Non Conformity to Norms: Why Do States Proliferate in Opposition to Well Established and Powerful Non-Proliferation Norms

<p>Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons and of these only three have acquired them in the past 40 years. The primary reason for this has been the establishment of a powerful nuclear non-proliferation regime and its associated norms. The powerful influence of both the regime and the resulting norms on state behaviour is unquestionable. However a limited amount of state proliferation continues and some states’ behaviour suggests that they either reject, or believe that they are outside of the influence of the regime and its norms. My study is looking at the problem of non-conformity to the non-proliferation norm to see why it occurs. The issue is specifically a nuclear one however non-conformity to norms has wider implications in the study of international relations (IR). Regimes and norms clearly do not exist in a vacuum but operate within an international social environment. This nuclear issue remains a central consideration for state foreign policy and hence has justified extensive examination in the field of IR. The intellectually and ethically complex issues that surround access to this technology were acknowledged from its devastating baptism in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. International regulation was seen as the most appropriate form of control of nuclear weapons. This was in part due to the potential consequence of the misuse and the impact of accidents transcending national boundaries. This ultimate destructive capability has only been in the hands of a few states and the dissemination and control of this capability has been contentious from the day it was first used. Initially its power came from its potential to completely dominate militarily. As soon as the second country gained the same capability it became a lot more complicated. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons is such that any future war that saw their use could result in the annihilation of the human species. The Cold War and its extreme vertical nuclear proliferation actualised this fear. Nuclear technologies dual purpose functionality, of both peaceful power generation and the creation of a military nuclear capability make for a complex situation. There is an obvious power imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots and a self protective desire to stop or at least limit the number of countries attempting to join the ‘nuclear club’. Both realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are able to explain, in part, conformity and non conformity to regimes and their associated norms within today’s social environment. In this study I will use a social constructivist approach, which is based on the outcomes of persuasion, identification and social conformity, to see if it can add to the current explanations of state nuclear proliferation.</p>

Non Conformity to Norms: Why Do States Proliferate in Opposition to Well Established and Powerful Non-Proliferation Norms

10.26686/wgtn.17003434 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

◽

James Te Rangihiwinui Latimer Kerr

Keyword(s):

Social Environment ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Social Conformity ◽

Complex Situation ◽

International Regulation ◽

State Behaviour ◽

National Boundaries ◽

The Cold War ◽

Preventing proliferation: the impact on international politics

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s002081830000415x ◽

1981 ◽

Vol 35 (1) ◽

pp. 213-240 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

George H. Quester

Keyword(s):

Nuclear Weapons ◽

International System ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Nuclear Industry ◽

Economic Exchange ◽

Military Interventions ◽

Political Clout ◽

The World ◽

The Impact ◽

Pariah States

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.

Perceptions and purpose of the bomb: Explaining India's nuclear restraint against China

Modern Asian Studies ◽

10.1017/s0026749x21000329 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-42

Author(s):

Yogesh Joshi

Keyword(s):

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Decision Makers ◽

New Delhi ◽

Indian Government ◽

Nuclear Threat ◽

Political Costs ◽

Nuclear Behaviour ◽

The Third World ◽

Abstract Much of the literature on India's nuclear programme assumes that China's nuclear capability drove New Delhi, the strategically weaker actor, to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear tests not only rendered New Delhi militarily insecure and dented its claim for the leadership of the Third World but they also polarized the domestic debate over the utility of the bomb. In the global scheme of nuclear proliferation, therefore, India was just another fallen nuclear domino. Marshalling recently declassified documents, this article revisits India's nuclear behaviour during the crucial decade between 1964 and 1974. By focusing on threat assessments made at the highest levels and internal deliberations of the Indian Government, this article shows how, contrary to the claims made in the literature, Indian decision-makers did not make much of the Chinese nuclear threat. This conviction emanated out of their distinct reading of the purpose of nuclear weapons in China's foreign and military policy; their perceptions of how India could achieve nuclear deterrence against China by using the bipolar international politics of the Cold War; and, finally, their understanding of the political costs of developing an indigenous nuclear response to China's nuclear threat. New Delhi's nuclear restraint resulted from its perceptions of Chinese nuclear intentions and its beliefs about the purpose of the bomb in Sino-Indian relations. India's perceptions of China as a nuclear adversary and its decision-makers’ views on the purpose of nuclear weapons in this rivalry were fundamentally different from the expectations set out by the domino theory of nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Proliferation Deterrence: Bullying vs Diplomacy

