scholarly journals 4 Privatizing the Public Good

2022 ◽  
pp. 119-143
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Sibicky ◽  
Cortney B. Richardson ◽  
Anna M. Gruntz ◽  
Timothy J. Binegar ◽  
David A. Schroeder ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Kear

Natural gas is an increasingly vital U.S. energy source that is presently being tapped and transported across state and international boundaries. Controversy engulfs natural gas, from the hydraulic fracturing process used to liberate it from massive, gas-laden Appalachian shale deposits, to the permitting and construction of new interstate pipelines bringing it to markets. This case explores the controversy flowing from the proposed 256-mile-long interstate Nexus pipeline transecting northern Ohio, southeastern Michigan and terminating at the Dawn Hub in Ontario, Canada. As the lead agency regulating and permitting interstate pipelines, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is also tasked with mitigating environmental risks through the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act's Environmental Impact Statement process. Pipeline opponents assert that a captured federal agency ignores public and scientific input, inadequately addresses public health and safety risks, preempts local control, and wields eminent domain powers at the expense of landowners, cities, and everyone in the pipeline path. Proponents counter that pipelines are the safest means of transporting domestically abundant, cleaner burning, affordable gas to markets that will boost local and regional economies and serve the public good. Debates over what constitutes the public good are only one set in a long list of contentious issues including pipeline safety, proposed routes, property rights, public voice, and questions over the scientific and democratic validity of the Environmental Impact Statement process. The Nexus pipeline provides a sobering example that simple energy policy solutions and compromise are elusive—effectively fueling greater conflict as the natural gas industry booms.


Author(s):  
Alasdair Cochrane

Chapter 3 asks what kinds of institutions are needed to protect the worth and rights of sentient creatures. The chapter’s ultimate claim is that they are best protected by democratic institutions: that is, institutions which are participative, deliberative, and representative, and underpinned by a set of entrenched rights. Crucially, the chapter further argues that those institutions should be comprised of dedicated animal representatives. The job of those representatives should be to act as trustees of the interests of ‘animal members’ of the political community. In other words, their job should be to translate the interests of animals with whom we share a ‘community of fate’ into their deliberations with other representatives over what is in the public good.


Author(s):  
Walter Rech

This chapter examines and contextualizes Sayyid Qutb’s doctrine of property and social justice, which he articulated at a time of deep social conflicts in Egypt. The chapter describes how Qutb, along with other writers concerned with economic inequality in the 1920s–40s such as Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri (1895–1971), conceptualised private ownership as a form of power that must be limited by religious obligations and subordinated to the public good. The chapter further shows that Qutb made this notion of restrained property central to a broader theory of social justice and wealth redistribution by combining the social teachings of the Qur’an with the modern ideal of the centralized interventionist state. Arguably this endeavour to revitalise the Quranic roots of Islamic charity and simultaneously appropriate the discourse of modern statehood made Qutb’s position oscillate between legalism and anti-legalism.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Futao Huang ◽  
Tsukasa Daizen ◽  
Lilan Chen ◽  
Kiyomi Horiuchi

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.


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