Effects of Hostile Tradition in Antitrust: Active Repentance versus Cooperation Agreements?

2014 ◽  
pp. 62-85
Author(s):  
N. Pavlova ◽  
A. Shastitko

The article focuses on the effects of leniency programs when the antitrust authority is capable of making errors in classifying agreements between competitors. The research confirms that the application of the program can impede the growth of social welfare by destroying and preventing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results can help explain the peculiar properties of the cases that have been investigated with the use of the leniency program in Russia.

Author(s):  
Umut Aydin

ABSTRACT In the last two decades, competition agencies around the world have increasingly directed their attention to enforcement against cartels. With the encouragement of the antitrust authorities of the United States, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, various countries have introduced leniency programs, and sanctions for individuals found guilty of colluding. Critics are concerned, however, that these measures are not backed by broad public support, which could jeopardize their enforcement. This paper explores public attitudes toward cartels in Chile, an emerging economy that introduced a leniency program in 2009 and criminal sanctions in 2016, by presenting the results of a public opinion survey conducted in this country in August–September 2019. The results of the survey show high awareness of cartels and the harm they cause, and high public disapproval of cartel conduct among the Chilean respondents. In particular, up to 70 percent of the respondents support prison sentences against individuals found guilty of colluding. Such strong public support for anti-cartel measures could be considered positive from the perspective of enforcement. The results also emphasize the importance of continued competition advocacy directed at the society to explain and gain public support for the anti-cartel agenda.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Dargaud ◽  
Armel Jacques

AbstractWhen multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.


Author(s):  
Suurnäkki Sari ◽  
Tomassi Paolo

This chapter focuses on leniency, which is an important investigative tool designed to serve the enforcement of cartel law, particularly the detection and investigation of cartel activity. In essence, leniency policy offers undertakings involved in a cartel—which self-report and hand over evidence—either total immunity from fines or a reduction of fines, which the European Commission would have otherwise imposed on them. It encourages cartel members to confess and provide first-hand, direct ‘insider’ evidence of conduct that is otherwise concealed. The leniency reward is thus essentially a cooperation incentive for undertakings that ensures detection and punishment of secret cartels. Moreover, leniency programs can help competition authorities to obtain evidence faster and at a lower direct cost, compared to other methods of investigation, and can lead to a more efficient resolution of cases. While the leniency program of the Commission is addressed to undertakings participating in a cartel, individuals can also help the Commission in the fight against cartels and other anti-competitive practices. In 2017, the Commission introduced a specially designed tool for ‘whistle-blowers’ willing to report cartel behaviour anonymously. The chapter then describes the Commission leniency and whistle-blower procedures.


Author(s):  
Hui Li ◽  
Meng Shang ◽  
Xiaohui Qin ◽  
Rou Li ◽  
Yong Tan

The main body of competition has changed from the competition between enterprises to the competition between supply chains. The cooperation of the chain-to-chain attracts large attention from entrepreneurs and scholars in an increasingly competitive environment. Thus, this paper studies a chain-to-chain system with price competition consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain under carbon cap-and-trade regulation. Considering vertical-horizontal cooperation, the six different models are established by introducing the structural cooperation and the contractual cooperation (adopting the wholesale price contract) of supply chains. Based on the Stackelbeg game and Nash game, the optimal solutions of six models are obtained. The results show that the decisions, profits, and social welfare of the supply chains are affected by the structural cooperation than the contractual cooperation. The asymmetric competition structure changes the bargaining power of the supply chains. The relationship of supply chains' pricing only is affected by the cooperation structures. The relationship of  the cap setting, profits, and social welfare are affected by the cooperation structures and the main decision parameters.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Anita Nindriani ◽  
' Pujiyono

<p>Abstract <br />Cartel is a dangerous criminal offense in the competition law. The impact of this cartel practice brings huge losses to consumers. The Business Competition Supervisory Commission in Indonesia has tried to eradicate cartels, but often constraints. The difficulty is finding direct / written evidence of a cartel. While most cartel agreements are not in writing, it could only be an agreement between the parties without making it in a written agreement. Program Leniency as one of the effective solutions in combating cartel activities, several countries have implemented this program in its law, but until now Indonesia has not regulated the leniency program. This article aims to determine the prospects of how to implement leniency programs in competition law in Indonesia. The research method used is empirical legal research (sociological/non-doctrinal) with the nature of descriptive research. The results of this study indicate that the leniency program can be applied in business competition law in Indonesia by adopting it in Law No. 5 of 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, in applying the leniency some things to consider include: Regulation of sanctions imposed, business actors or companies must understand that there is a high risk of cartel detection by competition authorities (fear of detections), as well as elements of clarity, transparency and predictability in implementing the leniency program.<br />Keywords: Competition Law; Cartel; Leniency Program.</p><p>Abstrak<br />Kartel merupakan kejahatan yang berbahaya dalam hukum persaingan usaha. Dampak dari praktik kartel ini membawa kerugian yang besar pada konsumen. Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha di Indonesia telah berusaha untuk memberantas kartel, tetapi seringkali tekendala. Kesulitannya adalah menemukan bukti langsung/tertulis adanya kartel. Sementara sebagian besar perjanjian kartel tidak secara tertulis, bisa jadi hanya kesepakatan di antara para pihak tanpa membuatnya dalam perjanjian tertulis. Leniency Program sebagai salah satu solusi efektif dalam memerangi kegiatan kartel, beberapa negara telah menerapkan program ini dalam hukumnya namun sampai saat ini Indonesia belum mengatur mengenai leniency program. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk membahas mengenai prospek bagaimana penerapan leniency program dalam hukum persaingan di Indonesia. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah penelitian hukum empiris (sosiologis / non doktrinal) dengan sifat penelitian deskriptif. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa leniency program dapat diterapkan dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia dengan mengadopsinya dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat, dalam menerapkan leniency beberapa hal yang perlu diperhatikan antara lain: Pengaturan sanksi yang dikenakan harus diperberat, Pelaku usaha ataupun perusahaan harus memahami bahwa terdapat resiko yang tinggi dari pendeteksian  kartel oleh otoritas persaingan jika mereka tidak mengajukan permohonan leniency (fear of detection),  serta Unsur kejelasan, transparansi, dan prediktabilitas dalam penerapan leniency program.<br />Kata Kunci: Hukum Persaingan Usaha; Kartel; Leniency Program.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
Ludwig von Auer ◽  
Tu Anh Pham

AbstractThis paper introduces an oligopoly model that includes three actors: a cartel (comprising two or more firms that operate like one merged company), a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The cartel is internally stable if none of its member firms finds it profitable to become a fringe firm. The antitrust authority can destabilize the cartel in the sense of making the cartel internally instable. To this end, the antitrust authority has three policy instruments at its disposal: its own effort, a fine for detected cartels, and a leniency program for cartel members that cooperate with the authority. Taking into account that the use of these instruments is not costless for society, a unique optimal antitrust policy is derived. The analysis reveals that both, the optimal force and mix of the antitrust authority’s policy depend on market characteristics such as the efficiency of the authority’s operations, the public respect for the rule of law, the ethical standards of the firms’ managers, the market volume, and the number of firms operating on the market.


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