Journal of Education and Vocational Research ◽

10.22610/jsds.v8i2.1801 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 47-55

Author(s):

Chidiebere C Ogbonna

Keyword(s):

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Well Being ◽

Policy Instrument ◽

International Community ◽

Access To Finance ◽

Policy Tool ◽

Plausible Mechanism ◽

The article examines the plausibility of using sanctions as an instrument that can deter nuclear proliferation. Sanctions have been a favored policy tool in the arsenal of the international community, when it comes to issues relating to deterring nuclear proliferation. The adoptions of sanctions as a policy instrument that can quench the nuclear ambition of states and/or regimes are based on two main assumptions. First, it is believed that they add cost to the regime aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons, by limiting the regimeâ€™s access to finance and thus discourage it from furthering its nuclear ambition. Second, it is believed that the impact of sanctions on the welfare and well-being of the citizens of a targeted regime will prompt the citizens to rebel against the regime and perhaps force it to comply with the demands of the sanctions imposing party. This article however, took a dissimilar view and argues that sanctions as a single policy tool cannot check nuclear proliferation. At best they can be used to express discontent or signal displeasure to a regime with nuclear ambition. The article concludes that diplomacy devoid of rapacity is and will remain the plausible mechanism to deter nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

International Law ◽

10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0108 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

María José Cervell Hortal

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

United Nations ◽

Security Council ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Secretary General ◽

General Assembly ◽

Peace And Security ◽

The United Nations ◽

The concept of nuclear nonproliferation was coined in a formal way at the beginning of the 1960s, though the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, would be the text that would consolidate it. After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, humanity was conscious of the danger of these weapons, and nuclear proliferation turned into one of the main problems of the Cold War period; their control and the implementation of strategies to limit them have become a priority since then. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons and deterrence policy were crucial elements in the peaceful coexistence of the two power blocs, and the initiatives to control them grew, as both countries were conscious of the danger that this accumulation could cause. The NPT created two categories of states: the “officially” nuclear ones, which could maintain their weapons (China, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States) and the nonnuclear ones, which were not allowed to acquire or develop them. Two more concepts emerged: vertical proliferation (that of the five official nuclear states) and horizontal proliferation (that of the states that had nuclear weapons but rejected to be a NPT party). Other treaties—multilateral, regional, and bilateral—which also sought to control the nuclear proliferation (see Treaties and Agreements Preventing Nuclear Weapons Proliferation) were subsequently added. The end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger. In fact, the Security Council considered in 1992 (Document S/23500, 31 January) that the proliferation of nuclear weapons “constitutes a threat for the international peace and security” (p. 4) that permitted it to activate, if necessary, chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter and all the consequences derived from it. With the new millennium, the United Nations Secretary-General described mass destruction arms (nuclear included) as one of the threats to peace and security in the 21st century (see United Nations General Assembly 2005, cited under Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General, para. 78). Nowadays, the nuclear question is still of great relevance. The nuclear problems in the 21st century’s international society are wide and varied and include states that withdrew the NPT (North Korea), states that fail to comply with it (Iran), states that have not yet ratified it (Israel, India, Pakistan), and non-state actors (such as terrorist groups), which are more and more interested in the wide destructive power of nuclear weapons. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 7 July 2017 was a significant step, but the low number of state accessions shows that nuclear weapons are still a relevant threat.

Success and Failure in Nuclear Reversal

Delaying Doomsday ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190077976.003.0005 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 115-129

Author(s):

Rupal N. Mehta

Keyword(s):

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Historical Record ◽

Nuclear Program ◽

Reversal Process ◽

The Impact ◽

Nuclear Reversal

To better understand the impact of inducements and to get a broader sense of the process of nuclear reversal, this chapter presents two vignettes of nuclear proliferation: the critical cases of Libya and China. These analyses help isolate core distinctions from the historical record: nuclear reversers from the current proliferators, allies from adversaries, those that tried and succeeded decades ago, and those that remained committed for decades with a failing nuclear program and ultimately abandoned it. These illustrative vignettes of success and failure help to delve deeper into the nuclear reversal process. This chapter provides a better understanding of how states embark on and are incentivized to end their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

12. The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century

Strategy in the Contemporary World ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198807100.003.0012 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 202-219

