scholarly journals Taiwanese Factor In Modern American-Chinese Relations

Author(s):  
S. Makhammaduly ◽  

The article analyzes the historical foundations, current state, and prospects of the development of dialogue between the shores of the Taiwan Strait. The research of US analytical centers on the prospects of the development of US-Chinese relations and the «Taiwan Question» is examined. Over the decades of virtually separate development, with the serious influence of the United States, radical changes have taken place in the political culture of the citizens of the Republic of China. The so-called “Taiwanese mentality” is being formed on the island, and the idea of Taiwan’s sovereignty is becoming more and more popular.

Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Between 1949 and 1979, the study of the relations across the Taiwan Strait concentrated on the contentious and sometimes violent coexistence of the two regimes that came out of the Chinese civil war: the victorious People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the largely defeated Republic of China (ROC), which had taken refuge on the island of Taiwan. After Deng Xiaoping in 1979 launched his “peaceful reunification policy,” interest moved to the burgeoning interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. But it was only after Chiang Ching-kuo, the ROC president, decided in 1987 to allow Taiwanese residents to travel to and trade with the mainland through a third port that publications on cross-Strait relations started to mushroom. Since then, an increasing number of scholarly books and articles have been devoted to this theme. Interest in cross-Strait relations has also been stimulated by the quasi-concomitant democratization of Taiwan. As informal talks between Beijing and Taipei took off in 1992, a large number of publications started to concentrate on the political interactions across the Strait. The unprecedented expansion of trade and economic relations has naturally occupied a large space in terms of both research and publications, often exploring the political and strategic implications of this new interdependence, and in what more and more authors have described as “economic integration” between Taiwan and mainland China. Triggered by the increasing tension between China’s and Taiwan’s conflicting objectives, the 1995–1996 missile crisis directly contributed to multiplying books and articles not only on both entities’ armed forces and readiness to go to or sustain war, but also on the role of the United States in a strategic relationship that is as triangular as bilateral, if not more so. Beyond these lasting issues, research has also focused on the growing daily interactions between the mainland Chinese and the Taiwanese societies, in terms of education, culture, religious organizations, migrations, and marriages, although to date less has been published on these topics. Since 2010 or so, more research work has been devoted to the Chinese Communist Party’s united front work on Taiwan as an alternative strategy aimed at eventually reunifying the island to the mainland. Yet, the future of cross-Strait relations has remained an attractive subject, analyzed in connection with the perceived weakening strategic role of the United States in East Asia vis-à-vis a rapidly modernizing Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the long term, and with the possible influence of Taiwan’s democratic experience on the mainland. Although it is not always easy to draw a line between studies on cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s often contentious domestic politics, excluded from this article are books and articles dealing mainly with the latter. With PRC sources in this area, scholars have faced another difficulty in the large amount of propaganda or biased publications; also included is a representative selection of both, attempting as much as possible to signal the limits of their usefulness. Finally, this bibliography prioritizes scholarly books and articles published in English or Chinese, complementing these with a few well-known titles in French and German.


1975 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 615-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-mao Tien

President Chiang Kai-shek's death on 16 April and President Gerald Ford's announcement that he would visit Peking in the autumn of 1975 once again direct attention to the political future of the Republic of China and the 16 million inhabitants of Taiwan. Progress towards diplomatic normalization between the United States and the People's Republic of China has been slower than many would have expected following President Nixon's visit to the mainland in February 1972. For the island's inhabitants any dramatic change in their political status may spell a permanent alteration in their life style, which has become substantially different from that of the mainland. Precisely because of this, one needs to look closely at their political aspirations and the socio-political changes that have occurred. Any political solution for Taiwan's future should be analysed with respect to its impact on these vital human interests.


