On the Constitutionality of aHauptausschuss(Main Committee) in the GermanBundestag

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Pierre Thielbörger ◽  
Tobias Ackermann

Since the end of 2013, Germany has been governed by a “grand coalition” of the biggest parties—Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its Bavarian sister, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). While one can generally call the hitherto work of the current government quite productive (regardless of any qualitative assessment), the first few months of the 18th legislature period painted a different picture: due to tough and slowly progressing negotiations over a new government, the German Parliament was paralyzed for a considerable time. After the election of 22 September 2013, in which Ms. Merkel's CDU missed an absolute majority, the constitutive session of theBundestagtook place on 22 October 2013, which was the last possible date within the thirty-day deadline as set out by Art. 39(2) of theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The new government, however, was elected not before 17 December 2013. In between, the newBundestogcould not effectively begin to work as the interplay with the government is an important part of the Parliament's work. Urgent business had to be left untouched. In order to end this deadlock, the factions of CDU/CSU and SPD took a unique step: they established a so-called “Main Committee” (Hauptausschuss), which was intended to serve as a preliminary body dealing with the most urgent tasks until a new government would finally be formed.

Author(s):  
Uwe Jun

This chapter addresses social democracy in Germany. For many years, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has performed poorly at the German parliamentary (Bundestag) elections, and crucially, has been unable to puncture the dominance of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union). The SPD is facing a range of problems, on numerous fronts. Programmatically, the SPD lacks a vision for society that is sufficiently coherent and forward-looking to attract voters. Moreover, the SPD's credibility has declined over the last two decades largely due to a combination of its failure to implement campaign promises and the difficulties it has experienced while seeking to address its tarnished legacy of office in the periods after 1998 and 2009.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-240
Author(s):  
Shawn Donnelly

This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.


Significance Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will once again govern in a grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Impacts Regional elections in Hesse and Bavaria at the end of 2018 will be the first tests for the grand coalition. The AfD will continue to grow in the short term, but incompetence may restrict its growth potential. The Green Party could emerge as a viable left-of-centre alternative to the SPD. Merkel’s electoral mishap diminishes her standing in the EU and could embolden countries opposed to French-German reform efforts. Domestically, euro-area reform could be hindered if dissent spills over from the AfD into the more conservative ranks of the CDU/CSU.


Subject Update on the German government. Significance Just over one year after the grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was renewed, all three parties are preparing for its breakdown by sharpening their profiles. Impacts Conflicts between the coalition parties may deepen if deteriorating economic conditions force hard budgetary choices. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s international influence is likely to decline as her domestic position weakens. Low poll ratings could moderate the parties’ desire for early elections.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Eric Lagenbacher

The elections for the German Bundestag on 24 September 2017 saw heavy losses for the two governing parties—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD)—and the rise of the rightpopulist Alternative for Germany (AfD). It took almost six months for a new grand coalition to be formed in light of the extremely fragmented parliament. Despite the good economic situation and relative calm domestically and internationally, much change is occurring under the surface. Most importantly, the country is preparing for the end of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s long tenure. Who and what will come next? Can the surging AfD be contained? Will Germany step up into the leadership role for which so many have called?


1995 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 129-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Rathkolb

In literature on diplomacy, the term Ostpolitik refers to the new foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced in 1966. The policy, was initiated by the grand coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic party (SPD) and was continued after 1969 by the SPD and Free Democratic party (FDP) coalition. The policy aimed at reconciling Germany with Poland and the Soviet Union. Willy Brandt, the SPD foreign minister from 1966 to 1969 and chancellor from 1969 until 1974, and Walter Scheel, FDP foreign minister from 1969 to 1974, were the architects of this new “selective Détente.” From the beginning, Brandt's Ostpolitik was “controlled” by the Nixon administration, especially by Kissinger. The United States feared that Brandt and Scheel would go too far without taking account of Washington's geo-political point of view.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
MIGUEL A. MARTINEZ

