Status signalling in the market for consumer goods
People are concerned with signalling their social status to others, and conspicuous consumption may be a prevalent means of signalling, such that purchasing decisions are motivated not only by the direct value of a product, but by the indirect value gained from what the product might communicate to others. Here we measure which products people might use as signals and ask how the signalling potential of products relates to the distribution of product offerings in the consumer goods market. In particular, we asked how the signalling potential of products influences the number, price, and dispersion of prices within and across department stores. Using data scraped from 11 department stores, we found that products with greater signalling potential are available in greater quantity, more expensive within a given store, and that more expensive stores stock more products with higher signalling potential, leading to greater global variance in prices for goods with greater signalling potential. Further, we use product visibility as an instrumental variable to estimate the causal effect of signalling potential on product offerings. Altogether, these results suggest that consumers demand to use visible goods as social signals, and being sensitive to this demand, suppliers of consumer goods position their product offerings to supply ample material for signalling via consumption.