scholarly journals Kräfteverhältnisse in der Eurokrise

Author(s):  
Fabian Georgi ◽  
John Kannankulam

John Kannankulam and Fabian Georgi show, that the dominant authoritarian neoliberal fraction of the german Federal Government made a change of course in summer 2012. It quits with some ordoliberal principles and stops resistance against the mutualization of debt and expansive monetary policy. The alliance of a national-conservative and an ordoliberal fraction broke up. The contradiction within the (neo-)liberals and conservatives result in a foundation of a new right-wing party, the AfD, Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany). Anyway new conflicts arise and the Great Coalition of Merkel’s CDU and the Social Democrats hold on its hard-line (against greece): austerity. John Kannankulam and Fabian Georgi reconstruct the dynamics on the basis of four phases in which the authoritarian-neoliberal fraction prevail.

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-58
Author(s):  
Wolf Linder ◽  
Sean Mueller

AbstractThis chapter explains how, despite the absence of single ethnic culture, Swiss state- and nation-building was possible. Neither the Swiss nation, nor the Swiss society existed when modern Switzerland was founded in 1848, after a brief civil war. The chapter provides a reading of Swiss history since then as one of gradually achieving the participation of the most important minority groups and the different social classes through proportional representation. Beginning with the losers of the civil war, the Catholic-Conservatives, followed by Protestant farmers and the petite bourgeoise, and ending with the Social-Democrats, the Swiss thus invented the ‘magic formula’ in 1959 for proportionally sharing the seven seats in the federal government. Even the rise of right-wing populism since the 1990s has not changed this basic feature.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 947-968 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua C Gordon

AbstractOver the past 25 years, Sweden has gone from having one of the most generous unemployment benefit systems among the rich democracies to one of the least. This article advances a multi-causal explanation for this unexpected outcome. It shows how the benefit system became a target of successive right-wing governments due to its role in fostering social democratic hegemony. Employer groups, radicalized by the turbulent 1970s more profoundly than elsewhere, sought to undermine the system, and their abandonment of corporatism in the early 1990s limited unions’ capacity to restrain right-wing governments in retrenchment initiatives. Two further developments help to explain the surprising political resilience of the cuts: the emergence of a private (supplementary) insurance regime and a realignment of working-class voters from the Social Democrats to parties of the right, especially the nativist Sweden Democrats, in the context of a liberal refugee/asylum policy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882091495 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Constantin Wurthmann ◽  
Stefan Marschall ◽  
Vasiliki Triga ◽  
Vasilis Manavopoulos

The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD’s extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party’s capacity to attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one’s vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. “conservative” self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.


Subject Canadian provincial and federal politicial dynamics. Significance As Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s term gets underway, Quebec is beginning its election campaign, running to October 1; the centre-right Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ) will likely perform well. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau faces a fractious final year, as relations worsen between the Liberal federal government and various new right-wing provincial governments. Leading issues are migration, carbon taxes, cross-border trade and right-wing provincial governments’ socially conservative and fiscally austere agendas. Impacts Failed NAFTA renegotiations would hurt Trudeau’s administration before 2019 and necessitate further post-2019 negotiations. Right-wing provincial premiers will still cooperate with Trudeau to mitigate the effect of US trade tariffs on Canada. Currently, Trudeau and the Liberals are likely to win in 2019, but opposition parties will gain votes.


2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (157) ◽  
pp. 577-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Kaindl

The success of right wing parties in Europe is closely linked to the lack of representation that went along with the neoliberal shift of the social democrats. Feelings of injustice going along with altering the trans-national mode of production, concepts of the welfare state and labour politics were taken into account by rightwing “critics” that fight globalization in fighting immigrants. The crisis and bail-out-politics enforced feelings of injustice but at the same time brought the state – and the unions – ‘back in’ e.g. in creating a ‘clash-for-clunkers’ project. That seems to have weakened right-wing parties in Germany and France presenting themselves as an authoritarian fordistic option, but at the same time strengthened racist campaigns in other countries.


