scholarly journals Assessment of the Clarity of Bank of Russia Monetary Policy Communication by Neural Network Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-33
Author(s):  
Alina Evstigneeva ◽  
◽  
Mark Sidorovskiy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Plain Language ◽  
Neural Network Approach ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Automated Evaluation ◽  
Policy Communication

Inflation targeting requires clear and transparent central bank’s communication. Analysts and market participants understand it as a broad list of information disclosed by the central bank. The general public understands it rather as the ability of a central bank to speak and explain its decisions in a plain language. In recent decades, monetary authorities in many countries have made significant progress in this direction. However, there has been no research on the quality of communication for the Bank of Russia. This paper aims to create a tool for automated evaluation of the readability of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy communication, taking into account the available experience of linguistic and textual analysis, including machine learning methods, as well as to provide recommendations for its improvement. This can contribute to improving the effectiveness of the Bank of Russia communication on monetary policy, which is vital for its credibility, anchoring inflation expectations, and predictability of the regulator’s decisions.

The czech experience with inflation targeting in transition

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kateřina Šmídková ◽  
Miroslav Hrnčíř
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Communication Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Countries In Transition ◽  
The One

This paper argues that inflation targeting is a strategy that can be under certain conditions adopted by central banks in countries in transition even though their typical goal is to disinflate instead of stabilising low inflation. On the one hand, according to the Czech experience, inflation targeting offers several benefits, such as increasing control over expectations and short-term flexibility of monetary strategy, that are attractive for economy in transition. On the other hand, constraints imposed by period of transition as well as by openness of economy are present no matter which monetary strategy is chosen by the central bank. Implied costs should not be attributed to a particular monetary strategy. Inflation targeting has made various factors constraining monetary policy more visible and, as a result, requirements on the quality of decisions as well as on communication strategy have increased.

Central bank’s perception on inflation and inflation expectations of experts

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 1142-1158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca Nicolay
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Response Analysis ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Vector Autoregressive ◽  
Central Bank Communication

Purpose – Due to the fact that studies on central bank communication in emerging countries are still scarce and there are few studies related to the influence that central bank’s perspectives about the state of the economy have on inflation expectations in emerging economies, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature in the following aspects: it proposes an indicator of the central bank’s perception of inflation based on the minutes of the COPOM meetings, and, it analyzes the influence of central bank communication on expert inflation expectations through such indicator. Design/methodology/approach – Due to the fact that the perception of the Central Bank of Brazil is not directly observable, it is measured through the fuzzy set theory by an indicator that captures the informational content of the minutes of the COPOM meetings. The empirical analysis uses ordinary least squares, the generalized method of moments and vector-autoregressive through impulse-response analysis. Findings – The findings suggest that the expectations of financial market experts react according to the content of the information provided by the central bank, i.e., announcements cause deterioration of expectations in times of instability, and reduce inflation expectations when inflation is controlled. The results also support the idea that the credibility of inflation targeting plays a key role in determining inflation expectations. Practical implications – This paper suggests a new approach on studies about central bank communication. The focus here is not on the effect of the announcements in terms of future monetary policy, but on the perception of the central bank in terms of inflation. This central bank’s perception reflects the optimistic or pessimistic view about the economic outlook and risk of inflation and this perception is considered by experts of financial markets. Originality/value – For Brazil, there are no studies about the influence of communication through the minutes of the Brazilian Monetary Policy Committee meetings on inflation expectations. The authors develop an indicator in order to measure central bank’s perception of inflation based on the minutes of COPOM meetings.

scholarly journals Effectiveness of Expectation Channel of Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Inflation Targeting System: An Empirical Study for Turkey

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-231
Author(s):  
Aslı Güler
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Transmission Mechanism ◽  
Monetary Transmission ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Transmission Mechanisms ◽  
Main Challenge

Monetary policy can affect economy through out various transmission mechanisms. One of this transmission mechanisms is expectations channel. The monetary policy can get involved in expectation channel of transmission mechanism by affecting the process of expectations formation. Because  the results of policies to be implemented vary according to the expectations, the main challenge in monetary policy is to correctly manage expectations. Because of the fact that only the systematic component of monetary policy (estimated component) can affect forward looking expectations, systematic behavior of the central bank has a critical role in determining the economic consequences of monetary policy. In this study, the effectiveness of expectation channel of transmission mechanism   was analyized by VAR model.  According the results  TCMB cannot affect inflation expectations via both the inflation targets and the policy interest. On the other hand, inflation expectations are affected significantly from actualized inflation rates and exchange rates.   Keywords: Central bank, Expectations, Monetary transmission mechanisms,  Monetary policy

