of the forfeiture on the rights of the children that lived in the house. This judgment comes at a time where issues such as the proposal for the reduction of the legal limit of alcohol for drivers to 0%2 are topical, and seems to point to a tougher stance towards the sale and consumption of alcohol in South Africa. The judgment may therefore be seen as a warning that the illegal sale of alcohol and running of a shebeen will no longer be seen as business as usual in cases where the seller does not heed the call to desist such business.

scholarly journals The South African constitutional Court and the Rule of Law: The Masethla Judgment, A Cause for Concern

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 467
Author(s):  
Rósaan Krüger
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The South ◽  
Public Power ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Republic

The rule of law as a foundational constitutional value constrains the exercise of public power but the precise limits of the constraints it sets are not well defined. In Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa,[1] the majority of the Constitutional Court opted for an interpretation of this value that frees the President from adherence to the demands of procedural fairness when exercising certain constitutional powers. This note will investigate the soundness of that interpretation against the background of theoretical expositions of the rule of law and earlier Constitutional Court judgments.[1]      2008 1 BCLR 1 (CC).

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