2022 ◽  
pp. 194016122110726
Author(s):  
Marcus Maurer ◽  
Pablo Jost ◽  
Marlene Schaaf ◽  
Michael Sülflow ◽  
Simon Kruschinski

The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies is often attributed to populists’ ability to instrumentalize news media by making deliberate provocations (e.g., verbal attacks on migrants or politicians from other parties) that generate media coverage and public awareness. To explain the success of populists’ deliberate provocations, we drew from research on populism and scandal theory to develop a theoretical framework that we tested in three studies examining the rise of German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) between January 2015 and December 2018. In Study 1, an input–output analysis of 17 deliberate provocations by AfD politicians in German news media revealed much more coverage about their attacks on migrants than about their attacks on political elites, although all were covered in predominantly scandalizing ways. Next, Study 2, involving media database research and an analysis of Google Trends data, showed that the provocations had increased overall media coverage about the AfD and influenced public awareness of the party


Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Lees

This article charts the rise of the ‘Alternative for Germany’ ( Alternative für Deutschland or AfD) from its inception in late 2012 to its unexpectedly strong performance in the 2017 Federal election. In terms of the ‘inward’ aspect of Euroscepticism, the article considers the impact of the emergence of successively more hardline leaderships in 2015 and 2017, which led to a shift beyond opposition to aspects of the European integration process to a more profound critique of German society and politics. In terms of the ‘outward’ aspect, it assesses the significance of these developments in the wider debates around Euroscepticism and populism. The article concludes that the AfD’s Euroscepticism is now nested within an ideological profile that increasingly conforms to the template of an orthodox European right-wing populist party. It argues that the widely unanticipated level of electoral support for the AfD in the 2017 Federal elections and its status as the main opposition party in the Bundestag is a systemic shock and potential critical juncture in the development of the German party system and the contestation of European integration in the Federal Republic.


1969 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen L. Evans

In descriptions of the political structure of the Weimar Republic, the German Center Party is usually grouped as a party of the “middle,” together with the German Democratic Party and German People's Party, between the left-wing Social Democrats and the right-wing German Nationalists. In the years after 1928, the Center showed an increasing disinclination to work in coalition with the Social Democratic Party and finally, under the leadership of Dr. Ludwig Kaas, the last chairman of the Center Party, broke completely with the Socialists. During the same years Heinrich Brüning, Chancellor of Germany from 1930 to 1932, made persistent, though futile, attempts to find an acceptable coalition partner for the Center on the Right, hoping, among other possibilities, to encourage a secession movement from the Nationalist Party in 1930. Because of the rapid dwindling of electoral support for the other parties of the middle, very little attention has been paid to the Center's relationship with them. It is the purpose of this article to show that the mutual antipathies between these parties and the Center were as great or greater than its antipathy toward Social Democracy on certain matters which were vital to the Center's existence. By 1928, in fact, coalition with the parties of the middle had become as unsatisfactory to the leaders of the Center as coalition with the party of the Left. The turning-point in this development was the breakup of the Marx-Keudell right-wing cabinet of 1927. The failure of that government to attain the party's goals in the realm of Kulturpolitik, i.e., religion and education, confirmed the Center's disillusionment with the workings of the parliamentary system itself.


1994 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
William Carl Mathews

On 29 December 1918 Gustav Noske was appointed as a People's Commissar and charged with command of the armed forces in Germany. Within days Noske was confronted with an armed in surrection in Berlin, the so-called Spartacist Uprising, and subsequent revolutionary outbreaks in Bremen, Braunschweig, and the Ruhr, where sympathy for the events in Berlin existed. Relying on volunteer units, the Free Corps (drawn from war veterans, students, and the middle classes), Noske developed a powerful army on which he could rely to suppress the revolutionary violence from the Left. Using military force and martial law, he reestablished order throughout Germany in 1919 and 1920. The results of the so-called Noskepolitik were at best mixed. Mass movements based on the councils (Räte), often identified as “bolshevism’ by Noske and his contemporaries, were indeed suppressed, but the price was very high: counterrevolution and right-wing terror developed to the point that massive protests were provoked among wide segments of the working class. Bloodshed ensued, including the political murders of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht by members of the Free Corps. Many workers became alienated from the newly formed Weimar Republic, while the Reichswehr drifted into hostility toward the young democracy, and some units joined in the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch in March 1920. Noske, already under serious criticism from his own party, the Social Democrats, was forced to resign because of his inability to control the army and guarantee its loyalty to the Republic.


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