scholarly journals Anti-social motives explain risk aversion for others in decisions from experience

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Olschewski ◽  
Marius Dietsch ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig

When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often havedifferent risk preferences for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti- social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed, however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute to the observed limited risk-taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (10) ◽  
pp. 2048-2059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Madan ◽  
Elliot A. Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L. Spetch

People's risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on information learned through experience. For decisions from description, people are typically more risk averse for gains than for losses. In contrast, for decisions from experience, people are sometimes more risk seeking for gains than losses, especially for choices with the possibility of extreme outcomes (big wins or big losses), which are systematically overweighed in memory. Using a within-subject design, this study evaluated whether this memory bias plays a role in the differences in risky choice between description and experience. As in previous studies, people were more risk seeking for losses than for gains in description but showed the opposite pattern in experience. People also more readily remembered the extreme outcomes and judged them as having occurred more frequently. These memory biases correlated with risk preferences in decisions from experience but not in decisions from description. These results suggest that systematic memory biases may be responsible for some of the differences in risk preference across description and experience.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jared Pickett

<p>People make different decisions when they know the odds of an event occurring, (e.g. told 10% chance of an earthquake that year) than when they draw on only their own experience (e.g. living in a city with, on average, one earthquake every 10 years). It may be that when we make decisions based on our past experience (decisions from experience) we are more likely to choose a risky option when it can lead to the biggest win and avoid it when it can lead to the biggest loss, this effect is called the Extreme-Outcome rule. Across three Experiments we tested the Extreme-Outcome rule by having participants make repeated choices between either safe or risky options which had the same expected value. In each experiment, we varied the magnitude of the reinforcer’s participants could win in both an Experience condition and a condition that had both description and experience information. In Experiment 1 where we had two reinforcer sizes (small and large) we found an Extreme-Outcome effect in the Experience condition, but not the Description-Experience condition. In Experiment 2 we tested a prediction of the Extreme-Outcome rule that participants would be sensitive to the best and worst outcome by adding another reinforcer size (reinforcers were small, medium and large) and therefore on some trials neither alternative included an extreme outcome. We also removed zero as a potential outcome to investigate whether zero aversion might be driving the effect of reinforcer magnitude in the Experience condition. We did not find response patterns consistent with an Extreme-Outcome rule in the Experience condition. Instead, participants were least risk seeking when the reinforcer was small, but there was no difference in levels of risk seeking between the medium and large reinforcer trials. In other words, there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome but not the high-extreme outcome. Like Experiment 1, in the Description-Experience condition risk preference was not influenced by reinforcer size, but the absolute levels were higher. To investigate whether this increase in risk preference was due to removing the zero, in Experiment 3 we manipulated whether zero was present or absent. When zero was absent, risk preference was not influenced by the size of the reinforcer in the Description-Experience condition, but there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome when zero was present. We also found an effect of the low extreme outcome in the Experience condition regardless of whether zero was present or absent. Overall, these findings suggest the Extreme-Outcome rule needs to be modified to take into account the effect of the low extreme but not the high extreme outcome.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jared Pickett

<p>People make different decisions when they know the odds of an event occurring, (e.g. told 10% chance of an earthquake that year) than when they draw on only their own experience (e.g. living in a city with, on average, one earthquake every 10 years). It may be that when we make decisions based on our past experience (decisions from experience) we are more likely to choose a risky option when it can lead to the biggest win and avoid it when it can lead to the biggest loss, this effect is called the Extreme-Outcome rule. Across three Experiments we tested the Extreme-Outcome rule by having participants make repeated choices between either safe or risky options which had the same expected value. In each experiment, we varied the magnitude of the reinforcer’s participants could win in both an Experience condition and a condition that had both description and experience information. In Experiment 1 where we had two reinforcer sizes (small and large) we found an Extreme-Outcome effect in the Experience condition, but not the Description-Experience condition. In Experiment 2 we tested a prediction of the Extreme-Outcome rule that participants would be sensitive to the best and worst outcome by adding another reinforcer size (reinforcers were small, medium and large) and therefore on some trials neither alternative included an extreme outcome. We also removed zero as a potential outcome to investigate whether zero aversion might be driving the effect of reinforcer magnitude in the Experience condition. We did not find response patterns consistent with an Extreme-Outcome rule in the Experience condition. Instead, participants were least risk seeking when the reinforcer was small, but there was no difference in levels of risk seeking between the medium and large reinforcer trials. In other words, there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome but not the high-extreme outcome. Like Experiment 1, in the Description-Experience condition risk preference was not influenced by reinforcer size, but the absolute levels were higher. To investigate whether this increase in risk preference was due to removing the zero, in Experiment 3 we manipulated whether zero was present or absent. When zero was absent, risk preference was not influenced by the size of the reinforcer in the Description-Experience condition, but there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome when zero was present. We also found an effect of the low extreme outcome in the Experience condition regardless of whether zero was present or absent. Overall, these findings suggest the Extreme-Outcome rule needs to be modified to take into account the effect of the low extreme but not the high extreme outcome.</p>


