Past Imperfect, Future Tense: The SPD before and after the 2013 Federal Election

2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 46-58
Author(s):  
Jonathan Olsen

In the 2009 federal election, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) achieved the worst electoral result in its history. Immediately afterwards, the party worked to improve its public image and fine-tune its policies and electoral message, hoping that state elections in the ensuring period might provide some momentum going into the next national election. Yet, in 2013, the Social Democrats improved their result only modestly, with Angela Merkel and the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) again gaining a decisive victory. This article explores the reasons behind the SPD's failure to radically improve its electoral showing, arguing that this can best be explained by a combination of the impact of the past—namely, the legacy of its economic reforms during the Schröder era and the SPD's disadvantages coming out of the previous Grand Coalition—as well as the weakness of its 2013 chancellor candidate, Peer Steinbrück, and the popularity of Angela Merkel. The article therefore suggests that the immediate future does not look particularly bright for the SPD: any chances of gaining the chancellorship are largely out of its hand, dependent on both stumbles by its rival, the CDU/CSU, as well as the taming of a possible coalition partner, the Left Party.

Author(s):  
Uwe Jun

This chapter addresses social democracy in Germany. For many years, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has performed poorly at the German parliamentary (Bundestag) elections, and crucially, has been unable to puncture the dominance of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union). The SPD is facing a range of problems, on numerous fronts. Programmatically, the SPD lacks a vision for society that is sufficiently coherent and forward-looking to attract voters. Moreover, the SPD's credibility has declined over the last two decades largely due to a combination of its failure to implement campaign promises and the difficulties it has experienced while seeking to address its tarnished legacy of office in the periods after 1998 and 2009.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Paterson

THE RESULT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER I972 APPEARED to many as a turning point in the post-war history of the German Social Democratic Party. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, the SPD. was the largest party winning 45.9 per cent of the list votes (230 seats in the Bundestag) to the CDU/CSU's 44.8 per cent (225 seats). In 1957 the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union had enjoyed a lead of 18.4 per cent over the SPD. This lead was steadily whittled away after the party adopted the moderate Bad Godesberg Programme in 1959. The SPD gained 4.4 per cent in 1961,3. 1 per cent in 1965, 3.4 per cent in 1969 and 3.2 per cent in 1972


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-240
Author(s):  
Shawn Donnelly

This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.


Significance Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will once again govern in a grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Impacts Regional elections in Hesse and Bavaria at the end of 2018 will be the first tests for the grand coalition. The AfD will continue to grow in the short term, but incompetence may restrict its growth potential. The Green Party could emerge as a viable left-of-centre alternative to the SPD. Merkel’s electoral mishap diminishes her standing in the EU and could embolden countries opposed to French-German reform efforts. Domestically, euro-area reform could be hindered if dissent spills over from the AfD into the more conservative ranks of the CDU/CSU.


Subject Update on the German government. Significance Just over one year after the grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was renewed, all three parties are preparing for its breakdown by sharpening their profiles. Impacts Conflicts between the coalition parties may deepen if deteriorating economic conditions force hard budgetary choices. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s international influence is likely to decline as her domestic position weakens. Low poll ratings could moderate the parties’ desire for early elections.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Pierre Thielbörger ◽  
Tobias Ackermann

Since the end of 2013, Germany has been governed by a “grand coalition” of the biggest parties—Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its Bavarian sister, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). While one can generally call the hitherto work of the current government quite productive (regardless of any qualitative assessment), the first few months of the 18th legislature period painted a different picture: due to tough and slowly progressing negotiations over a new government, the German Parliament was paralyzed for a considerable time. After the election of 22 September 2013, in which Ms. Merkel's CDU missed an absolute majority, the constitutive session of theBundestagtook place on 22 October 2013, which was the last possible date within the thirty-day deadline as set out by Art. 39(2) of theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The new government, however, was elected not before 17 December 2013. In between, the newBundestogcould not effectively begin to work as the interplay with the government is an important part of the Parliament's work. Urgent business had to be left untouched. In order to end this deadlock, the factions of CDU/CSU and SPD took a unique step: they established a so-called “Main Committee” (Hauptausschuss), which was intended to serve as a preliminary body dealing with the most urgent tasks until a new government would finally be formed.


1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel H. Barnes ◽  
Frank Grace ◽  
James K. Pollock ◽  
Peter W. Sperlich

Each German federal election since 1949 has resulted in a reduction in the number of parties securing representation in the Bundestag. While this trend continued in 1961, there is evidence that the party system is becoming stabilized, making it unlikely that any of the present parties will disappear in the near future. This article examines the 1961 election and its significance for the German party system.The major outlines of the present German party system became apparent as early as 1946, when party activities were resumed on a zonal basis. The principal parties then in the field were the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union, and the Free Democratic Party. The last two of these were known differently in different sections of West Germany, but today, with very few exceptions, the designation for each group is the same throughout the Federal Republic.


2018 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Thau

Abstract In Denmark, as in other Western European countries, the working class does not vote for social democratic parties to the same extent as before. Yet, what role did the social democratic parties themselves play in the demobilization of class politics? Building on core ideas from public opinion literature, this article differs from the focus on party policy positions in previous work and, instead, focuses on the group-based appeals of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark. Based on a quantitative content analysis of party programs between 1961 and 2004, I find that, at the general level, class-related appeals have been replaced by appeals targeting non-economic groups. At the specific level, the class-related appeals that remain have increasingly been targeting businesses at the expense of traditional left-wing groups such as wage earners, tenants and pensioners. These findings support a widespread hypothesis that party strategy was crucial in the decline of class politics, but also suggests that future work on class mobilization should adopt a group-centered perspective.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubomír Kopeček ◽  
Pavel Pšeja

This article attempts to analyze developments within the Czech Left after 1989. Primarily, the authors focus on two questions: (1) How did the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) achieve its dominance of the Left? (2)What is the relationship between the Social Democrats and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)? We conclude that the unsuccessful attempt to move the KSČM towards a moderate leftist identity opened up a space in which the Social Democrats could thrive, at the same time gradually assuming a pragmatic approach towards the Communists. Moreover, the ability of Miloš Zeman, the leader of the Social Democrats, to build a clear non-Communist Left alternative to the hegemony of the Right during the 1990s was also very important.


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