scholarly journals Distinguishing Interpersonal and Ideological Prosociality: Introducing the Construct of Ideological Prosociality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Nezlek

Prosociality refers to dispositions and behaviors intended to benefit others, and the present study assumed that these dispositions reflect people’s values. Much of the research on prosociality has examined prosociality in what can be called the interpersonal domain, e.g., helping others. I propose that prosociality also exists in the ideological domain. People hold prosocial values that concern collectives, not specific individuals. Multilevel analyses of data collected in Wave 8 of the European Social Survey (44,000 respondents in 23 countries) found significant positive relationships between ideological prosocial values and attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, attitudes about the environment and climate change, gays and lesbians, social benefits, and income equality. Moreover, these relationships remained after controlling participants’ sex, income, happiness, and political orientation. In contrast, with the exception of attitudes about the environment, relationships between these attitudes and interpersonal prosocial values were either negative or not significant.

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Barni ◽  
Alessio Vieno ◽  
Michele Roccato

We performed a multilevel, multinational analysis using the 2012 European Social Survey dataset (N = 41 080, nested in 20 countries) to study how living in a non–communist versus in a post–communist country moderates the link between individual conservative values (drawn on Schwartz's theory of basic human values) and political orientation (assessed as self–placement on the left–right axis and attitude towards economic redistribution). The results supported the moderating role of living in a non–communist versus in a post–communist country in the case both of political self–placement and of attitude towards economic redistribution, even controlling for the countries’ degree of individualism, power distance and democracy. Specifically, conservative values were positively related to a rightist political self–placement among participants living in countries without a communist past, and to a favourable attitude towards economic redistribution in countries with a communist past. The limitations, implications and future directions of this study are discussed. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology


Intersections ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-127
Author(s):  
Vera Messing ◽  
Bence Ságvári

In this paper we aim to discuss attitudes towards immigrants in a European context and analyse drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes such as the feeling of control, basic human values, political orientation and preferences related to right-wing populism. Based on data from the European Social Survey, we first describe how attitudes of people in Europe changed throughout a period of almost two decades (between 2002 and 2018). We will show that although attitudes are influenced by a number of demographic and subjective features of individuals, on the macro-level they seem to be surprisingly stable, yet hide significant cross-country differences. Then, we zoom in to the three most significant elements influencing attitudes towards immigrants: the feeling of control, basic human values, and political orientation. Applying a multi-level model we test the validity of three theories about factors informing attitudes towards immigrants—competition theory, locus of control, and the role of basic human values—and include time (pre- and post-2015 refugee-crisis periods) into the analysis. In the discussion we link ESS data to recent research on populism in Europe that categorizes populist parties across the continent, and establish that the degree to which anti-migrant feelings are linked to support for political populism varies significantly across European countries. We show that right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general, and this process is also driven by the significance awarded the value of security vis-à-vis humanitarianism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-912 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stockemer ◽  
Arne Niemann ◽  
Doris Unger ◽  
Johanna Speyer

Between 2015 and 2017, the European Union (EU) was confronted with a major crisis in its history, the so-called “European refugee crisis.” Since the multifaceted crisis has provoked many different responses, it is also likely to have influenced individuals’ assessments of immigrants and European integration. Using data from three waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) — the wave before the crisis in 2012, the wave at the beginning of the crisis in 2014, and the wave right after the (perceived) height of the crisis in 2016 — we test the degree to which the European refugee crisis increased Europeans’ anti-immigrant sentiment and Euroscepticism, as well as the influence of Europeans’ anti-immigrant attitudes on their level of Euroscepticism. As suggested by prior research, our results indicate that there is indeed a consistent and solid relationship between more critical attitudes toward immigrants and increased Euroscepticism. Surprisingly, however, we find that the crisis increased neither anti-immigrant sentiments nor critical attitudes toward the EU and did not reinforce the link between rejection of immigrants and rejection of the EU. These findings imply that even under a strong external shock, fundamental political attitudes remain constant.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. van der Meer ◽  
Nick Mulder

The scarring effect: the lasting impact of long-term unemployment on wellbeing In this article we answer the question whether the scarring effect of unemployment lasts into retirement. This is an interesting question because the answer provides insights into the explanation of this scarring effect. If pensioners are scarred by unemployment than this suggests that the scar is caused by a loss of self-esteem. If pensioners don't have the scar than this suggests that the scar among employed is explained by either a scaring effect or by not abiding social norms. Our multilevel analyses of data for 25 countries that participated in the European Social Survey showed that pensioners do have such a scar. Pensioners who have been unemployed for at least three months have a lower level of subjective well-being than pensioners who were never unemployed. This shows that unemployment coincides with a loss of self-esteem. It is an additional argument why governments should give a higher level of priority in combatting unemployment to avoid social losses, not only for the unemployed but for the pensioners as well.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 237802311772997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Ponce

