scholarly journals Illusory Truth Occurs Even with Incentives for Accuracy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia M Brashier ◽  
David Gertler Rand

Fake news sites, politicians, and advertisers often make false claims believable by repeating them. Repeated statements feel easier to process, and thus truer, than new ones. In two large experiments (N = 1188), we investigated whether monetary incentives for accuracy reduce this 'illusory truth effect.' Repetition misled people regardless of whether they could earn money for correct answers. The illusion occurred even when participants received item-by-item reminders about possible rewards. Our findings suggest that motivation is not always enough to disengage people from using heuristics to evaluate truth, with implications for a “post-truth world.”

Author(s):  
Aumyo Hassan ◽  
Sarah J. Barber

AbstractRepeated information is often perceived as more truthful than new information. This finding is known as the illusory truth effect, and it is typically thought to occur because repetition increases processing fluency. Because fluency and truth are frequently correlated in the real world, people learn to use processing fluency as a marker for truthfulness. Although the illusory truth effect is a robust phenomenon, almost all studies examining it have used three or fewer repetitions. To address this limitation, we conducted two experiments using a larger number of repetitions. In Experiment 1, we showed participants trivia statements up to 9 times and in Experiment 2 statements were shown up to 27 times. Later, participants rated the truthfulness of the previously seen statements and of new statements. In both experiments, we found that perceived truthfulness increased as the number of repetitions increased. However, these truth rating increases were logarithmic in shape. The largest increase in perceived truth came from encountering a statement for the second time, and beyond this were incrementally smaller increases in perceived truth for each additional repetition. These findings add to our theoretical understanding of the illusory truth effect and have applications for advertising, politics, and the propagation of “fake news.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Muh. Zulfajri Shadiq Taswin ◽  
Whisnu Yudiana

Penyebaran informasi yang begitu cepat ternyata kurang dapat diimbangi dengan jaminan bahwa informasi tersebut benar adanya. Fenomena beredarnya berita di dunia maya yang kontennya tidak sesuai dengan kenyataan, dikenal dengan istilah berita palsu (fake news). Semakin sering seseorang mendengar sebuah informasi, terlepas dari apakah informasi tersebut benar atau tidak, semakin mungkin pula ia mempercayai bahwa informasi tersebut benar. Fenomena tersebut dinamakan dengan efek kebenaran semu (illusory truth effect). Kecenderungan menggunakan salah satu dari dua proses kognitif yang ada, yakni proses tipe 1 (intuitif) atau tipe 2 (reflektif), ketika menerima berita palsu dinamakan gaya kognitif. Orang dengan gaya kognitif reflektif cenderung lebih mungkin untuk mampu membedakan berita palsu dari berita asli, dibandingkan orang dengan gaya kognitif intuitif. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah dalam situasi efek kebenaran semu terjadi, seseorang yang diinduksikan gaya kognitif reflektif lebih mampu menilai berita palsu sebagai palsu dibandingkan orang yang tidak terinduksi. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan eksperimen dengan metode between participant post-test only design yang dilakukan pada 215 mahasiswa Fakultas Psikologi Universitas Padjadjaran menggunakan simple random sampling. Induksi gaya kognitif reflektif diberikan pada kelompok eksperimen menggunakan metode Visual Priming gambar patung The Thinker. Data hasil penelitian dianalisis menggunakan uji statistik Mann-Whitney U dua sampel bebas. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa tidak terdapat pengaruh induksi gaya kognitif reflektif terhadap persepsi akurasi berita palsu dalam situasi adanya efek kebenaran semu. Penjelasan dominan yang menjadi dugaan peneliti ialah karena induksi menggunakan visual priming gambar patung The Thinker tidak dapat direplikasi pada penelitian ini.


Author(s):  
Felix Speckmann ◽  
Christian Unkelbach

AbstractPeople rate and judge repeated information more true than novel information. This truth-by-repetition effect is of relevance for explaining belief in fake news, conspiracy theories, or misinformation effects. To ascertain whether increased motivation could reduce this effect, we tested the influence of monetary incentives on participants’ truth judgments. We used a standard truth paradigm, consisting of a presentation and judgment phase with factually true and false information, and incentivized every truth judgment. Monetary incentives may influence truth judgments in two ways. First, participants may rely more on relevant knowledge, leading to better discrimination between true and false statements. Second, participants may rely less on repetition, leading to a lower bias to respond “true.” We tested these predictions in a preregistered and high-powered experiment. However, incentives did not influence the percentage of “true” judgments or correct responses in general, despite participants’ longer response times in the incentivized conditions and evidence for knowledge about the statements. Our findings show that even monetary consequences do not protect against the truth-by-repetition effect, further substantiating its robustness and relevance and highlighting its potential hazardous effects when used in purposeful misinformation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 00 (00) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Yanfang Wu