For a social movement and urban scholar, these are not the best days for conducting fieldwork on the streets. Off-line demonstrations, protests with gathering bodies and banners, deliberative assemblies and the like have been on hold for a long period in countries such as Spain. The coronavirus pandemic and the stringent measures taken by the government have set an unprecedented situation in terms of social life and politics, especially for the generations who did not live under the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1978), where surveillance and repression determined daily routines and anti-regime mobilisations. The current ruling coalition between the social democratic party, PSOE, and the more leftist Unidas Podemos, had opened up a promising term for, at least, some progressive policies since they took office in January 2020. However, the sudden economic crisis that the pandemic is unfolding has abruptly undermined even the least optimistic prospects. As a regular online observer of bottom-up organisations, campaigns, and collective actions, as well as a follower of the debates that stir and flood the political sphere in Spain, I was surprised by some of the innovative ways of continuing to protest during these difficult times of home confinement, starting March 15, 2020, when the government declared a state of emergency. Obviously, online protests are not new at all but, in this short period of time, activists explored appealing forms of articulating discourse and campaigns. Grassroots mobilisations for social justice have included practices and challenges to the authorities previously unforeseen. In particular, the following selection of experiences resembles the context of the 2008 global financial crisis, although some dimensions have changed too. Hence, this preliminary analysis aims at understanding what seems like the first stage of an emerging cycle of mutating mobilisations.


2018 ◽  
pp. 60-64
Author(s):  
Volodymyr Gula

The subject of this article is the views of the General Jewish Labour Bund in Lithuania, Poland and Russia (Bund) on the use of terrorist methods in the political struggle. An analysis of the evolution of party’s views on this issue is carried out on the basis of personal testimonies from members of the Bund, as well as documents of the Police Department. Chronologically, the article covers the period from the creation of the Bund to the end of the revolution of 1905. During this period, the revival of terrorism in the Russian political arena was taking place: the escalation of socio-economic and ethnic conflicts under the conditions of an autocratic monarchy had an inevitable consequence the surge of violence. The Bund, on the one hand, the Social-Democratic Party, and on the other — the leading political force 64 ISSN 2524-0757 Київські історичні студії: науковий журнал • № 2 (7), 2018 р. of nationality discriminated against in the empire, faced on difficult choice. Official party resolutions condemned terrorism, since this method left the masses passive. The struggle against the existing regime in this case was conducted only by individual heroes. At the same time, attempts by the government to maintain the authority of the autocratic monarchy among the society were completed by the search for enemies, convenient to see in the Jews, especially given their low integration into the imperial society. Therefore, a situation need self-defense: at the initiative of the Bund the paramilitary formations are founded. In 1905 this formations played a role in ending of the pogrom wave, that rocked by the cities and towns of the West and South-West provinces of the Russian Empire.


2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 46-58
Author(s):  
Jonathan Olsen

In the 2009 federal election, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) achieved the worst electoral result in its history. Immediately afterwards, the party worked to improve its public image and fine-tune its policies and electoral message, hoping that state elections in the ensuring period might provide some momentum going into the next national election. Yet, in 2013, the Social Democrats improved their result only modestly, with Angela Merkel and the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) again gaining a decisive victory. This article explores the reasons behind the SPD's failure to radically improve its electoral showing, arguing that this can best be explained by a combination of the impact of the past—namely, the legacy of its economic reforms during the Schröder era and the SPD's disadvantages coming out of the previous Grand Coalition—as well as the weakness of its 2013 chancellor candidate, Peer Steinbrück, and the popularity of Angela Merkel. The article therefore suggests that the immediate future does not look particularly bright for the SPD: any chances of gaining the chancellorship are largely out of its hand, dependent on both stumbles by its rival, the CDU/CSU, as well as the taming of a possible coalition partner, the Left Party.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 24-50
Author(s):  
Marjorie Lamberti

This article examines the complex interplay between the American military governor and German political leaders through an analysis of two crises that occurred over the making of the Basic Law. Why did a trial of strength between General Lucius Clay and the Social Democratic Party leadership in March and April 1949 come about? Understanding Clay's intervention in the politics of constitution-making in occupied Germany requires a more probing investigation than references to the temperament of a “proconsul” or a bias against a left-wing party. The analysis of Clay's intervention in this account shows how the Social Democrats evaded and challenged directives from the occupation authorities, and illuminates the limits of his influence over German framers of the Basic Law.


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