2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Li ◽  
Yongqing Fang

AbstractTriggered by rather surprising findings that respondents in Asian cultures (e.g., Chinese) are more risk-seeking and more overconfident than respondents in other cultures (e.g., in United States) and that the reciprocal predictions are in total opposition, four experiments were designed to extend previous collective-culture oriented researches. Results revealed that (1) Singapore 21, which is a vision of Singapore in the 21st century and has highlighted the promotion of a collective culture, did not advocate greater risk-seeking but led to weaker overconfidence; (2) the knowledge of "financial help from social network" did not permit prediction of risk preference but the knowledge of "the value difference between possible outcomes" did; (3) the social network could be viewed not only as a positive "cushion" but also as a negative "burden" in both gain and loss domains of risky choices; (4) the predictions of the risk-as-value, risk-as-feelings and stereotype hypotheses were not consistent with the predicted risk preferences of others but the predictions of the economic-performance hypothesis were consistent with the predicted risk preferences as well as the predicted overconfidence of others. The implications for cross-cultural variations in overconfidence and for cross-cultural variations in risk-taking were discussed.


2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary E. Marche

Although corruption and optimal law enforcement literature have addressed the effects of corruption, little has been done to analyze the decision to become corrupt. For example, little is known about risk preferences and how they might affect the nature of a corrupt exchange scheme. To answer this question, a theoretical analysis is developed that considers the noncoercive incentivea and circumstances necessary for a law enforcement official, assumed averse to criminal risk, to choose a corrupt exchange with organized crime that involves murder. Risk-aversion and the severity of the crime involved are shown to reduce the likelihood of detecting the corruption scheme and murder is shown to be optimal. Corruption schemes involving less risk averse offenders are analyzed and compared.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolay Zubanov

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on the effectiveness of incentive pay schemes, by examining the link between individual effort and risk aversion in situations where outcome uncertainty multiplies with effort. Such “multiplicative noise” situations are common, occurring whenever payment is awarded per success rather than per attempt. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a theoretical model which predicts a negative risk aversion-effort link under multiplicative noise without a performance target (PT), and a weaker negative link once the target is introduced. This model is then taken to the data from a lab experiment where participants were randomly assigned to a control group, which received fixed pay, and a treatment group, which received a piece rate awarded with a certain probability, with and without a PT. Risk aversion is measured with a menu of lottery choices offered at the end of the experiment. Findings – Compared to their peers in the control group, the more risk-averse participants in the treatment group put in progressively less effort in the absence of a PT. The introduction of a PT substantially weakens this negative risk aversion-effort link, so that there are no more significant differences in performance between the more and the less risk averse. Research limitations/implications – The paper’s findings speak to the empirical puzzles of incentive pay schemes backfiring and of the proliferation of PTs. The negative risk aversion-effort link may be one reason behind the failure of incentive schemes to deliver improved performance, whereas the weakening of this link may be one justification for the existence of PTs. Practical implications – In the multiplicative noise environments, managers should take their workers’ risk preferences into account when designing incentive pay schemes. A PT may be a useful motivational tool for the risk-averse workers who are more likely to under-perform. Originality/value – The multiplicative noise environment has been largely overlooked by the existing literature, yet it is common in practice. An example is the work of a sales agent who receives a bonus per sales which succeeds with a certain probability after each customer contact. This paper is one of the first to model, and test experimentally, worker performance in this environment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-48
Author(s):  
Matthew Rabin ◽  
Max Bazerman

Managers often engage in risk-averse behavior, and economists, decision analysts, and managers treat risk aversion as a preference. In many cases, acting in a risk-averse manner is a mistake, but managers can correct this mistake with greater reflection. This article provides guidance on how individuals and organizations can move toward greater reflection and a more profitable aggregate portfolio of decisions. Inconsistency in risk preferences across decisions is a costly mistake for both individuals and for organizations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Jammernegg ◽  
Peter Kischka

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 628-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary E Bolton ◽  
Axel Ockenfels

In a series of binary choice problems, we investigate how a chooser's risk taking changes when others share in their personal risk, either equally or unequally. We find that when the safe option yields inequality, the risky option is taken significantly more often. On the other hand, the inequality resulting from the risky choice does not affect risk taking. We also find that choosers tend to be less risk-averse in a one-person context compared to when the risk also affects the payoff of another. (C72, D81, Z13)


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