The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence

2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 695-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Lawrence Broz ◽  
Michael Plouffe
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Substantial Reduction ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Data

AbstractAnalyses of monetary policy posit that exchange-rate pegs, inflation targets, and central bank independence can help anchor private-sector inflation expectations. Yet there are few direct tests of this argument. We offer cross-national, micro-level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private-sector inflation concerns. Using firm-level data from eighty-one countries (approximately 10,000 firms), we find evidence that “international” anchors (exchange-rate commitments) correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private-sector concerns about inflation while “domestic” anchors (inflation targeting and central bank independence) do not. Our conjecture is that private-sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange-rate anchors because they are more transparent, more constraining, and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements.

scholarly journals Communication as an instrument for enhancing trust in a central bank: the case of Ukraine

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliia Shapoval ◽  
Kateryna Anufriieva ◽  
Svitlana Brus ◽  
Yevhen Bublyk
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Communication Strategy ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Communication Policy ◽  
Market Participants

The relevance of trust in the central bank is determined by the rapid growth of the gap between the expectations of a regulator and market participants regardless of the reforms carried out by the NBU. Therefore, the need to use the “non-traditional” monetary policy instruments has enhanced the role of verbal interventions in the context of inflation targeting. The aim of the article is to ground that trust causes adequate rational behavior of the market participants in response to the central bank’s communication policy. The type of this research is an explanatory research method. As determined, trust is the necessary condition for the effectiveness of the central bank’s communication strategy and it favors the achievement of proclaimed objectives. It is established that although since 2014 the NBU activated verbal interventions as an additional instrument to anchor expectations, the increase of transparency does not prompt the trust because of the lack of confidence of citizens in the NBU and high level of stress in the domestic financial sector. It is emphasized that the pursuit of inflation targeting requires expanded communication to gather the expectations of economic agents. The NBU, in its communication policy concerning the economic climate, underlines devaluation expectations, the exchange rate and explanations on the discount rate. However, the deviation of expected enterprises’ exchange rate from the actual exchange rate, growing velocity of money circulation against the declining share of funds involved in the banking system, low monetization level and low penetration of financial services evidence the distrust in monetary policy.

scholarly journals Does Monetary Policy Credibility Help in Anchoring Inflation Expectations? Evidence from Six Inflation Targeting Emerging Economies

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Aslı Güler
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
The Public ◽  
Inflation Expectation ◽  
Using Data

Abstract Most emerging market central banks have adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy system. The heart of inflation targeting system is inflation expectations. The success of a central bank in achieving targets depends on to the extent to which inflation expectations are formed by the announced targets. As the credibility of the central bank increases, its ability to affect the public expectation also increases. The public adjusts its inflation expectations based on announced inflation target only in case of that they believe that the central bank has the sufficiency to reach the inflation target. Credibility enables expectation to be formed in a forward-looking way by weakening its connection with the past. This study aims to contribute to the literature concerning the effects of credibility on monetary policy. For this purpose, using data of six emerging inflation targeting economies (Turkey, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Chile, Poland, and South Africa), the empirical tests were carried out in order to understand the effect of the credibility on the behaviour of inflation expectation in emerging economies. The findings denote that credibility is quite relevant to reduce inflation expectations and contributes to the strength of inflation targets being an anchor for inflation expectations.

scholarly journals A Text Mining Analysis of Central Bank Monetary Policy Communication in Nigeria

2020 ◽  
pp. 73-107
Author(s):  
Mohammed M. Tumala ◽  
Babatunde S. Omotosho
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Text Mining ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Communication Strategy ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Monetary Policy Committee ◽  
Textual Data ◽  
Policy Communication ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Monetary Policy Transparency

This paper employs text-mining techniques to analyse the communication strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the period 2004-2019. Since the policy communique released after each meeting of the CBN’s monetary policy committee (MPC) represents an important tool of central bank communication, we construct a corpus based on 87 policy communiques with a total of 123, 353 words. Having processed the textual data into a form suitable for analysis, we examined the readability, sentiments, and topics of the policy documents. While the CBN’s communication has increased substantially over the years, implying increased monetary policy transparency; the computed Coleman and Liau readability index shows that the word and sentence structures of the policy communiques have become more complex, thus reducing its readability. In terms of monetary policy sentiments, we find an average net score of -10.5 per cent, reflecting the level of policy uncertainties faced by the MPC over the sample period. In addition, our results indicate that the topics driving the linguistic contents of the communiques were influenced by the Bank’s policy objectives as well as the nature of shocks hitting the economy per period.

