Remedial consistency in private law

Author(s):  
Peter Jaffey

This article is concerned with the concept of ‘remedial consistency,’ the consistency of remedial rights with primary rights in the sense I explain. I argue that the requirement of remedial consistency has important implications across private law. It suggests that the ‘continuity thesis’ does not provide a justification for the right to compensation for a wrong, and I argue that rights to compensation are not generally based on wrongdoing. I also consider whether the absence of a right to specific performance is consistent with the existence of a duty of performance, and I discuss the need for alternative remedies to be mutually consistent. I also discuss the implications of remedial consistency for the concept of unjust enrichment, and I argue on the basis of remedial consistency for the general availability of proprietary claims for invalid transfers.

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Sanders

AbstractNeither in England, nor in Germany, nor in all Canadian provinces, does the law provide specific rules for the redistribution of property for unmarried cohabitants after the breakdown of their relationship. Instead, courts apply the law of trusts, contract and unjust enrichment with an eye to the characteristics of intimate relationships, as, for example, in decisions like the EnglishJones v Kernott([2011] UKSC 53) and the CanadianKerr v Baranow(2011 SCC 10). This article compares English, Canadian, and German case law and evaluates it both from a doctrinal perspective and as a part of a general approach towards cohabitation. The article concludes with an appeal for legislative action that strikes the right balance between party autonomy and protection of the weaker party.


1969 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stevens ◽  
Jason W. Neyers

The law of restitution has developed out of the law of quasi-contract and the law of constructive trust. Inadequate attention to the logic and coherence of doctrines in the law of restitution, however, renders this new law as opaque and confused as its predecessor. This is largely due to the remedial mentality of the common law. The remedy to the remedial mentality is to concentrate future efforts in stating doctrine on defining rights, not remedies. The precedent for this type of change in method is the transformation that occurred in contract and tort over the past 100 years, inspired, in part, by civilian theories of private law. The right that generates the remedy restitution is the cause of action in unjust enrichment. It arises where there has been a non-consensual receipt and retention of value, that is, a receipt and retention of value that occurs without "juristic reason." "Nonconsensual" means by mistake, by theft or by finding. There are a number of problems in the method of the common law tradition which stand in the way of recognizing this simple formulation: (a) The inherent expansiveness of "restitution " and "unjust enrichment" if these terms are not rigorously defined; (b) The lack of serious competition for the expansive versions of the subject, on a number of fronts; (c) The lack of a clear direction in the efforts to reform the law of quasi-contract and constructive trust; (d) The deeply embedded nature of the quasi-contract thinking; (e) Poor analysis in some areas of the law of contract and (f) Tort; and (g) The lack of an explicit agency of reform in the tradition.


Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg

This chapter provides an introduction to problems of performance, which for the most part concern post-contract formation issues, such as a promisee’s rights where the promisor has rendered a performance that is imperfect but substantial. Generally speaking, problems of performance concern sanctions for breach other than damages or specific performance, such as suspension of performance or termination of the contract by the aggrieved party. These sanctions are often much more severe than damages. For example, if a promisee has the right to terminate a contract the promisor may lose the profits she would have earned if the contract had continued in force, as well as the value, or at least the contract price, of the performance she rendered before the contract was terminated.


Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein

This chapter articulates the Kantian approach to private law. It begins by explaining the aims and ambitions of Kantian legal philosophy more generally and, in particular, introducing the Kantian idea that a particular form of thought is appropriate to a particular domain of inquiry or conduct. The chapter situates the Kantian view within a broad natural law tradition. For the part of that tradition that Immanuel Kant develops, the moral structure of natural law is animated by a conception of personal interaction that is so familiar as to be almost invisible. Despite its centrality to both morality and law, in the absence of legal institutions, this natural law is inadequate to its own principles. It requires legal institutions to render it fully determinate in its application consistent with everyone’s independence. It also requires public institutions of adjudication. The chapter further looks at Kant’s “division” of private rights, distinguishing first between the innate right that everyone has simply in virtue of being human and acquired rights that require an affirmative act to establish them. It then goes through the Kantian division of the titles of private right, situating them in relation to the distinction between persons and things. Finally, the chapter articulates the Kantian account of what might be called the naïve theory of remedies—that is, that the remedy is an imperfect continuation of the right that was violated.


