scholarly journals Chinese Leader, Islam Majority and the Clash of Civilization Study of Muslim Acceptability in Jakarta Toward Governor Ahok

Author(s):  
Agustina Zubair ◽  
Morissan
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Vol 158 ◽  
pp. 314-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Li

At the 15th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress held in September 1997, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin announced that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would reduce its manpower by 500,000 in the next three years. This is apparently a new step to deepen the military reform that Deng Xiaoping had initiated in early 1980s. Such reform aims to transform the PLA from a manpower-based military geared toward fighting a major defensive “people's war” to a technology-based military capable of forward deployment to deal with more variegated local contingencies. While substantial research has been done on major aspects of this reform, changes within major PLA organizations, such as the Central Military Commission (CMC), the higher command structure, the research and learning institutions, and the force structure, have not been adequately and systematically analysed. This study intends to shed light on these changes. Such a study is necessary and significant also because it helps towards an understanding of the extent, direction and problems of China's defence modernization drive, which may have important implications for Asian security. Finally, it provides an analytical framework for research regarding further organizational changes of the PLA.


2021 ◽  
pp. 159-182
Author(s):  
Rush Doshi

Chapter 7 explores the dawn of China’s grand strategy to build regional order as well as the ends, ways, and means of this strategy. Using Party texts, it explores how the shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to take a more assertive course. It begins with a thorough review of China’s discourse on “multipolarity” and the “international balance of forces,” concepts China uses as euphemisms for US power and which it ties to its strategic guidelines. It then shows that the Party sought to lay the foundations for order—coercion, inducements, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance “actively accomplish something” issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao in 2009. This strategy, like blunting before it, was implemented across multiple instruments of statecraft—military, political, and economic.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 56-67
Author(s):  
Larissa S. Ruban ◽  
Anna V. Boyarkina

The article highlights the idea of «common destiny» of countries and peoples in the works of Russian scientists, politicians and spiritual leaders, which is especially important since the Chinese leader Xi Jinping put forward the concept of «community of common destiny of mankind», on the other hand, in connection with the crisis development of the world community in a pandemic that raised the problem of survival.


1996 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torstein Hjellum

Deng's truth-from-facts willingness to discard outmoded dogmas and his black-cats/white-cats readiness to tinker with China's basic economic institutions had led him boldly to venture where no Chinese leader - no leader anywhere in the communist world - had previously dared to go. Early on, Deng decoupled the engine of market competition (good) from the stigma of capitalist exploitation (bad) and threw open China's doors to the outside world, setting in motion a process of accelerated socio-economic development and modernization. . . . Rapid but uneven economic growth, accompanied by a deep erosion of traditional ideological norms and social controls, produced a situation high in raw entrepreneurial energy but low in institutionalized immunity to a wide variety of potential systemic disorders, ranging from rising regional inequality and uncontrolled rural emigration to a nationwide epidemic of crime, corruption, and popular cynicism. All this arguably rendered China more volatile politically than at any time since the late 1940s.'


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yishan Du ◽  
Liguo Xu ◽  
You Min Xi ◽  
Jing Ge

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the Chinese leader–follower interaction model in school cases considering followers’ effect at varying social distances. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a case study approach. Findings First, Chinese leader–follower interactions in school cases are flexible in practice. Second, within leader–follower flexible interactions, contradictory perceptions and field-of-work consciousness foster different behavior choices between leaders and followers. Third, perceptions concerning the proximity of leaders to followers are positively influenced in relation to hierarchical distinctions and negatively influenced owing to private connections. Finally, the perceived leader distance of leaders from followers further influences the contradictory perceptions and field-of-work consciousness of leaders and followers and positively influences the degree of flexible leader–follower interaction. Research limitations/implications This study examined a single institution; hence, results may have been influenced by school-specific features and conditions. Future research should study more organizations to explore whether their unique characteristics and contexts could affect leader–follower interactions, thus providing more generalized and universally applicable conclusions. Originality/value First, this study proposed a leader–follower flexible interaction model in school cases and the concepts of field-of-work consciousness and contradictory perceptions, exploring the active effects of followers in the leadership process to offer guidance toward better understanding the leadership process. Second, it was found that private connections between leaders and followers, as well as hierarchical differences, influenced the perceptions of both leaders and followers concerning leader distance in a Chinese context, and the influence of leader distance on leader–follower interactions was also analyzed.


Author(s):  
Sergey Radchenko

This chapter analyzes the border clashes between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in March 1969. It details the development of Chinese leader Mao Zedong's perception of the Soviet Union as a challenge to China's autonomy and the (cultural) revolution, underscoring Mao's failure to understand how the Soviet Union interpreted his actions as a credible threat. Employing his own frame of reference, Mao failed to grasp that the Soviet Union did not see the border conflict as a catalyst for internal mobilization and political control at home and in its satellite states, but as yet another manifestation of the seeming irrationality of Chinese foreign policy. Mao's surprise and feeling of hostile encirclement, as well as the deepening of Soviet distrust, paved the way in turn for China's famous rapprochement with the United States under President Richard Nixon.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danhui Li ◽  
Yafeng Xia

In October 1961 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a policy of tacit struggle against the program of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU's resumption of de-Stalinization alarmed the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, but he did not yet want to discard a limited rapprochement with Moscow. However, when high-level Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963 collapsed, the relationship between the CPSU and the CCP became irretrievable. Through the subsequent great polemics, the CCP intended to project itself as the spokesman of true Marxism-Leninism and the natural leader of world Communism. After the CCP attacked the top leaders of the CPSU by name, hostility between the two parties intensified. The breakdown of the CCP-CPSU organizational relationship was only a matter of time. Relying on a large array of Chinese-language sources, including records of Chinese leaders' speeches and comments at secret party meetings, this article reassesses the most critical period in the Sino-Soviet split from October 1961 to July 1964.


2021 ◽  
pp. 98-112
Author(s):  
T. N. Zubakina ◽  
E. D. Sapko

The results of the analysis of the rhetoric of Xi Jinping’s public speech are presented. The novelty of the research lies in an attempt of a comparative interpretation of allusive linguistic representations of the text of the speech and its translations into English and Russian. It is emphasized that the interpretation of linguistic representations or their decoding is possible in the contexts of linguacultural accents of allusions of the text and dictionary entries, since by its sign essence language is one of the codes of culture. The authors proceed from the fact that the allusion, being a cognitive category, has a cultural-code meaning (CC-meaning), which is reflected not only in the vocabulary conceptual content, but also in the system of extralinguistic knowledge, associations and images that acquire meaning, enshrined in the culture of linguistic community. The results of an interpretative analysis in order to identify allusive hidden meanings and cultural-code meanings of the units under study are presented in the article. An algorithm is proposed for the interpretative analysis of figurative units in the speech of Xi Jinping by comparing their representations in three languages. The question is raised that the allusions in the speech of the Chinese leader and their semantic correspondences in the translation texts are addressed both to the internal addressees / speakers of the Chinese language and to the external — foreign-language audience.


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