This study seeks to uncover the effects of source and repetition on the illusory truth effect and the dissemination of fake news on social media with an online experiment. This study found that in a personalized source system where trustworthy traditional news sources and personal contacts converged on social media, repetition has a big influence on the trustworthiness of news source and balance of news story. Although most people intend to share real news stories with balance, the illusory truth effect causes mis-judgement, which makes fake news more likely to go viral than real news. The multi-group SEM analysis of the two groups – without source and with source – showed that readers in the no source group rated the effect of repetition on news evaluation as more significant than the with source group. The findings suggest that the effect of source has diminished in the evaluation of news quality. However, sharers on social media are becoming more influential.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Wright ◽  
Xiaoning Guo ◽  
Drew Brown ◽  
Chris Manolis ◽  
John Dinsmore ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Melanie Freeze ◽  
Mary Baumgartner ◽  
Peter Bruno ◽  
Jacob R. Gunderson ◽  
Joshua Olin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (11) ◽  
pp. 4944-4957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Adam Bear ◽  
Evan T. Collins ◽  
David G. Rand

What can be done to combat political misinformation? One prominent intervention involves attaching warnings to headlines of news stories that have been disputed by third-party fact-checkers. Here we demonstrate a hitherto unappreciated potential consequence of such a warning: an implied truth effect, whereby false headlines that fail to get tagged are considered validated and thus are seen as more accurate. With a formal model, we demonstrate that Bayesian belief updating can lead to such an implied truth effect. In Study 1 (n = 5,271 MTurkers), we find that although warnings do lead to a modest reduction in perceived accuracy of false headlines relative to a control condition (particularly for politically concordant headlines), we also observed the hypothesized implied truth effect: the presence of warnings caused untagged headlines to be seen as more accurate than in the control. In Study 2 (n = 1,568 MTurkers), we find the same effects in the context of decisions about which headlines to consider sharing on social media. We also find that attaching verifications to some true headlines—which removes the ambiguity about whether untagged headlines have not been checked or have been verified—eliminates, and in fact slightly reverses, the implied truth effect. Together these results contest theories of motivated reasoning while identifying a potential challenge for the policy of using warning tags to fight misinformation—a challenge that is particularly concerning given that it is much easier to produce misinformation than it is to debunk it. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 1058-1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Moritz ◽  
Ulf Köther ◽  
Todd S. Woodward ◽  
Ruth Veckenstedt ◽  
Alice Dechêne ◽  
...  

Journalism ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 146488491987800
Author(s):  
Graham Majin

The journalistic coverage of Russiagate, between 2017 and March 2019, has been described as ‘a catastrophic media failure’. Drawing on political and social psychology, this article seeks to enrich, and refresh, the familiar journalistic concepts of agenda-setting, framing and priming by combining them under the heading of the ‘news narrative’. Using this interdisciplinary approach to media effects theory, Russiagate is considered in terms of the Illusory Truth Effect and the Innuendo Effect. These effects hypothesise that the more audiences are exposed to information, the more likely they are to believe it – even when they are told that the information is unreliable. As a specific example, we focus on the stance taken by BBC News – which has an obligation to journalistic impartiality. We ask what implications arise from this analysis with regard to audience trust.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 739-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei-Chun Wang ◽  
Nadia M. Brashier ◽  
Erik A. Wing ◽  
Elizabeth J. Marsh ◽  
Roberto Cabeza

The “illusory truth” effect refers to the phenomenon whereby repetition of a statement increases its likelihood of being judged true. This phenomenon has important implications for how we come to believe oft-repeated information that may be misleading or unknown. Behavioral evidence indicates that fluency, the subjective ease experienced while processing information, underlies this effect. This suggests that illusory truth should be mediated by brain regions previously linked to fluency, such as the perirhinal cortex (PRC). To investigate this possibility, we scanned participants with fMRI while they rated the truth of unknown statements, half of which were presented earlier (i.e., repeated). The only brain region that showed an interaction between repetition and ratings of perceived truth was PRC, where activity increased with truth ratings for repeated, but not for new, statements. This finding supports the hypothesis that illusory truth is mediated by a fluency mechanism and further strengthens the link between PRC and fluency.


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