scholarly journals Perceiving Images and Styles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Gavaler ◽  
Nathaniel Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Image Representation ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Perceptual Theory ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Dependence Theory ◽  
Response Dependence ◽  
Paul Grice ◽  
Mark Johnston

Marks individually or in combination constitute images that represent objects. How do those images represent those objects? Marks vary in style, both between and within images. Images also vary in style. How do those styles relate to each other and to the objects that those images represent? Referencing a diverse range of images, we answer the first question with a response-dependence theory of image representation derived from Mark Johnston, differentiating Lockean primary qualities of marks from secondary qualities of images. We answer the second question with a perceptual theory of style derived from Paul Grice, differentiating physical style from image style, and representing conventionally from representing conversationally.

Berkeley v. Locke on Primary Qualities

Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (212) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Made In

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.

The Origin and Classification of Ideas

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-41
Author(s):  
Georges Dicker
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities

This chapter (1) expounds Locke’s empiricist principle that all of our ideas are derived from experience, and (2) offers a clarification of the structure of Book II of the Essay. Regarding (1), it explains his twofold use of the term “idea” to mean both any sensory or introspectible state and any concept, his distinctions between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection and between simple and complex ideas, and his classification of simple ideas. It identifies some noteworthy points about the idea of solidity. Regarding (2), it provides a clarification of the organization of Book II, in light of the facts that Locke (a) digresses into the theory of primary qualities and secondary qualities in Book II Chapter viii before continuing his aetiology of ideas, and (b) discusses several complex ideas of reflection, in Book II Chapters x and xi, before officially turning to complex ideas in Chapter xii.

scholarly journals Secondary Qualities as Dispositions

Locke Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nathan Rockwood
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Dispositional Properties

In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.

Qualities, Powers, and Bare Powers in Locke

2021 ◽  
pp. 186-205
Author(s):  
Lisa Downing
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
New Science ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Matter Theory

Lisa Downing focuses on the important issue of the metaphysics of Locke’s primary–secondary qualities distinction. In recent years this has returned as a topic of scholarly contention. Downing is concerned by the anti-realist trends in recent work on the metaphysics of Locke primary–secondary qualities distinction, and she is keen to defend the claims that Locke was ‘putting forward a kind of realism about secondary qualities’ and that his realism does not readily appear to be a reductive form of realism. Downing begins with the traditional claim that Locke’s distinction was driven by his understanding of matter theory within the new science, like many others in the seventeenth century. From this perspective, she criticizes recent work on the nature and priority of primary qualities, which fail to root the primary in a metaphysical base or connect them to the metaphysical base in the wrong way. Next, she turns toward explaining her own understanding of the subordinate status of the secondary qualities, which brings Downing to Locke’s claim that secondary qualities are ‘mere powers’ and what this meant metaphysically to him.

Realism, Essentialism, and Intrinsic Properties: The Case of Molecular Shape

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffry L. Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
Molecular Structure ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Molecular Shape ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Spatial Properties ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
Sensible Qualities

Figure, or shape, has long been ensconced in modern philosophy as a primary or essential quality of matter. Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes, and Boyle all apparently endorsed the Lockean claim that shape is “in Bodies whether we perceive them or no” (Locke, [1700] 1975, p. 140). In addition, most seventeenth-century philosophers endorsed the inference that because shape is primary, it is one of the “ultimate, irreducible explanatory principles” (Dijksterhuis, 1961, p. 433; cf. Ihde, 1964, p. 28). Locke has often been read in this way, and in Origins of Forms and Qualities, Boyle claims the “sensible qualities . . . are but the effects or consequents of the . . . primary affections of matter,” one of which is figure (quoted in Harré, 1964, p. 80). Little appears to have changed. Most analytic philosophers and realist-minded philosophers of science “would endorse a distinction between primary and secondary qualities” (Smith, 1990, p. 221). Campbell (1972, p. 219) endorses the claim that “shape, size and solidity are generally held to be primary,” even though he argues that “the philosophy of primary and secondary qualities” is confused. Mackie (1976, p. 18) discounts solidity but endorses spatial properties and motion as “basic” physical features of matter. Most philosophers also endorse the inference to the explanatory character of the primary qualities. Mackie (1976, p. 25) asserts spatial properties are “starting points of explanation.” Boyd (1989, pp. 10-11) claims “realists agree” that “the factors which govern the behavior . . . of substances are the fundamental properties of the insensible corpuscles of which they are composed.” As befits our current situation, explanation purportedly flows from spatial microstructure. A body “possesses a certain potential only because it actually possesses a certain property (e.g., its molecular structure)” (Lange, 1994, pp. 109-110). Even Putnam, who argues all properties are Lockean secondaries, claims powers “have an explanation . . . in the particular microstructure” of matter (Putnam, 1981, p. 58).

Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Steven Nadler
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
External Objects ◽  
The Mind

Part of Berkeley's strategy in his attack on materialism in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous is to argue that the epistemological distinction between ideas of so-called primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities, especially as this distinction is found in Locke, is untenable. Both kinds of ideas-those presenting to the mind the quantifiable properties of bodies (shape, size, extension, motion) and those which are just sensations (color, odor, taste, heat)-are equally perceptions in the mind, and there is no reason to believe that one kind (the ideas of primary qualities) represents true properties of independently existing external objects while the other kind does not.

Primary and Secondary Qualities

1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Special Relationship ◽  
Preliminary Step ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

The philosophy of primary and secondary qualities is in a state of some confusion. There is no agreement as to the basis upon which the two classes of quality may be distinguished—a host of features, as diverse as perceptible by more than one sense and belonging to the definition of matter, are offered as the mark of the primary. There is not even agreement on which qualities belong to which group. Shape, size and solidity are generally held to be primary, while colours, smells, and the like (I) are favoured secondary candidates. But for large numbers of qualities, for example being acidic, malleable, rust-proof—or, among perceptible qualities, glistening and vibrating—we are offered no effective guidance.Inevitably, in such a situation, we are without clear answers to the questions; Why should any distinction be made between primaries and secondaries? Must all qualities be the one or the other? To the solution of which problems does the distinction serve as a preliminary step? What special relationship is there between primary qualities and scientific theory, or between secondary qualities and peculiarities in perception?

God in the Philosophy of Alexander

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 124-166
Author(s):  
Katyayanidas Bhattacharya ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Space Time ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Empirical World ◽  
Previous Level ◽  
The Universe

In the view of Alexander Space-Time or Pure Motion is the basic stuff of the universe, for it is Space-Time or Pure Motion that remains if one thinks out all that can be excluded through a rigorous act of abstraction short of annihilation. Alexander subscribes to the doctrine of emergent evolution and holds that the empirical world in all its ascending levels emerges out of the primal background of Space-Time. The first ascending level of emergence is that of matter with primary qualities; the next ascending level is that of secondary qualities; life emerges in the next ascending level and mind emerges in the next ascending level. Reductive materialism must be rejected, for each new quality emerging in the ascending level is irreducible to the previous level and there is always an explanatory gap between the previous level and the ascending level. The highest of the empirical qualities known to us is mind or consciousness; there is an empirical quality which is to succeed the distinctive empirical quality of our level, that new empirical quality is God or deity. We cannot tell what the nature of deity is; but we can be certain that it is not mere mind or spirit, for no new emergent quality can be reduced to the previous level. Rather deity is what mind or spirit deserves in the ascending order.

“A Notion of the True System of the World”: Berkeley and his Use of Plato inSiris

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Larsen
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
The World ◽  
True System

AbstractThis paper considers Berkeley’s use of Plato in Siris. Berkeley’s engagement with ancient thinkers in Siris has been a source of puzzlement for many readers. In this paper I focus on Siris § 266. In particular, I consider why Berkeley says of the Platonists that they “distinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary” and why, given his own well-known misgivings about the distinction, he characterizes this as part of a “notion of the true system of the world.” I argue that in Siris Berkeley accepts a distinctive form of corpuscularianism, and that he thinks a distinction between primary and secondary qualities follows from this. I further argue that in § 266, and elsewhere in Siris, Berkeley engages in a careful reading of Plato’s Timaeus, which he uses to bolster his defense of the compatibility between corpuscularianism and his immaterialist idealism.

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