2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-83
Author(s):  
Iain D. Henry

Leaders believe that if their state abandons one ally during a crisis, then their state's other allies will expect similar disloyalty in the future. Thus, a single instance of disloyalty can damage, or even destroy, alliances with other states. Because of this belief in interdependence—that developments in one alliance will also affect other alliances—the desire to demonstrate loyalty has exercised a tremendous influence on U.S. policy. But is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case study suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, several allies worried that U.S. loyalty to the Republic of China increased the risk of unwanted conflict, and as the crisis persisted, these allies sought to restrain the United States and thus reduce the likelihood of war. Although U.S. leaders were reluctant to coerce the Republic of China into backing down during this territorial dispute with the People's Republic of China, other U.S. allies actively encouraged such disloyalty. These findings have significance for theories of alliance politics and international reputation, as well as contemporary alliance management.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Steven Hugh Lee

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.


Author(s):  
Stephen Lovell

The introduction considers the place of the spoken word in Russian history, presenting a pre-history of rhetoric and oratory in Russia before the 1860s. Examples are drawn from sermons, literature, theatre, and the universities, as well as from the political practice of Russia’s rulers. The introduction goes on to explain the significance of public speaking in Russia’s ‘stenographic age’, highlighting the challenges of modern mass politics and communications. It further offers comparisons between Russian political culture and the political culture of Britain, Germany, and the United States, paying particular attention to the place of oratory in the political imagination. It concludes by outlining the structure and rationale of the book.


Author(s):  
Alison Groppe

Li Yongping is a Taiwan author who rose to literary fame for a collection of interrelated short stories called Retribution: The Jiling Chronicles (吉陵春秋, 1986), considered among the works exemplifying the best of Taiwan modernism. Now a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Li was born in Kuching, a city in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak, in northwest Borneo. Sarawak became a British crown colony in 1946, and then joined the independent Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Li left Kuching in 1967 to pursue university education in Taiwan, following a route that was and has remained popular with many Chinese Malaysians who, like Li himself, had received some Chinese-language education in Malaysia. Li graduated from National Taiwan University in 1971 and later received postgraduate degrees in the United States. Li relinquished his Malaysian citizenship in 1987. Over the course of his career, Li has published several long novels and collections of short stories and essays; he has also worked as an editor, translator, and professor.


2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN WARE

This article examines critically an explanation, first propounded by Austin Ranney, as to the causes of party reform in the United States. Ranney argued that there is an ambivalent attitude to parties in the United States; while there is evidence of popular support for parties, the political culture is also infused by anti-party values. Periodically this has facilitated the enactment of legislation, promoted by anti-party reformers, constraining parties. Focusing on the Australian Ballot, the article argues that its rapid adoption in the United States resulted from its seeming to solve problems facing party elites in the 1880s – problems that arose from the erosion of a face-to-face society. Despite opposition from anti-party reformers, parties in most states legislated for types of ballot that preserved party control of the electorate. Moreover, during the Progressive era the parties generally continued to preserve a type of ballot that favoured them. The ability of parties to defend their interests against anti-party reformers was possible when it was clear where those interests lay. With other reforms, including the direct primary, this was much less evident, and it was then far more difficult for the parties to defend themselves.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-295
Author(s):  
Keith Allan Clark II

In 1955, Jiang Tingfu, representing the Republic of China (roc), vetoed Mongolia’s entry into the United Nations. In the 26 years the roc represented China in the United Nations, it only cast this one veto. The roc’s veto was a contentious move because Taipei had recognized Mongolia as a sovereign state in 1946. A majority of the world body, including the United States, favored Mongolia’s admission as part of a deal to end the international organization’s deadlocked-admissions problem. The roc’s veto placed it not only in opposition to the United Nations but also its primary benefactor. This article describes the public and private discourse surrounding this event to analyze how roc representatives portrayed the veto and what they thought Mongolian admission to the United Nations represented. It also examines international reactions to Taipei’s claims and veto. It argues that in 1955 Mongolia became a synecdoche for all of China that Taipei claimed to represent, and therefore roc representatives could not acknowledge it as a sovereign state.


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