Author(s):

C. Dale Walton

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Arms Control ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

First Century ◽

Strategic Culture ◽

Nuclear Age ◽

The World ◽

The Face ◽

This chapter examines the role played by nuclear weapons in international politics during and after the cold war, making a distinction between the First Nuclear Age and the ongoing Second Nuclear Age. After providing a background on the First Nuclear Age, the chapter considers the various risks present in the Second Nuclear Age, focusing on issues related to nuclear deterrence, nuclear proliferation networks, strategic culture, and ballistic missile defences. It then discusses the assumption that arms control and disarmament treaties are the best means to further counterproliferation efforts. It also assesses the future of nuclear weapons and whether the world is facing a Third Nuclear Age before concluding with an analysis of the relevance of deterrence in the face of changing political and technological circumstances.

Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia

The Middle East Journal ◽

10.3751/60.3.11 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 60 (3) ◽

pp. 421-443 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Gawdat Bahgat

Keyword(s):

Saudi Arabia ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Security Policy ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Nuclear Program ◽

External Threats ◽

The Us ◽

Strategic Incentives ◽

The Persian Gulf ◽

Since the 1970s, the world's attention has focused on nuclear proliferation in Iran and Iraq. Very little attention has been given to nuclear proliferation in the third regional power in the Persian Gulf — Saudi Arabia. This article addresses the question of potential Saudi nuclear ambition. Most policymakers and analysts agree that Saudi Arabia does not possess nuclear weapons. Still, some argue that the Kingdom has both strategic incentives and financial resources to pursue a nuclear program. This article examines the security threats to Saudi Arabia from Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Yemen. It also analyzes the impact of domestic economic and political reform on Riyadh's security policy. The article argues that the US' strong commitments to defend Saudi Arabia against external threats have been crucial in reducing incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.

7. Post-Cold War era

Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction ◽

10.1093/actrade/9780198860532.003.0007 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 104-126

Author(s):

Joseph M. Siracusa

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Global Security ◽

Post Cold War ◽

Nuclear Terrorism ◽

Regional Conflict ◽

Cold War Era ◽

History Of ◽

What significant lessons can be learned from the history of nuclear weapons? ‘Post-Cold War era’ considers post-Cold War attempts to curb nuclear proliferation. The clarity of the Cold War world has given way to the ambiguities and uncertainties of a world where global security is threatened by regime collapse, nuclear terrorism, new nuclear weapons states, regional conflict, and pre-existing nuclear arsenals. The nuclear rivalry with Russia, North Korea, and Iran gives the feeling of returning to the Cold War period, with the ever present threat of a deliberate or unintended confrontation. So far, we have avoided mutual destruction, but is this down to policy or luck?

International Security: Nuclear Proliferation

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.121 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Wilfred Wan ◽

Etel Solingen

Keyword(s):

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Explanatory Power ◽

Nuclear Proliferation ◽

Relative Power ◽

Theoretical Frameworks ◽

The Road ◽

Nuclear Age ◽

Rigorous Testing ◽

Since the advent of the nuclear age, scholars have sought to provide rationales behind decisions to pursue, forgo, or relinquish nuclear weapons programs. Security, status, cost, technical capabilities, and domestic considerations have played central roles in explaining those choices. Classical neorealism was once the conventional wisdom, advancing that relative power and the logic of self-help in an anarchic world drove states to nuclear weapons. Yet, the analysis of nuclear proliferation has evolved in accordance with broader debates in international relations theory in recent decades, including the incorporation of neoliberal institutionalist, constructivist, and domestic political perspectives. The end of the Cold War and the upheaval of international order in particular marked a watershed for the literature, with scholars challenging the dominant paradigm by examining the effects of institutions, norms, and identities. Those approaches, however, under-theorized—if not omitted altogether—the role of domestic political drivers in choices to acquire or abstain from acquiring from nuclear weapons. Such drivers provide filters that can be invaluable in explaining whether, when, and how state actors are susceptible to considerations of relative power, international institutions, and norms. More recently, scholars have deployed more sophisticated theoretical frameworks and diverse methodologies. The road ahead requires greater analytical flexibility, harnessing the utility of classical perspectives while adding enough nuance to increase explanatory power, greater attentiveness to the complex interaction among variables, and improved specification and operationalization amenable to rigorous testing, all with an eye toward enhancing both historical accuracy and predictive capabilities.