scholarly journals Emerging Self-Representation Presents a Challenge for Perspective Tracking in Infancy

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuela Yeung ◽  
Dimitrios Askitis ◽  
Velisar Manea ◽  
Victoria Southgate
Keyword(s):  
Pupil Dilation ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Conflict Processing ◽  
Young Infants ◽  
Self Recognition

The capacity to track another’s perspective is present from early in life, with young infants ostensibly able to predict others’ behaviour even when the self and other perspective are at odds. Yet, infants’ abilities are difficult to reconcile with the well-documented challenge that older children face when they need to ignore their own perspective. Here we provide evidence that it is the emergence of self-representation, from around 18 months, that likely creates a perspective conflict between self and other. Using mirror self-recognition as a measure of self-awareness and pupil dilation to index conflict processing, our results show that mirror recognisers perceive greater conflict than non-recognisers when viewing a scenario in which the self and other have divergent perspectives, specifically when the conflict between self and other is salient. These results suggest that infants’ perspective tracking abilities may benefit from an initial absence of self-representation.

scholarly journals Valuation of Morality and Mind: Morality as a Metacognitive Byproduct

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Baxter
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Preliminary Analysis ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Inanimate Object ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
High Valuation ◽  
Mental Properties

The organism has evolved to view itself as a sentient being. It is theorised that morality is a byproduct of the high valuation of mental properties (the nature of its theory of mind). Five studies were conducted with 2675 participants. A positive association was confirmed between valuation of explicit morality, neutral (general) mind as measured by sentience, and significance of (specific) mind as measured by integrity (1). The moral worth ratings of a protagonist were affected by manipulating perceived significance of mind as expressed by scope and intensity of thought (2). 50% of participants thought morality applies exclusively to creatures with minds (3). A positive association was found between the self-awareness and moral worth ratings of a variety of creatures and human characters (4). Furthermore, the moral worth ratings of a human being and `philosophical phantom' (sentient inanimate object) were greater than those of a philosophical zombie and rock (5). Like H. Gray et al. [1], this research suggests that morality is based on the belief in mind (1-5). Specifically, the results suggest that valuation of experience (sentience) and agency (significance of mind) are not independent, as assignment of morality appears preconditioned upon the perception of (or assumption of) sentience (5). Furthermore, contrary to dyadic models [2], preliminary analysis supported the prediction of self and other-directed morality (1).

scholarly journals Mirror self-recognition in gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla): a review and evaluation of mark test replications and variants

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsay E. Murray ◽  
James R. Anderson ◽  
Gordon G. Gallup
Keyword(s):  
Gorilla Gorilla ◽  
The Self ◽  
Olfactory Cues ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Gorilla Gorilla Gorilla ◽  
Mark Test ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Over Time

AbstractMirror self-recognition (MSR), widely regarded as an indicator of self-awareness, has not been demonstrated consistently in gorillas. We aimed to examine this issue by setting out a method to evaluate gorilla self-recognition studies that is objective, quantifiable, and easy to replicate. Using Suarez and Gallup’s (J Hum Evol 10:175–183, 1981) study as a reference point, we drew up a list of 15 methodological criteria and assigned scores to all published studies of gorilla MSR for both methodology and outcomes. Key features of studies finding both mark-directed and spontaneous self-directed responses included visually inaccessible marks, controls for tactile and olfactory cues, subjects who were at least 5 years old, and clearly distinguishing between responses in front of versus away from the mirror. Additional important criteria include videotaping the tests, having more than one subject, subjects with adequate social rearing, reporting post-marking observations with mirror absent, and giving mirror exposure in a social versus individual setting. Our prediction that MSR studies would obtain progressively higher scores as procedures and behavioural coding practices improved over time was supported for methods, but not for outcomes. These findings illustrate that methodological rigour does not guarantee stronger evidence of self-recognition in gorillas; methodological differences alone do not explain the inconsistent evidence for MSR in gorillas. By implication, it might be suggested that, in general, gorillas do not show compelling evidence of MSR. We advocate that future MSR studies incorporate the same criteria to optimize the quality of attempts to clarify the self-recognition abilities of gorillas as well as other species.

Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Southgate
Keyword(s):  
Executive Functions ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Human Infants ◽  
Second Year ◽  
Do So

From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others’ perspectives, and can do so even when the other’s perspective conflicts with the infant’s own. Infants’ success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other’s perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others’ attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants’ ability to take others’ perspectives, but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others’ mental states.

scholarly journals The importance of Motacilla Alba behavior on hitting its own mirror reflection

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan ZHANG ◽  
Greg Mirt ◽  
Fan XU ◽  
Fangfang LIU
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Mirror Reflection ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Motacilla Alba ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Look

Self-awareness is considered as a capability of recognize oneself and increasingly received attention. However, self-awareness in the bird Motacilla Alba is unclear. To study the self-recognition in Motacilla Alba, the subject is observed by mirror while eating. The bird performed the look around, confirm again the surroundings, become alert, hit the mirror. These behaviors suggests that presently Motacilla Alba does not have the capacity of self-awareness by the test.