Author(s):  
Robert Stevens

This chapter focuses on defenses. A considerable number of theories has grappled with the normative justification(s) for the various claims that arise in private law. This focus on the rights and powers in private law is understandable. After all, without a claim there is nothing much further to discuss. What has gone underexamined are the justifications for the various defenses that exist—the ways of resisting otherwise good claims. Defenses pose a challenge to any monist theory of private law. If private law, or a part of it, is all about efficiency or independence or utility or any other single thing, why not deal with all the elements of what justifies the plaintiff’s claim as an element of the cause of action? Why do people need defenses at all? Either the claim is justified or it is not. On the monist view of private law—that it is only concerned with One Big Thing—what is the need or role for any separate “defenses” that concern countervailing considerations? The chapter then describes what a defense is before looking at pleading and proof and distinguishing between justification and excuse. It also considers the form of reasons and details the general defenses, defenses in contract, defenses to torts, defenses in unjust enrichment, and equitable defenses.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Katharina Pistor

Abstract In this brief introduction, I summarize the core themes of my book “The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality”. Capital, I argue, is coded in law – predominantly in a handful of private law institutions. By relying on legal coding techniques, asset holders invoke the right to enforce claims against others, if necessary with the help of the state’s coercive power.


Global Jurist ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocco Alessio Albanese

Abstract This paper intends to discuss some major European legal issues by building on the critique of a certain narrow relevance of human basic needs, according to traditional Western legal conceptions of the subject as well as of the public-private divide. In particular it aims at verifying the potentiality of consumer law for rethinking the right to housing, within recent trends of European Private Law, by adopting a remedial approach. For this reason the paper analyzes three well-known cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – namely Aziz, Sanchez Morcillo and Kušionová – as examples of this meaningful trend. Through the combination of the fairness test over contractual terms with the criteria of effectiveness and proportionality, a broader protection of right to housing is recognised even in horizontal private relationships. Art. 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) could represent the constitutional reference for this new perspective. The paper also intends to show how the relevance of the basic need for housing is traced to debtor's families. CJEU's interpretative itinerary seems to start from a fairness test about contractual terms, but eventually comes to give protection to subjective situations that are even out of the domain of the contract.


2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Gerstenberg

In this paper I want to address, against the background of the ECtHR’s recent attempt to resolve the clash between property rights and the right to freedom of expression in its decision in Appleby v. UK, two questions, both of which I take to be related to the overarching theme of “social democracy”. First, there is the problem of the influence of “higher law”-of human rights norms and constitutional norms-on private law norms; second, the question of the role of adjudication in “constitutionalizing” private law, in other words, the question of the “judicial cognizability” of constitutional norms within private law.


Author(s):  
Matthew Watson

The market has no independent objective existence beyond the practices that are embedded within particular market institutions. Those practices, in turn, involve learning particular techniques of performance, on the assumption that each market environment rewards a corresponding type of market agency. However, the ability to reflect what might be supposed the right agential characteristics is not an instinct that is hardwired into us from birth. Instead it comes from perfecting the specific performance elements that allow people to recognize themselves as potentially competent actors in any given market context. This chapter takes the reader back to some of the earliest accounts of these performance elements, showing that important eighteenth-century debates about how to flourish as a market actor revolved around little else. In the early eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe emphasized the need for market actors to create convincing falsehoods, hiding their true feelings behind a presentation of self where customers’ whims were always catered to. In the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith was still wrestling with the dilemma of how genuinely the self could be put on display within market environments, believing that customers had a responsibility to curb excessive demands so that merchants’ interests could be respected. This meant not forcing them into knowingly false declarations, so that moral propriety and economic expedience were not necessarily antagonistic forces in the development of merchants’ character.


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