Fretting about Modest Risks Is a Mistake

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-48
Author(s):  
Matthew Rabin ◽  
Max Bazerman
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Averse

Managers often engage in risk-averse behavior, and economists, decision analysts, and managers treat risk aversion as a preference. In many cases, acting in a risk-averse manner is a mistake, but managers can correct this mistake with greater reflection. This article provides guidance on how individuals and organizations can move toward greater reflection and a more profitable aggregate portfolio of decisions. Inconsistency in risk preferences across decisions is a costly mistake for both individuals and for organizations.

AND, INJUSTICE FOR SOME CORRUPT EXCHANGE AND THE RISK-AVERSE OFFICIAL

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary E. Marche
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Enforcement Official ◽  
Optimal Law Enforcement

Although corruption and optimal law enforcement literature have addressed the effects of corruption, little has been done to analyze the decision to become corrupt. For example, little is known about risk preferences and how they might affect the nature of a corrupt exchange scheme. To answer this question, a theoretical analysis is developed that considers the noncoercive incentivea and circumstances necessary for a law enforcement official, assumed averse to criminal risk, to choose a corrupt exchange with organized crime that involves murder. Risk-aversion and the severity of the crime involved are shown to reduce the likelihood of detecting the corruption scheme and murder is shown to be optimal. Corruption schemes involving less risk averse offenders are analyzed and compared.

Risk Preferences and Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Low Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Legal Rules

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.

scholarly journals Risk aversion and effort under an incentive pay scheme with multiplicative noise

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolay Zubanov
Keyword(s):  
Treatment Group ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Multiplicative Noise ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Piece Rate

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on the effectiveness of incentive pay schemes, by examining the link between individual effort and risk aversion in situations where outcome uncertainty multiplies with effort. Such “multiplicative noise” situations are common, occurring whenever payment is awarded per success rather than per attempt. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a theoretical model which predicts a negative risk aversion-effort link under multiplicative noise without a performance target (PT), and a weaker negative link once the target is introduced. This model is then taken to the data from a lab experiment where participants were randomly assigned to a control group, which received fixed pay, and a treatment group, which received a piece rate awarded with a certain probability, with and without a PT. Risk aversion is measured with a menu of lottery choices offered at the end of the experiment. Findings – Compared to their peers in the control group, the more risk-averse participants in the treatment group put in progressively less effort in the absence of a PT. The introduction of a PT substantially weakens this negative risk aversion-effort link, so that there are no more significant differences in performance between the more and the less risk averse. Research limitations/implications – The paper’s findings speak to the empirical puzzles of incentive pay schemes backfiring and of the proliferation of PTs. The negative risk aversion-effort link may be one reason behind the failure of incentive schemes to deliver improved performance, whereas the weakening of this link may be one justification for the existence of PTs. Practical implications – In the multiplicative noise environments, managers should take their workers’ risk preferences into account when designing incentive pay schemes. A PT may be a useful motivational tool for the risk-averse workers who are more likely to under-perform. Originality/value – The multiplicative noise environment has been largely overlooked by the existing literature, yet it is common in practice. An example is the work of a sales agent who receives a bonus per sales which succeeds with a certain probability after each customer contact. This paper is one of the first to model, and test experimentally, worker performance in this environment.

scholarly journals The development of risk aversion and prudence in Chinese children and adolescents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Heinrich ◽  
Jason Shachat
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Choice Task ◽  
Chinese Children ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Chinese Children And Adolescents

AbstractThis study experimentally evaluates the risk preferences of children and adolescents living in an urban Chinese environment. We use a simple binary choice task that tests risk aversion, as well as prudence. This is the first test for prudence in children and adolescents. Our results reveal that subjects from grades 5 to 11 (10 to 17 years) make mostly risk-averse and prudent choices. The choices of 3rd graders (8 to 9 years) do not differ statistically from risk neutral benchmarks, but at the same time they make mostly prudent choices. We also find evidence for a transmission of risk preferences. There is positive correlation between all children’s and their parents’ tendency to make risk-averse choices. There is also positive correlation between girls’ and their parents’ tendency to make prudent choices.

scholarly journals Anti-social motives explain risk aversion for others in decisions from experience

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Olschewski ◽  
Marius Dietsch ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Social Motives ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risky Option

When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often havedifferent risk preferences for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti- social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed, however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute to the observed limited risk-taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.