Mirror self-recognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Schilhab
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Concept ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Mark Test ◽  
Self Recognition

Mirror self-recognition (MSR) refers to the empirical investigation of self-awareness, also known as the ‘mirror and mark test’ introduced by psychologist Gordon G. Gallup (1970). The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth or to groom the eye by the aid of mirrors has been interpreted as the recognition of the self and evidence of a self-concept. Unknowingly, a similar approach was developed independently with children (Amsterdam 1972). The successful passing of the mirror and mark test has been widely used as a benchmark for distinguishing conscious and non-conscious species within fields with a general interest in evolutionary perspectives on consciousness and cognition such as comparative psychology and cognitive ethology, although controversies about the methodology and theoretical framework persist. These disputes question our intuitions about consciousness and accentuate the epistemic difficulty of obtaining evidence on mental states in others.

Self-consciousness: an I-World patterned process model

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 211-223
Author(s):  
José-Luis Díaz
Keyword(s):  
Process Model ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Social Dimensions ◽  
Activation Pattern ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Moral Consciousness ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Ethical Stance ◽  
Self Reference

The self is herein recognized as self-consciousness, a broad dynamic system of self-recognition and self-reference. Eight psychosomatic and extended cognitive functions working as an interactive whole are proposed to constitute self-consciousness: (1) somatic domain and body image; (2) situation and domestic range; (3) agency and power to act; (4) introspection, mindfulness, and metacognition; (5) first person discourse and appropriation; (6) episodic memory, autobiography, and role; (7) attribution and alterity; (8) conscience, moral consciousness, and ethical stance. These functions, complemented with considerations about depersonalization and selflessness, are briefly defined and described. These subsystems may work independently but they may interact and variably coalesce according to the demands of the task. Since self-awareness would require a dynamic swarm-like activation pattern of the cluster, the self does not reside in particular brain sites or networks but depends on top-down and bottom-up mechanisms coupled with incoming and outgoing sensory-motor data loops. This psychophysical theory avoids the swing between internal and external elements in favor of an embracing I-World patterned process that comprises neural, bodily, behavioral, environmental, and social dimensions converging in the construction and expression of self-conscious and personal identity experiences integrated by a participant brain.

Gallup's Mirrors: More Than an Operationalization of Self-Awareness in Primates?

1989 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 287-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Morin ◽  
Sandra DeBlois
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Concept ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Social Origin ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
The Social

This speculative article comments on Gallup's work on self-recognition and self-awareness in primates. It exposes Gallup's position on the social origin of the self-concept and proposes the existence of “self-representational” processes capable of reproducing internally the social phenomena implicated in the acquisition of self-information. On that basis, the possibility is raised that allowing primates to see themselves in a mirror might provide them with such a process, with which introspection, and consequently, the formation of a more sophisticated self-concept, would be possible.

Children's Drawings and Attachment to Pets

1995 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aline H. Kidd ◽  
Robert M. Kidd
Keyword(s):  
Gender Differences ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Eighth Graders ◽  
The Self ◽  
Farm Animals ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Children's Drawings ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
The Family ◽  
Children’S Drawings

To help confirm the concept that distances placed between the self and other figures in children's drawings represent emotional distances, 242 pet-owning and 35 nonpet-owning kindergarteners through eighth graders drew pictures of themselves, a pet, and/or a family member. Owners drew pets significantly closer than family-figures although the younger the child, the greater the distance between self and pet. Older children drew themselves holding pets significantly more often, but younger children placed the family-figure between the self and the pet significantly more often. There were no significant gender differences in self-figure/pet-figure distances, but cats, dogs, caged animals, and farm animals were placed significantly closer to self-figures than were fish. Over-all, owners were clearly emotionally closer to pets than to family members, but nonowners were as close emotionally to family members as were owners.

L'interaction mère-enfant et la genèse du soi chez le nourrisson*

1992 ◽  
Vol 37 (6) ◽  
pp. 406-411
Author(s):  
Diane Spooner ◽  
Marcelle Ricard ◽  
Jean-Francois Saucier
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Relational Experiences ◽  
Care Giving ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
The Impact

The mother is the principal care-giving partner of the infant and an important source for the development of self-awareness and self-esteem. The importance of the early relational experiences of the nursing infant with its mother has been widely emphasized by the psychoanalytical approach. Through this special interaction with the parent, the infant gradually internalizes images leading to the individuated self and to self-love. The purpose of this paper is to present succinctly some of the broad theoretical positions regarding the forming of the self in the nursing infant, first within the “classical” psychoanalytical current, then under the impact of more recent research in experimental psychology which have given rise to new syntheses. Empirically, the capacity for self-recognition may be observed during early childhood by means of a child's reactions in front of the mirror; therefore, the work dealing with this phenomenon will be discussed briefly.

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