scholarly journals The Star Gate Archives : Reports of the United States Government Sponsored Psi Program, 1972–1995. Volume 3: Psychokinesis compiled and edited by Edwin C. May and Sonali Bhatt Marwaha

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-136
Author(s):  
Nemo C. Mörck

The remote viewing research conducted at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and later at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was covered in The Star Gate Archives Volumes 1 and 2, both reviewed in this journal (see Mörck, 2018, 2019). Less well-known is the fact that much psychokinesis (PK) research was also carried out. This research “ . . . was never intended to be an academic exercise typical of most laboratories. Rather, the only interest was to determine the degree to which PK might be used as part of a defensive or even offensive weapon system” (p. 12). This sounds dramatic. To U.S. intelligence agencies, a proper threat assessment was deemed necessary due to research conducted in the Soviet Union. The research in America, at SRI, was initially directed by Harold Puthoff from 1972 on, and later, for about ten years, by one of the volume’s editors, Edwin May. In addition to research reports and reviews, Volume 3, like its predecessor volumes, includes nine appendixes, a list of abbreviations, an extensive glossary, an author index, and a subject index. The papers are arranged chronologically, but it is not necessarily a good idea to read them in that order.

Author(s):  
Benjamin Tromly

During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the United States government unleashed covert operations intended to weaken the Soviet Union. As part of these efforts, the CIA undertook support of Russian exiles, populations uprooted either during World War II or by the Russian Revolution decades before. No one seemed better prepared to fight in the American secret war against communism than the uprooted Russians, whom the CIA directed to carry out propaganda, espionage, and subversion operations from their home base in West Germany. Yet the American engagement of Russian exiles had unpredictable outcomes. Drawing on recently declassified and previously untapped sources, Cold War Exiles and the CIA examines how the CIA’s Russian operations became entangled with the internal struggles of Russia abroad and also the espionage wars of the superpowers in divided Germany. What resulted was a transnational political sphere involving different groups of Russian exiles, American and German anti-communists, and spies operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Inadvertently, CIA’s patronage of Russian exiles forged a complex sub-front in the wider Cold War, demonstrating the ways in which the hostilities of the Cold War played out in ancillary conflicts involving proxies and non-state actors.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


Author(s):  
Jonathan R. Eller

Chapter five surveys the poems and musical experiments that both distracted Bradbury from story writing and renewed his creativity in the early 1970s. Television and film composer Lalo Schifrin put Bradbury’s Madrigals for the Space Age to music just as Bradbury’s accelerating output of poems led to the first of three volumes of verse with his trade publisher Alfred A. Knopf. His defiant articles on the termination of the Apollo lunar missions culminated in his December 1972 Playboy article, “From Stonehenge to Tranquility Base,” a title image meant to convey the all-too-brief period of human history devoted to reaching the heavens. Chapter five concludes with unsuccessful attempts by the United States government to negotiate a cultural exchange for Bradbury with the Soviet Union.


Worldview ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Nicholas O. Berry

It is a truth, if not universally acknowledged at least widely accepted, that the United States Government would like its Third World allies and client states to be stable, progressive, democratic, and domestically popular. While the U.S. feels it must protect these allies and clients from direct Soviet aggression, ideally they would manage their internal problems themselves.Unfortunately, the ideal is the exception in the Third World. Many of America's allies and clients face a disloyal opposition at home, and often one that seeks or attracts assistance from the Soviet Union or its surrogates. With few exceptions, these governments are neither democratic nor want to be: For every Costa Rica there is an El Salvador or a Guatemala; for every Singapore there is a South Korea or a Philippines.


Polar Record ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-2 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. J. Dodds

Surrounded by potted palm trees, the 12 delegations including the Soviet Union invited to participate by the United States government decided, over the course of six intense weeks, the legal, political and scientific future of the Antarctic continent and surrounding seas. Thanks in part to the neatly typed entries of Brian Roberts, the Foreign Office's polar advisor for many years; we have at least one source that vividly conveys (from the perspective of a British delegate of course) the febrile atmosphere surrounding the conference (see King and Savours 1995; Dodds 2008). Notwithstanding the achievements of the recently completed 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year and its extension the International Geophysical Co-operation (1959), there was no reason to presume that an Antarctic Treaty would be recognised as legitimate and sufficiently robust to accommodate all the parties concerned. Indeed, it is not uncommon to read in the reports prepared by the delegates for their domestic political leaders, a whole series of counter-factual possibilities if the negotiations failed to secure a modus vivendi for the polar region. We may not assume, therefore, that it was in any way inevitable that a treaty (lasting now for over fifty years) would have emerged when the delegates sat down to discuss the future of Antarctica in October 1959. The treaty was nearly not ratified in Argentina for example because of the anger felt by some political leaders about Article IV and what they considered the ‘giving away’ of Argentine sovereign rights.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-143

Austrian State Treaty: On October 31, 1951, the Foreign Minister of Austria, Karl Gruber, transmitted to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in Vienna a note requesting these countries to reopen negotiations on the Austrian state treaty at the earliest possible moment. Subsequently, the United States High Commissioner for Austria, Walter Donnelly, stated that it was “consistent with the unswerving policy of the United States Government to terminate the occupation of Austria by means of a state treaty” and was “also in keeping with the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States in Washington on September 14.” He added that the United States would continue to press for the conclusion of the treaty and withdrawal of troops from Austria, but would not withdraw until all the occupying powers were prepared to do likewise.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Vince Houghton

This introductory chapter describes the problems associated with scientific intelligence, and introduces the key questions of the book, namely: Considering how successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, so completely, in all potential metrics – collection, analysis, and dissemination? How did we get this so wrong?


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Whitton

Coincident with the outbreak of the “cold war” the Soviet Union began a series of propagandistic attacks on the United States, its leaders and its policies, using every medium of communication for this purpose, but with special emphasis on radio propaganda. For some time the United States Government suffered these attacks to go unanswered, but in February, 1947, the “Voice of America” began to include among its other foreign programs regular broadcasts in Russian to the Soviet Union. At first these programs were confined almost entirely to music and straight news reports, but gradually more and more time was devoted to answering Soviet attacks considered hostile to the United States or harmful to its national interests.In retaliation Moscow, on April 24, 1949, embarked on a vast effort to jam the American programs, and is at present devoting over 1000 broadcasting stations to this single purpose. The American Government protested through diplomatic channels and to the International Telecommunications Union against this jamming campaign. Furthermore, jamming was condemned by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press at its Montevideo meeting in May, 1950, as a violation of accepted principles of freedom of information. Also, the Economic and Social Council, at its eleventh session, held in Geneva during the summer of 1950, adopted a resolution recommending to the General Assembly that it call on all Members to refrain from jamming.


2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty


Author(s):  
Joshua Kotin

This book is a new account of utopian writing. It examines how eight writers—Henry David Thoreau, W. E. B. Du Bois, Osip and Nadezhda Mandel'shtam, Anna Akhmatova, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and J. H. Prynne—construct utopias of one within and against modernity's two large-scale attempts to harmonize individual and collective interests: liberalism and communism. The book begins in the United States between the buildup to the Civil War and the end of Jim Crow; continues in the Soviet Union between Stalinism and the late Soviet period; and concludes in England and the United States between World War I and the end of the Cold War. In this way it captures how writers from disparate geopolitical contexts resist state and normative power to construct perfect worlds—for themselves alone. The book contributes to debates about literature and politics, presenting innovative arguments about aesthetic difficulty, personal autonomy, and complicity and dissent. It models a new approach to transnational and comparative scholarship, combining original research in English and Russian to illuminate more than a century and a half of literary and political history.


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