Eliciting Risk Preferences and Elasticity of Substitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 314-329
Author(s):  
Johan Burgaard ◽  
Mogens Steffensen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Discount Rate ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Recursive Utility ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Indirect Utility ◽  
Consistent Estimation ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Certainty Equivalents ◽  
Elasticity Of Intertemporal Substitution

Risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are separated via the celebrated recursive utility building on certainty equivalents of indirect utility. Based on an alternative separation method, we formulate a questionnaire for simultaneous and consistent estimation of risk aversion, subjective discount rate, and EIS. From a representative group of 1,153 respondents, we estimate parameters for these preferences and their variability within the population. Risk aversion and the subjective discount rate are found to be in the orders of 2 and 0, respectively, not diverging far away from results from other studies. Our estimate of EIS in the order of 10 is larger than often reported. Background variables like age and income have little predictive power for the three estimates. Only gender has a significant influence on risk aversion in the usually perceived direction that females are more risk-averse than males. Using individual estimates of preference parameters, we find covariance between preferences toward risk and EIS. We present the background reasoning on objectives, the questionnaire, a statistical analysis of the results, and economic interpretations of these, including relations to the literature.

scholarly journals Market-based instruments for risk-averse farmers: rubber agroforest conservation in Jambi Province, Indonesia

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Utkur Djanibekov ◽  
Grace B. Villamor
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Real Options ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Variance Model ◽  
Income Uncertainty ◽  
Real Options Approach ◽  
Pigovian Taxes ◽  
Rubber Agroforest ◽  
Mean Variance

AbstractThis paper investigates the effectiveness of different market-based instruments (MBIs), such as eco-certification premiums, carbon payments, Pigovian taxes and their combination, to address the conversion of agroforests to monoculture systems and subsequent effects on incomes of risk-averse farmers under income uncertainty in Indonesia. For these, the authors develop a farm-level dynamic mean-variance model combined with a real options approach. Findings show that the conservation of agroforest is responsive to the risk-aversion level of farmers: the greater the level of risk aversion, the greater is the conserved area of agroforest. However, for all risk-averse farmers, additional incentives in the form of MBIs are still needed to prevent conversion of agroforest over the years, and only the combination of MBIs can achieve this target. Implementing fixed MBIs also contributes to stabilizing farmers’ incomes and reducing income risks. Consequently, the combined MBIs increase incomes and reduce income inequality between hardly and extremely risk-averse farmers.

scholarly journals OPTIMAL OUTCOME SHARING WITH A CONSORTIUM OF CONTRACTORS

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 655-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mahdi HOSSEINIAN ◽  
David G. CARMICHAEL
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Original Solution ◽  
Project Outcome ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Current Practices

Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribu­tion should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a con­sortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.

Do Migrants Think Differently? Evidence from Eastern European and Post-Soviet States

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 831-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxanda Berlinschi ◽  
Ani Harutyunyan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
International Migration ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Economic Liberalism ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Politically Active ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

This research investigates migrant self-selection on values, beliefs, and attitudes using data from Eastern European and former Soviet countries. We find that individuals who intend to emigrate are more politically active, more critical of governance and institutions, more tolerant toward other cultures, less tolerant of cheating, more optimistic, and less risk averse. With the exception of risk aversion, all selection patterns are heterogeneous across regions of origin. On the other hand, no self-selection pattern is detected on education, willingness to pay for public goods, and economic liberalism. These findings provide new insights into the determinants of international migration and reveal some of its less known consequences, such as a possible reduction of domestic pressure for political improvements in post-Soviet states due to politically active citizens’ higher propensity to emigrate.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document