Gender emerges as a key site of contestation with respect to immigrants’ integration and public presence in Europe. The recent politicization of gender and Islam in immigration debates marks an increasingly salient constructed opposition between egalitarian European values and traditional immigrant cultures. Against this background, this study investigates how gender structures attitudes toward immigrants of different economic and cultural profiles. Prior research finds that women are usually less likely to exhibit anti-immigrant attitudes than are men. Using 2014 European Social Survey data, results show that women are no less likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes. However, in a significant reversal of traditional gender patterns, women are more likely to hold targeted anti-Muslim attitudes. Further, social trust moderates this gendered anti-Muslim effect. I interpret findings as a shift in how gender structures xenophobia resulting from the increased salience of gender ideology as a boundary-defining feature and growing demonization of Muslims as gender inegalitarian.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1212-1237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian S. Czymara

Immigration is among the most vividly discussed topics in Europe’s national parliaments in recent years, often with a particular emphasis on the inflow of Muslims. This article examines the link between articulations of national political parties (political elite discourses) and natives’ attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. It provides a nuanced view of this relationship by (i) distinguishing more (inclusionary) from less (exclusionary) immigration-friendly political elites and (ii) isolating natives’ openness toward two specific groups: Muslim immigrants and ethnically similar immigrants. Combining the European Social Survey with party manifesto data and other sources, the analysis reveals that political elite discourses perform better in explaining natives’ attitudes compared to national demographic or economic aspects. Native Europeans’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are more hostile in countries where political elites are more exclusionary and more welcoming where political elites are more inclusionary. In contrast, Europeans’ views on ethnically similar immigrants seem largely unaffected by exclusionary political elites. These findings suggest that political elites can play an important role in fostering or impeding immigrant integration by shaping public opinion, particularly toward more marginalized immigrant groups.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia S. Mastikova

This article, based on a European social survey for the year 2016, analyzes the attitudes of Russian and European citizens towards the influx of migrants into their respective countries, as well as towards the changes that said migrants bring with them. Despite the fact that Russia is among the leading countries in terms of migrant count, while remaining separated from those migration flows which bred the current European migrant crisis, it is among the top three nations with the most negative attitudes towards people migrating to their country, as well as in terms of evaluating the changes attributed to said migrants. In regards to migration inflow, the utmost negative assessments are prevalent in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Russia. Positive assessments were recorded in Iceland and Sweden. When it comes to changes introduced by migrants, the most negative assessments among all of the countries surveyed were again recorded in Hungary, Russia and the Czech Republic. The most tolerant countries in this regard turned out to be Scandinavian nations: Iceland, Sweden and Finland. Negative assessments in Hungary and the Czech Republic can be attributed to the fact that these nations act as migration transit points of sorts on the path towards the wealthiest of European states. They do not possess the resources necessary to handle accommodating and supporting transit migrants, as well as providing security for their own host populations. This article also cites the discussion on potential reasons for anti-migrant attitudes in foreign research. Among the main reasons highlighted are cultural factors (values and beliefs in the countries studied), economic (competition in the labor market, income level, GDP, the proportion of migrants among the general population), social-demographic (gender, age, education level, type of settlement), contextual factors (religion, political orientation, mass-media influence) etc. In Russia, aside from the aforementioned factors, the effect of low living standards and propagandistic coverage of the European migrant crisis in mass-media is also a consideration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Mitchell

Research investigating how social conditions influence attitudes about immigrants has focused primarily on demographic and economic factors as potential threat inducing contexts that lead to anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the empirical evidence supporting this link is mixed, while social cohesion indicators such as the influence of social trust, have largely been left unexamined. This article uses the European Social Survey (2002–2016) to test how differences in social trust, both within and between countries influence attitudes about immigrants. Results from longitudinal analyses show that countries with higher levels of social trust have more favorable attitudes toward immigrants, and while changes in social trust over time are small, they result in comparably large changes in anti-immigrant attitudes, even when controlling for other social factors. These results are robust across different model specifications and data sources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidas Vilčinskas

Individual behaviour has a significant role to play in reducing the negative impacts of climate change. The energy sector is a significant component impacting climate. Although individual energy saving behaviour can be perceived as something detached from climate change, it is important because of its impact and is therefore the subject of research. The aim of this study is to identify the main factors influencing energy saving behaviour in Lithuania. The Theory of Planned Behaviour and the Theory of Basic Human Values are tested using the European Social Survey Round 8 data. The results show that intention to save energy is the most important factor influencing behaviour. Values are also a strong predictor of energy saving behaviour. Attitudes towards climate change and perceived behavioural control have only a very weak relationship with behaviour.


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