scholarly journals Can inflation forecast and monetary policy path be really useful? The case of the Czech Republic

Equilibrium ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magdalena Szyszko ◽  
Karolina Tura
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Inflation Forecasts ◽  
National Bank ◽  
Parametric Statistics

Producing and revealing inflation forecast is believed to be the best way of implementing a forward-looking monetary policy. The article focuses on inflation forecast targeting (IFT) at the Czech National Bank (CNB) in terms of its efficiency in shaping consumers’ inflation expectations. The goal of the study is to verify the accuracy of the inflation forecasts, and their influence on inflation expectations. The research is divided into four stages. At the first stage, central bank credibility is examined. At the second stage – accuracy of the inflation forecasts. The next step of the research covers a qualitative analysis of IFT implementation. Finally, the existence of the interdependences of inflation forecast, optimal policy paths and inflation expectations is analyzed. Credibility of the central bank, accuracy of the forecast and decision-making procedures focused on the forecast are the premises for the existence of relationship between forecasts and expectations. The research covers the period from July 2002 – till the end of 2013. Its methodology includes qualitative analysis of decision-making of the CNB, quantitative methods (Kia and Patron formula, MAE forecasts errors, quantification of expectations, non-parametric statistics). The results confirm the existence of interdependences between inflation forecasts and expectations of moderate strength. The preconditions of such interdependences are partially fulfilled. The research opens the field for cross-country comparisons and for quantification of IFT implementation.

Central bank transparency, inflation targeting and monetary policy: a panel data approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Cristiane Gea
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Policy Interest

Purpose The evidence concerning the effects of the inflation targeting (IT) regime as well as greater central bank transparency on monetary policy interest rates is not conclusive, and the following questions remain open. What is the effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of monetary policy interest rate? Does central bank transparency affect the level of the monetary policy interest rate and its volatility? Are these effects greater in developing countries? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by answering these questions. Hence, the paper analyzes the effects of IT and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses a sample of 48 countries (31 developing) comprising the period between 1998 and 2014. Based on panel data methodology, estimates are made for the full sample, and then for the sample of developing countries. Findings Countries that adopt the IT regime tend to have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. The effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is smaller in developing countries. Besides, countries with more transparent central banks have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. In turn, the effect of central bank transparency on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is greater in developing countries. Practical implications The study brings important practical implications regarding the influence of both the IT regime and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Originality/value Studies have sought to analyze whether IT and central bank transparency are effective to control inflation. However, few studies analyze the influence of IT and central bank transparency on interest rates. This study differs from the few existing studies since: the analysis is done not only for the effect of transparency on the level of the monetary policy interest rate, but also on its volatility; the central bank transparency index that is used has never been utilized in this sort of analysis; and the study uses panel data methodology, and compares the results between different samples.

scholarly journals Coordinating expectations through central bank projections

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Mokhtarzadeh ◽  
Luba Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Aggregate Stability ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Output Gap ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Ex Ante

AbstractCentral banks are increasingly communicating their economic outlook in an effort to manage the public and financial market participants’ expectations. We provide original causal evidence that the information communicated and the assumptions underlying a central bank’s projection can matter for expectation formation and aggregate stability. Using a between-subject design, we systematically vary the central bank’s projected forecasts in an experimental macroeconomy where subjects are incentivized to forecast the output gap and inflation. Without projections, subjects exhibit a wide range of heuristics, with the modal heuristic involving a significant backward-looking component. Ex-Ante Rational dual projections of the output gap and inflation significantly reduce the number of subjects’ using backward-looking heuristics and nudge expectations in the direction of the rational expectations equilibrium. Ex-Ante Rational interest rate projections are cognitively challenging to employ and have limited effects on the distribution of heuristics. Adaptive dual projections generate unintended inflation volatility by inducing boundedly-rational forecasters to employ the projection and model-consistent forecasters to utilize the projection as a proxy for aggregate expectations. All projections reduce output gap disagreement but increase inflation disagreement. Central bank credibility is significantly diminished when the central bank makes larger forecast errors when communicating a relatively more complex projection. Our findings suggest that inflation-targeting central banks should strategically ignore agents’ irrationalities when constructing their projections and communicate easy-to-process information.

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